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HENDERSON, DORIS J. Legal Aspects of the School Principalship. 
(1981) 
Directed by: Dr. Joseph E. Bryson. Pp. 260. 
The school principalship demands greater knowledge of 
legal issues concerning education than in the past. More and 
more courts are recognizing that students and teachers have 
constitutional rights which must be protected. Administrators 
are being challenged in court cases involving student rights, 
tort liability, and teacher rights. 
This study provides principals with information concerning 
major court rulings in the areas viewed as most litigious, in­
cluding student rights involved in freedom of expression, 
speech, or press, personal appearance, suspension and ex­
pulsion, corporal punishment, search and seizure, marriage 
and parenthood, and handicapped children; tort liability; and 
teacher rights involved in First Amendment rights, due process, 
and academic freedom. 
Among the conclusions of this study are the following: 
(1) First Amendment rights of students are upheld by 
the courts when student conduct does not "materially and sub­
stantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate dis­
cipline in the operation of the school," but conduct which 
"materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder 
or invasion of the rights of others" is not immunized by consti­
tutional guarantees of freedom of speech. 
(2) Circuit courts of appeal are divided in rulings as 
to personal appearance codes for students. 
(3) The United States Supreme Court has outlined minimal 
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procedures for meeting requirements of due process in sus­
pensions of ten days or less, providing that students must 
be given notice of charges, an explanation of evidence, and 
the opportunity to present the students' side of story. In ex­
pulsions and long-term suspensions, students must be given 
adequate notice, a fair hearing, and there must be substantial 
evidence to support suspension or expulsion. 
(4) The United States Supreme Court holds that the 
state has a "countervailing interest" in maintenance of order 
sufficient to sustain the right of teachers and school officials 
to "administer reasonable punishment for disciplinary purposes," 
without requirement for prior notice and a hearing. 
(5) Most courts have held that while the Fourth Amendment 
applies to school searches, the "in loco parentis" doctrine 
lowers standard applied to determine reasonableness of search 
to that of "reasonable suspicion." However, as searches become 
more intrusive, the standard rises. 
(6) Courts have established the principle that students 
cannot be prohibited from school attendance on a permanent 
basis solely because of marriage; school board rules prohibiting 
school attendance by unwed mothers or pregnant, unwed girls have 
been invalidated; and courts have found school board rules barring 
participation of married students in extracurricular activities 
unconstitutional. 
(7) Courts have extablished that among the rights belong­
ing to handicapped children are the rights to equality of edu­
cational opportunity and due process. 
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(8) Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 
and actions of the courts provide that school officials who 
deprive teachers and students of constitutional rights may 
be personally liable. Areas involved in tort litigation 
against principals include lack of supervision, improper or 
inadequate instruction, failure to exercise responsibilities 
properly, field trips, and accountability. Tests used in 
determining liability on the part of school administrators 
are the "reasonable and prudent" and "foreseeability" tests. 
(9) The courts have ruled that public employment is 
a benefit which cannot be conditioned upon denial of consti­
tutional rights. A plaintiff's claim under the First Amend­
ment is not defeated by the fact that an employee does not 
have tenure. The courts have made it clear that personnel 
decisions must be free from constitutional violations. Due 
process claims in public employment are governed by "property" 
and "liberty" interests. Teachers' constitutional rights to 
freedom of speech have been recognized by the courts, although 
such rights may be limited due to the unique nature of a 
school. 
Legal precedents and trends related to the above 
areas are identified, and principals are provided with recom­
mended guidelines. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the history of public education in America, 
judicial decisions have played an important role in shaping 
public schooling. However, during the past thirty years, 
court decisions have made major changes in the operation 
of the public schools, creating a necessity for principals to 
be aware of court rulings and legal implications of their 
actions. The importance of the role of the courts in educa­
tional policymaking cannot be over-emphasized. 
Federal courts, in particular, have become more involved 
in education. It is likely that the judicial branch of the 
federal government is the greatest shaping agent in American 
education today. Moreover, since the 1954 Brown I decision,^" 
the United States Supreme Court has shown considerable interest 
in protection of constitutional rights relating to education. 
Educators have come to recognize the wisdom of Alexis De 
Tocqueville, when he said, "Hardly any question arises in the 
United States that is not resolved sooner or later into a 
2 judicial question." 
"'"Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U. S. 483, 
98 L. Ed. 873, 74 S. Ct. 686 (1954). 
2 Walter F. Murphy and Herman Pritchett, Courts, Judges 
and Politics (New York: Random House, 1961), p. 33. 
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There are two separate court systems in the United 
States, federal and state, both of which are empowered to 
hear cases relating to education under certain conditions. 
The federal court system is made up of the Supreme Court, 
eleven circuit courts of appeal, and eighty-eight district 
courts. 
The United States Supreme Court, a product of the 
Constitution, with restrictions and requirements imposed by 
Congress, is principally an appellate court (although it does 
have original jurisdiction in cases involving the states, am­
bassadors, public ministers, and consuls as parties). A 
Supreme Court review is usually sought through filing a peti­
tion for writ of certiorari from a state supreme court or 
federal court of appeals decision. The Court has authority 
to review all cases from lower federal courts and cases in 
state courts which involve the meaning or effect of a constitu­
tional provision. 
Below the United States Supreme Court are the eleven 
circuit courts of appeal, which review district court decisions, 
except when the law provides for direct review of the Supreme 
Court. The circuit courts of appeal relieve the Supreme Court 
from the obligation to hear all appeals from district courts. 
The district courts, at least one of which is located 
in every state, function in line of authority just below the 
appellate courts. District courts serve as trial courts with 
general federal jurisdiction. 
3Ibid., p. 31. 
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CHART I 
FEDERAL COURT STRUCTURE 
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (88) 
Trial Courts 
General Federal Jurisdiction 
Decisions of Federal District Courts 
COURTS OF APPEAL (11) 
Cases from Lower Federal Courts; 
Cases from State Courts Concern­
ing Constitutional Provision 
or State Statute 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
E. Edmund Reutter compares the federal court system to 
the school system/ indicating that the district court per­
forms much like the teacher, with the court of appeals acting 
as principal, and dealing with what the district court (teacher) 
has done. Reutter views the United States Supreme Court as 
being on the level of the school superintendent, who approves 
or disapproves actions of the district court (teacher) and 
4 the circuit court of appeals (principal). 
Federal court jurisdiction for cases affecting education 
is recognized when cases question the validity of a state or 
federal statute under the United States Constitution or allege 
that an individual right, privilege, or immunity protected 
^E. Edmund Reutter, Workshop at NOLPE School Law Seminar, 
Williamsburg, Virginia (June 6, 1980). 
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under the Constitution has been violated. Many federal court 
cases have involved the First and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the Constitution. 
The First Amendment states: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; 
or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; 
or of the right of the people peaceably to assemble, ^ 
and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. 
This Amendment originally applied only to Congress. 
• In 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment made the provisions 
of the First Amendment applicable to the states. Section One 
of the Fourteenth Amendment follows: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens 
of the United States and of the state wherein they 
reside. No state shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any state 
deprive any person of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.® 
A number of school cases involving the First Amendment 
have arisen: those involving use of public funds for the benefit 
of nonpublic schools or students; those related to school regu­
lations which are objectionable on religious grounds; and those 
having to do with freedom of speech, press, and assembly. 
The "due process" and "equal protection" clauses of 
the Fourteenth Amendment have had wide interpretation in public 
school cases. The Fourteenth Amendment has been invoked in 
5 U. S. Const, amend. I. 
^U. S. Const, amend XIV. 
cases regarding flag salutes., parents' rights, racial segre­
gation, teacher dismissal, student dismissal, uses of school 
funds, rights of the handicapped, and rights of married and 
pregnant students. 
United States Supreme Court decisions establish precedent 
throughout the United States. Even the denial of review by the 
Supreme Court is important, because in denying review, the Court 
is in effect affirming the decision of the lower court. 
In addition to the federal court system, each state 
has a separate state system of courts. Like the federal court 
system, the state courts are organized with different ranks, 
usually composed of the State Supreme Court, intermediate 
courts, trial courts, and magistrates or justices of the peace. 
North Carolina's judicial system is described here as 
an example of a state judicial system. North Carolina has a 
Supreme Court, court of appeals, superior courts, and district 
courts. 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina consists of the 
chief justice and six associate justices, who hear oral argu­
ments on questions of law, including constitutional questions. 
The Supreme Court does not hear witnesses or have juries. 
North Carolina has a court of appeals, made up of 
nine judges, who sit in panels of three. The court of 
appeals handles cases which have been appealed from lower 
courts, dealing only with questions of law. 
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The superior court is the court with general trial juris­
diction in North Carolina. The court sits in each county of 
the state at least twice yearly. There are forty-seven regular 
superior court judges, each elected for an eight-year term, 
and eight special judges appointed by the governor for four-
year terms. 
The superior courts try all felony cases (those involv­
ing major crimes). Misdemeanor cases (for which punishment 
cannot exceed two years' imprisonment) can be appealed to 
these courts from conviction in a district court. Civil cases 
involving an amount of more than five thousand dollars are 
handled in superior court. 
North Carolina has district courts, with two to eight 
district judges in each of the thirty judicial districts. 
A chief district judge is appointed by the chief justice of 
the Supreme Court. The district court's jurisdiction is as 
follows: 
Civil Cases: The district court tries cases where 
the amount of controversy is five thousand dollars or 
less, and domestic relations cases. 
Criminal Cases: Preliminary hearings are held in 
district court for felony cases, to determine proba­
ble cause for binding defendants over to the grand 
jury. Misdemeanor cases are also dealt with here. 
Juvenile Cases: The district court tries defendants 
under sixteen years of age, although cases of children 
charged with felonies may be tried in superior court. 
Magisterial Matters: The chief district court judge 
supervises magistrates, who are appointed by the 
senior resident superior court judge upon recommendation 
of the clerk of superior court. The magistrate's 
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authority and discretion is limited to minor civil 
and criminal cases, and they may accept 'guilty* 
pleas for petty offenses.? 
The various state courts must interpret state constitu­
tional and statutory mandates and attempt to settle litigation. 
Appeal may be taken to a higher court if a person or agency is 
not satisfied with results obtained. 
CHART II - ORGANIZATION OF 
NORTH CAROLINA COURTS SYSTEM 
APPELLATE DIVISION 
SUPREME COURT 
COURT OF APPEALS 
I 
I 
SUPERIOR COURT 
Clerk 
DISTRICT COURT 
The purpose of this study is to review and analyze 
all major court cases which have implications for school 
principals. Cases will be reported in the areas of First 
Amendment rights of students (dealing mainly with wearing 
League of Women Voters of North Carolina, North Carolina; 
Our State Government (Durham: League of Women Voters of North 
Carolina, 1976), pp. 48-51. 
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of insignia and emblems and with student publications); 
personal appearance of students; due process and suspension 
or expulsion of students; corporal punishment; search and 
seizure; rights of married and pregnant students; rights of 
handicapped children; tort liability; and teacher rights. 
There is a need for an up-to-date analysis of the 
law in this area and for recommendations to aid the school 
principal in making decisions which comply with the law and 
current court rulings. The overall purpose of this study 
is to provide school principals with appropriate information 
regarding the legal aspects of school operation so that 
principals will be able to make decisions which are legally 
sound. 
Statement of the Problem 
There is a need for the establishment of guidelines to 
be used by the principal in making decisions which will be 
upheld by the courts. Judicial decisions in areas of conflict 
with which principals are confronted must be reviewed to deter­
mine trends and legal precedents which have been established. 
This study will attempt to do this. 
Questions to be Answered 
The purpose of this study, as already indicated, is the 
development of practical, legal guidelines for school principals 
to use in making decisions which may become litigious. Below 
are several questions which will be answered in order to develop 
legal guidelines or recommendations for principals. 
1. What are the areas most frequently involved in 
litigation concerning First Amendment rights 
of students, and what legal precedents have 
been established by the courts in these areas? 
2. Since the Supreme Court has not spoken on the 
issue of constitutionality of hair and dress 
codes, how have the various circuit courts of 
appeal ruled on codes governing personal 
appearance of students? 
3. What student rights are entitled to due 
process protection, and what procedures have 
been held by the courts to be required for 
suspension and expulsion? 
4. What do landmark cases of the Supreme Court 
hold concerning corporal punishment in the 
schools? 
5. How does the Fourth Amendment apply to search 
and seizure in the school setting? 
6. What principles have been established by the 
courts on prohibition of school attendance 
for married students and unwed mothers or 
pregnant students, and what principles have 
been established dealing with denial of the 
right to participate in extracurricular acti­
vities by married students? 
7. What rights have been upheld by the courts for 
handicapped children, and what protections for 
the handicapped have been provided by legislation 
8. What legal decisions have been made in tort 
liability actions having to do with lack of 
supervision, improper or inadequate instruction, 
failure to exercise responsibilities properly, 
field trips, and accountability, and what im­
plications do these decisions have for the 
school principal? 
9. What teacher rights are recognized by the courts 
in cases involving teacher dismissal for incom­
petency, immorality, insubordination, and neglect 
of duty; teacher tenure; First Amendment rights; 
due process; and academic freedom? 
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10. Based on the established precedents, what 
are acceptable guidelines for decisionmaking 
by principals in the above areas? 
Scope of the Study 
This is a study and analysis of court cases which have 
been instituted by students, parents, teachers, and other groups, 
challenging actions of school principals, teachers, school boards, 
and other educators. Research describes reasons for litigation, 
results of major court cases in the areas reported, and impli­
cations these cases have for principals and other school offi­
cials. 
The major thrust of the research is directed toward 
reporting and analyzing major cases dealing with (1) student 
rights in the areas of freedom of expression, speech, or 
press, personal appearance, suspension and expulsion, corporal 
punishment, search and seizure, marriage and parenthood, and 
handicapped children; (2) tort liability; and (3) teacher 
rights in the areas of tenure, First Amendment rights, due 
process, and academic freedom. Legal precedents and trends 
related to the above areas are identified, and an effort is 
made to establish guidelines for the school principal to use 
in dealing with similar situations. Major court cases which 
establish precedent or indicate a trend are reported. 
Methods, Procedures, and Sources of Information 
The basic research technique of this historical research 
study was to examine and analyze the available references con­
cerning the legal aspects of the school principalship. In 
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order to determine whether a need existed for such research, 
a search was made of Dissertation Abstracts for related topics. 
Journal articles related to the topic were located through 
use of such sources as Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature, 
Education Index, and the Index to Legal Periodicals. 
General research summaries were found in the Encyclopedia 
of Educational Research, a number of books on school law, and 
in a review of related literature obtained through a computer 
search from the Educational Resources Information Center (ERIC). 
Federal and state court cases related to the topic were 
located through use of the Corpus Juris Secundum, American 
Jurisprudence, the National Reporter System, and the American 
Digest System. Recent court cases were found by examining 
case summaries contained in the 1979 and 1980 issues of the 
NOLPE School Law Reporter. All of the cases were read and 
placed in categories according to the subject areas being re­
ported. 
Other information was received from attending a National 
Organization for Legal Problems in Education School Law Seminar, 
from Institute of Government materials, Phi Delta Kappa fastbacks, 
School Law Bulletins, Sports and the Courts quarterlies, and from 
Workshop Materials on the Impact of Current Legal Action on Edu­
cating Handicapped Children. 
Definition of Terms 
For purposes of this study, the following selected terms 
are defined: 
Suspension: Generally an act of a professional member 
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of the school staff resulting in the temporary withdrawal of 
a student from school, usually for a short period of time. 
Expulsion; An act of the school board, resulting in 
exclusion of a student from school permanently or for a 
long period of time, such as for the remainder of a term or 
for the remainder of the school year. 
Procedural Due Process: The requirement that when 
persons are to be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
they must be given notice of the proceedings against them, 
must be given the opportunity to defend themselves (a hearing)., 
and the problem of the propriety of the deprivation under the 
g 
circumstances presented must be resolved in a fair manner. 
Substantive Due Process; The constitutional guarantee 
that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property 
for arbitrary reasons, with such deprivation to be constitu­
tionally supportable only if conduct bringing about the 
deprivation is proscribed by reasonable legislation which has 
9 been reasonably applied and with laws operating equally. 
"In Loco Parentis;" Doctrine which holds that the re­
lationship of educator to pupil is "in place of the parent'' 
while the pupil is in school, and which was originally intended 
to be used in dealing with discipline of students. 
Tort; A wrongful act, which results in injury to another's 
g 
E. C. Bolmeier, Legality of Student Disciplinary Prac­
tices (Charlottesville: The Michie Company, 19761, p~. 38. 
^Ibid., p. 39. 
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person, property, or reputation, and for which the injured 
party is entitled to be compensated. 
Negligence; "The failure to act as a reasonable and 
prudent person would act in like circumstances. 
Significance of Study 
Principals are frequently confronted with situations 
requiring decisionmaking which may result in litigation. 
They formulate rules and regulations governing student disci­
pline and school personnel. When these rules and regulations 
are violated, school principals often resort to some form of pu­
nitive action. Frequently, rules and regulations and the way 
they are enforced cause parents, students, and teachers to 
challenge the propriety and legality of administrators' actions. 
Consequently, principals need a knowledge of basic educational 
law. This study is designed to aid school administrators in 
the understanding of the law as it relates to organization 
and governance of education. 
Principals should find this study helpful in clarifying 
the law on given day-to-day administrative topics. It is 
also written for the purpose of helping school administrators 
to keep up to date with developments in school law. The em­
phasis is on current legal issues and court decisions with 
identification of legal principles growing out of recent court 
decisions. Older cases are also treated where they have prece­
dential value. 
10Morris v. Ortiz, 437 P. 2d 652 (Ariz. 1968). 
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This study identifies guidelines of benefit to administra­
tors. Principals' knowledge of current legal decisions will pre­
vent litigation and lead to better administration. The signifi­
cance of this study is that it enumerates and analyzes court 
cases and legal principles which serve as guidelines to the 
adoption of practices likely to be upheld in court. 
Design of the Study 
The remainder of the study is divided into three major 
parts. Chapter II contains a review of related literature, 
describing the evolution of the school principalship and 
demands made upon the school principal in the area of school law. 
Chapter III includes a narrative discussion of the major 
legal principles which have been established concerning issues 
with which the principal is most likely to be involved. 
Chapters IV, V and VI contain a general listing and dis­
cussion of recently litigated court cases which have reference 
to student rights, tort liability, and teacher rights. 
The concluding chapter of the study contains a review 
and summary of the information obtained from the review of the 
literature and the analysis of selected court cases. Questions 
asked in the introductory part of the study are reviewed and 
answered in this chapter. Finally, recommendations are made 
as to guidelines for principals in each area covered. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
OVERVIEW 
The role of the school principal has evolved from that 
of head teacher to that of manager of a complex organization, 
whose duties and responsibilities have been and continue to 
be altered and shaped by litigation and legislation. 
Development of the School Principalship 
The principalship in America began when one-room schools 
were displaced by multi-room schools, requiring someone to be in 
charge. Often, one of the teachers was simply designated "Head 
2 Teacher," and given certain authority over other teachers. 
The chief duty of these head teachers was to teach, and administra­
tive functions consisted of administering cruel, frequent flog-
3 gings intended to serve as a stimulus to learning. One school 
principal in the Latin grammar school was described as a "great 
4 schoolmaster...." who "taught and flogged and wrote." 
^Richard A. King, "Litigation, Legislation, and the Prin­
cipal," Paper presented at annual meeting of American Educational 
Association, San Francisco, April 8-12, 1979, p. 1. 
^Harold Benjamin, American Education (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1960), p. 69. 
•^Forest C. Ensign, "Evolution of the High School Principal-
ship," The School Review 31 (March, 1923): 179. 
^Paul B. Jacobson, William C. Reavis, and James D. Logs-
don, The Effective School Principal (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), pT 492. 
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The headmaster in the academy had little opportunity 
to practice administrative or supervisory skills, since the 
staff usually consisted of the headmaster (principal) and one 
or two assistants.^ 
The free public high school began to take the place 
of the academy shortly before the Civil War. Some of these 
schools used the title, "principal," for the head. Early in 
the high school movement, new administrative duties and respon­
sibilities were required of principals. The principal or head 
teacher had to lighten his teaching load, usually retaining 
the more advanced subjects to be taught by himself. Scholarship, 
the traditional characteristic of the headmaster, along with 
organizing and leadership abilities, were demanded of the 
, 6 principal. 
As a result of the rapid growth of cities in the United 
States during the second half of the nineteenth century, school 
enrollments increased, making it necessary that more principals 
be named to perform such tasks as opening and closing school, 
scheduling classes, securing supplies and equipment, taking 
care of and managing the building, and communicating with parents 
7 and patrons. 
Early records in Cincinnati indicate that the duties 
5Ibid., pp. 492-493. 
g 
Ensign, "Evolution of the High School Principalship," 
p. 188. 
7 Ivan B. Gluckman, "Legal Aspects of the Principal's 
Employment," The School Principal and the Law, Ralph D. Stern, 
Ed. (Topeka: National Organization on Legal Problems of Edu­
cation, 1978), p. 1. 
of the "principal teacher" were: 
1. To function as the head of the school charged to 
his care; 
2. To regulate the classes and course of instruction 
of all the pupils, whether they occupied his room or 
rooms of other teachers; 
3. To discover any defects in school and apply 
remedies; 
4. To make defects known to the visitor or trus­
tee of ward or district, if he were unable to remedy 
conditions; 
5. To give necessary instruction to his assis­
tants; 
6. To classify pupils; 
7. To safeguard school houses and furniture; 
8. To keep the school clean; 
9. To instruct assistants; 
10. To refrain from impairing the standing of 
assistants, especially in the eyes of their pupils; 
g 
11. To require the cooperation of assistants. 
By the middle of the nineteenth century, a teaching male 
principal was the controlling head of schools in large cities; 
female and primary departments had women principals under the 
direction of the male principal; and the principal had duties 
which consisted mainly of discipline, routine administrative 
acts, and grading of pupils. In order to carry out their 
duties, principals were sometimes released from teaching for 
9 a portion of the day. 
8 Jacobson, Reavis, and Logsdon, The Effective School 
Principal, pp. 493-494. 
^Ibid., p. 494. 
18 
During the last half of the nineteenth century, 
principals took on new duties, including responsibility 
for organization and general management and control of stu­
dents, grounds, and buildings. The prestige of the prin-
cipalship was enhanced, with the principal acting as a 
mediary between the central office and teachers. Standards 
safeguarding the health and morals of students were enforced; 
janitors were rated and supervised; and educational and 
maintenance supplies and equipment were ordered by the prin­
cipal, who was clearly recognized as the administrative head 
of the school. 
During the early years of the twentieth century, princi­
pals began to experiment with ways of breaking the "lockstep" 
of the graded system. They were provided with clerical assis­
tants to relieve them of routine tasks so that they could give 
attention to professional duties. They were relieved of direct 
responsibility for the physical condition of the school plant, 
except for supervisory duties."^ 
Organization and supervision of extracurricular duties 
gained importance after 1920. The principal became responsible 
for improvement of instruction, as well as for management of 
the school. Standardized tests of ability and achievement came 
into use, and the principal was expected to use these in the 
12 . supervisory program. In 1923, Ensign described the principal 
"^Ibid. , p. 495. 
11Ibid., pp. 496-497. 
19 
as a "builder of curriculums," rather than the administrator 
13 of those already made. 
H. D. Fillers wrote in 1923 that the greater part of the 
principal's time was taken up with clerical matters and duties 
related to general school control, while supervision received 
only a small portion of the total day. Managerial duties of 
the principal were classified as curricular and extracurricu-
lar.14 
Today, the successful principal, in addition to being an 
educational leader, must possess many of the same skills re­
quired for successful management in private industry. Personnel 
problems must be dealt with; considerable sums of money must 
be expended; safety of students and staff must be insured; 
parents must be dealt with; constitutional rights of students 
must be protected; order and discipline must be maintained; 
15 and most important, students must receive an education. 
In recent years, the role of the principal has become 
more distinct. State legislatures have taken action to differen­
tiate the principal from teachers. A study of the National 
Association of Secondary School Principals, in November, 1976, 
indicated that twenty<-four states and the District of Columbia 
have school codes providing the essentials of legal identity for 
13 Ensign, "Evolution of the High School Principalship," 
p. 179. 
14h. D. Fillers, "The Managerial Duties of the Principal," 
School Review XXXI, No. 1 (January, 1923): 48. 
l^Ralph D. Stern, The School Principal and the Law 
(Topeka: National Organization on Legal Problems of Education, 
1978), Foreword. 
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the principalship, while only nine states have codes that cover 
the principal under the general term, "teacher," with little 
or no reference to the principalship as a separate entity. 
Other states mention the principal with regard to specific 
duties and responsibilities, although they fall short of 
16 clearly providing a separate legal identity for the principal. 
During the past decade, principals have been involved 
in learning to recognize and respond to the various rights 
movements (students' rights, civil rights, and women's rights) 
17 which have affected the schools. Federal laws and court 
decisions have opened an entire new realm of knowledge needed 
by principals as federal influence and federal funds have 
18 entered the schools. 
The principal can no longer survive with a knowledge of 
the state school code on attendance requirements, mandated areas 
of study, teacher certification, and the required school calen-
19 dar. Familiarity with civil law is also required. 
The school principalship has come to demand far more than 
in the past, especially in the area of school law. Findings 
16 National Association of Secondary Silool Principals, "Con­
cerning Statutory Protection for Principals, Part 1, Position 
and Status" (Reston, Virginia: NASSP, November, 1976), p. 1. 
17 Eugene T. Connors, "An Administrator's Legal Guide to 
Student Control," (Harrisonburg: James Madison University, 1978), 
p. 1. 
18 Gilbert R. Weldy, Principals: What They Do and Who They 
Are (Reston, Virginia: NASSP, 1979), p. 27. 
"^Ibid. , p. 38. 
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of a Texas study by Mary Eren Johnson indicate that principals 
perceive a need for greater knowledge of school law and mas-
20 tery of skills necessary for compliance with school law. 
During the 1970's, public education was greatly affected 
by judicial decisions and legislative mandates. With state 
legislatures and school boards no longer able to establish in­
dividual systems of public schools free from extensive federal 
involvement, administrators have had to respond to increased 
21 judicial and legislative interest in educational policymaking. 
Judicial Review and the School Principal 
Until recent decades, school principals were seldom in­
volved in court suits as litigants or defendants. If principals 
appeared in court, it was to serve as witnesses or complainants 
against defendants involved in theft, disorderly conduct, or 
similar charges. But times have changed. More and more, 
22 principals are challenged m court cases involving freedom 
of expression and First Amendment rights, the constitutionality 
of dress and hair style codes, due process and suspension 
or expulsion, corporal punishment, constitutionality of 
search and seizure, rights of married or pregnant students, 
2 0  Mary Eren Johnson, "A Study of Principals' Perceptions 
of Competencies in School Law Necessary in Texas" (Houston: 
University of Houston, 1976), p. 4746. 
21 King, "Litigation, Legislation, and the Principal," 
p. 3. 
22 Louis Panush, "The Principal in Court," NASSP Bulle­
tin (January, 1978): 115. 
23 Connors, "An Administrator's Legal Guide to Student 
Control," p. 1. 
22 
rights of handicapped children,^ tort liability,^ and teachers' 
• v.,. 26 rights. 
In the last fifteen years, the United States Constitution 
has been applied in many areas where principals at one time exer­
cised their own discretion and judgment. Principals now must 
be certain that students' First Amendment rights are protected. 
Gilbert R. Weldy states that principals can no longer exercise 
absolute control of student expression, petitioning, and publi­
cations; that school dress is no longer the responsibility of 
the school to regulate, nor is the length or style of students' 
27 hair. 
Prior to 1970, educators had almost complete control over 
discipline for students who were outspoken or who expressed 
2 o 
unpopular beliefs. The system of governance which the public 
schools inherited from the Puritan colonial structure had founded 
the beliefs that the authority of school administrators was 
virtually unlimited; that they were responsible for seeing that 
those below them behaved correctly in every respect; that those 
24 Martha M. McCarthy and Stephen B. Thomas, "The Right 
to an Education: New Trends Emerging from Special Education 
Litigation," NOLPE School Law Journal 7, No. 1 (1977): 76. 
25 Warren F. Thomas, "Tort Liability of Teachers and 
Principals," NASSP Bulletin (February 1978): 49. 
2 6 Karen S. Boote, "The Public School Teacher's Right to 
Criticize the School Administration," NOLPE School Law Journal 
5, No. 2 (1975): 129. 
27 Weldy, Principals: What They Do and Who They Are, p. 38. 
2 8 Connors, "An Administrator's Legal Guide to Student 
Control," p. 35. 
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at the bottom (students) had few rights; and that the school 
system must provide for intimidation, coercion, and as a last 
29 resort, removal of those at the bottom. 
During the 1970's, the Madisonian perspective of gover­
nance, stressing the rights of the individual, began to gain 
power through judicial rulings. It was recognized that everyone 
has important rights, including the rights to freedom of speech 
and press. The Supreme Court supported Madisonian principles 
by stating, "The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the 
states, protects the citizens against the state itself and all 
30 of its creatures— boards of education not excepted." 
Federal courts became concerned with the issue of regu­
lating student speech and expression. They held, in almost 
all cases, that educators cannot enforce regulations that in-
31 fringe upon the First Amendment rights of students, as stated 
below: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; 
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; 
of the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and ^ 
to petition the government for a redress of grievances. 
The Fourteenth Amendment made this applicable to the 
states, and therefore, public school systems must abide by 
29 David G. Carter, Sr.-, J. John Harris, III, and Frank 
Brown, "Student and Parent Rights: What Are Their Constitutional 
Guarantees?," NOLPE School Law Journal 6, No. 1 (1976): 46-47. 
30 
Ibid., p. 47. 
31 Connors, "An Administrator's Legal Guide to Student 
Control," p. 35. 
32 U. S. Const, amend. I. 
the stipulations of the First Amendment. 
In 1969, the Supreme Court's decision in the Tinker 
33 case, had a tremendous impact upon principals and their 
views of First Amendment rights of students. The Court held 
that First Amendment rights are available to teachers and 
students, neither of whom "shed their constitutional rights 
34 to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." 
The Court further stated: 
In order for the State in the person of school offi­
cials to justify prohibition of a particular expression 
of opinion, it must be able to show that its action 
was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid 
the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany 
an unpopular viewpoint. Certainly where there is no 
finding and no showing that the exercise of the for­
bidden right would 'materially and substantially inter­
fere with the requirements of appropriate discipline 
in the operation of the school,' the prohibition cannot 
be sustained...35 
Since 1968, the role of the school principalship has 
been further shaped by a procession of cases involving questions 
concerning the power of school administrators to control stu­
dent publications. The courts have clearly held that any 
restraint must be tested against the First Amendment's protection 
3 6 of freedom of speech and press. Decisions have been 
generally favorable to students, although unfavorable decisions 
33 . Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dis-
trist, 393 U. S. 503, 89 S. Ct. 733 (1969). 
34Ibid., p. 736. 
35Ibid., p. 737. 
3 6 E. Edmund Reutter, Jr., The Courts and Student Conduct 
(Topeka: National Organization on Legal Problems of Education, 
1975), p. 18. 
have sometimes been made when publications advocated breaking 
of school rules, showed a high degree of disrespect and 
contempt, were vulgar and profane, or disrupted the educa-
37 38 tional process. The Fifth Circuit court in Shanley 
made it clear to school authorities that the burden of proof 
for justifying a regulation falls upon the school board. 
Legal issues related to dress and appearance of stu­
dents have given rise to numerous court challenges by parents 
and students of school officials' rights to regulate dress 
39 and appearance. During the 1970's, hair and dress codes 
40 were a major area of conflict in the courts. While the 
Supreme Court has not ruled specifically on this issue, cases 
have been decided at the United States Circuit Court of Appeals 
level, with wide geographical differences in the interpretation 
41 of the law. The principal must be aware of the circuit m 
which his or her school is located and rulings in that circuit. 
Circuits, states included in them, and recent rulings reported 
37 Carter, Harris, and Brown, "Student and Parent Rights: 
What Are Their Constitutional Guarantees?," p. 57. 
3 8 Shanley v. Northeast Independent School District, 
Bexar County, Texas, 462 F. 2d 960 (1972). 
39 E. Edmund Reutter, Jr., "Student Discipline," The 
School Principal and the Law, Ralph D. Stern, Ed. (Topeka: 
National Organization on Legal Problems of Education, 1978): 
p. 89. 
40 David E. Shelton, "A Study of the Opinions of the 
Federal and State Courts on the Length of Male Students' 
Hair in the Public Schools" (Ed. D. dissertation, University 
of North Carolina, Greensboro, 1979), p. 1. 
41 Eugene T. Connors, Student Discipline and the Law 
(Bloomington, Indiana: Phi Delta Kappa Educational Foundation, 
1979), p. 43. 
42 by Eugene T. Connors as to hair and dress codes which have 
influenced the role of the principal are shown in Chapter IV. 
In considering the changing role of the principal in 
regard to the law, L. Brooks Patterson, prosecuting attorney 
for Oakland County, Pontiac, Michigan, indicates that the 
43 
Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education 
can be pinpointed as the time when the balance between the 
administrators' traditional rights and responsibilities and 
those of students in general began to shift. Patterson states 
that prior to 1954, education was viewed as a privilege and 
4 4 that the decision m Brown ruled that education is a right, 
which must be extended to all equally. 
Brown v. Board of Education states: 
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may 
reasonably be expected to succeed in life who is 
denied the opportunity of an education. Such an 
opportunity, where the state has undertaken to 
provide it, is a right which must be made available 
to all on equal terms.4 5 
If school attendance today were not viewed as a right, 
"hair length could be dictated, arm bands forbidden, school 
newspapers censored, demonstrations controlled, and the 
authority of a principal to run his school with an iron 
^Ibid. , p. 43. 
4 3 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 98 L. Ed. 
873 (1954). 
44 L. Brooks Patterson, "The Principal, the Student, and 
the Law: A Prosecuting Attorney's View," Paper presented at 
the National Association of Secondary School Principals, 
Washington, D. C., February 13-18, 1976, p. 6. 
45 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 98 L. Ed. 
873 (1954). 
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46 hand virtually unchallenged." 
Evolving from the Brown decision came the idea of rights 
in litigation which affected the school principalship. Edu­
cation became a valid, enforceable property right, protected 
4 under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. 
The Fifth Amendment states: "....nor shall any person 
be.... deprived of life, liberty, or property without due 
4 8 process of law " 
The Fourteenth Amendment sets out the requirements of 
due process again: 
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privilege or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any state deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law;....49 
The Tinker case stated that 
Students in school, as well as out of school, are per­
sons under our Constitution....possessed of fundamen­
tal rights which the state must respect.... 50 
The United States Supreme Court helped to establish 
guidelines for principals in meeting due process requirements 
51 m short-term suspensions from school m Goss v. Lopez. 
46 Patterson, "The Principal, the Student, and the Law: 
A Prosecuting Attorney's View," p. 7. 
47ibid. 
48u. S. Const, amend. V. 
4 9u. S. Const, amend. XIV. 
^Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District, 393 U. S. 503, 89 S. Ct. 733 (1969). 
^Goss V. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975). 
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The Court ruled that students must be given some type of minimal 
52 due process hearing. C. A. Hollister states, "The courts 
have come a long way from an 1890 ruling that allowed a school 
53 board to expel a student for 'general bad conduct.1" 
While no single court has provided guidelines for ad­
ministering long-term suspensions, the principal can glean 
basic requirements from various courts' decisions concerning 
v, • 54 such suspensions. 
It has come to be generally accepted that the principal 
does not have authority to expel students. Courts seem to 
55 hold this action to be a school board prerogative. 
As a result of the rights of students guaranteed by the 
Constitution and rulings in Brown and Tinker, due process 
has become an issue in litigation. School principals are 
often held to be government officials, to whom the due 
process restriction applies in the performance of their 
duties. No longer can the principal deprive a student of 
liberty or property rights without due process of law.^ 
Due process rights must be protected by fair play. Courts 
52connors, "An Administrator's Legal Guide to Student 
Control," p. 19. 
5̂ C. A. Hollister, "Why the Courts Will Allow School 
Officials to Treat Students Unfairly - Up to a Point," 
American School Board Journal 160 (July 1973): 38. 
54 Connors, "An Administrator's Legal Guide to Student 
Control," p. 19. 
55Ibid., p. 20. 
^Patterson, "The Principal, the Student, and the Law: 
A Prosecuting Attorney's View," p. 10. 
require that students be accorded minimum standards of fair­
ness and due process of law in disciplinary actions which may 
result in suspension or expulsion. 7̂ 
The Supreme Court upheld the right of educators to 
5 8 
administer corporal punishment in Ingraham v. Wright, 
stating that corporal punishment does not violate the Eighth 
Amendment and does not require a formal due process hearing. 
An informal investigation of facts was encouraged, however. 
While no formal due process hearing was required in 
Ingraham v. Wright, minimal due process requirements were 
5° 
outlined in Baker v. Owen, " when the Supreme Court affirmed 
a federal district court decision in North Carolina which 
upheld the right of educators to administer corporal punish­
ment over parental objections. 
State laws and regulations have also influenced the 
principal's right to administer corporal punishment. Massa­
chusetts and New Jersey prohibit corporal punishment by 
state statute, and Maryland's state school board prohibits 
use of corporal punishment. Some local school boards have 
also restricted or banned its use.^ 
57 Robert E. Phay, The Law of Procedure in Student Sus­
pensions and Expulsions (Topeka: National Organization on 
Legal Problems of Education, 1977), p. 1. 
58 
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 51 L. Ed. 2d 711, 
97 S. Ct. 1401 (1977). 
59 Baker v. Owen, 395 F.Supp. 294 (1975), aff'd. 423 
U. S. 907 (1976) . 
^Connors, Student Discipline and the Law, p. 11. 
Until recent years, principals' right to search stu­
dents or their lockers was little questioned. The Fourth 
Amendment prohibition against unreasonable search and 
seizure had been viewed as inapplicable to the schools. 
Now, however, courts have begun to recognize that the 
Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable search 
and seizure applies to searches by school officials who are 
viewed as government employees.^ 
The Fourth Amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their per­
sons, houses, papers, and effects against un­
reasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but for 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation 
and particularly describing the place to be ^ 
searched, and the person or things to be seized. 
The Fourth Amendment prohibition is not applied to 
school searches in the same way as to police searches, be­
cause school officials are operating in loco parentis, 
even though they are government employees. Fourth Amendment 
prohibition applies except where there is consent; probable 
cause and warrant issued; probable cause and circumstances 
such that taking time to obtain a warrant would frustrate 
the purpose; and when a valid arrest has been made and the 
6 3 search is incident to the arrest. 
ft 1 
Robert E. Phay, Speech at NOLPE School Law Seminar, 
Williamsburg, Virginia, June 7, 1980. 
ft J 
U. S. Const, amend. IV. 
6 3 Phay, Speech. 
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While courts have found that a student has no reasona­
ble expectation of privacy in a school locker, these same 
courts have concluded that "this reasoning has no applica­
tion and is unpersuasive with respect to a student's 
64 person." Searches of clothing and body have been held 
subject to at least minimum safeguards, because they are 
6 5 greater intrusions into the student's privacy. 
The law regarding search and seizure is in a state 
of flux. Robert Phay suggests that principals should see 
that students' privacy is protected and that strip searches 
6 6 are never made without a search warrant. 
Another area where change has occurred in the prin­
cipal 's authority has to do with rights of married or pregnant 
students. Prior to the 1960's, educators had much control 
over married or pregnant students. Usually, if a student 
became pregnant or married, the school rule provided for 
exclusion from school. Reasons given by principals for ex­
pulsion of married or pregnant students were that the presence 
of married students contributed to "moral pollution;" that if 
married students were not allowed to attend school, early 
marriages would be discouraged; and that unwed mothers or 
64State v. D, 34 N. Y. 2d 483, 358 N. Y. S. 2d 403, 407, 
315 N. E. 2d 466, 469 (1974). 
6 5 Robert E. Phay and George T. Rogister, Jr., "Searches 
of Students and the Fourth Amendment," Paper presented at 
NOLPE School Law Seminar, Williamsburg, Virginia, June 7, 1980. 
^^Phay, Speech. 
32 
6 7 
pregnant students were an embarrassment to the school. 
Educators were usually given a free hand in dealing 
with pregnant or married students until the 1960's, when 
federal and state courts began to change their rulings and take 
a more humanistic view of such issues. Between 1964 and 1972, 
a number of cases were decided which dealt with the rights of 
Q 
these students. The courts have established the right of 
married or pregnant students to attend school, and have ruled 
that schools have no right to punish students by expelling them 
for marriage or pregnancy. They also have the right not to 
attend school. 
Prior to the past few years, the attitude of the courts 
toward marriage as a reason for exclusion from extracurricular 
activities had been quite different from their attitude to­
ward exclusion from school because of marriage. All decisions 
prior to 1972 upheld the right of school boards to limit 
participation in extracurricular activities. Since that 
time, a number of decisions have resulted in invalidation of 
regulations barring married students from extracurricular 
activities.^ 
Tremendous changes have occurred in the realm of handi­
capped children's rights. These have brought about a great 
Connors, Student Discipline and the Law, p. 28. 
68Ibid., p. 29. 
69 Ibid., p. 33. 
70 Reutter, The Courts and Student Conduct, pp. 77-81. 
need on the part of the principal for knowledge of legislation 
and court rulings concerning handicapped students. Since the 
71 United States Supreme Court ruling in Brown that once a 
state elects to provide public education, "it is a right 
which must be made available to all on egual terms," the rights 
of the handicapped have received more and more attention. 
Current educational rights of handicapped school chil­
dren were formed in two major lawsuits, Pennsylvania Association 
72 for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and 
73 Mills v. Board of Education, which exposed ten basic wrongs 
74 that required righting for handicapped children. These 
wrongs consisted of: 
1. Exclusion of handicapped from instruction; 
2. Failure to identify special needs of handicapped, 
to evaluate, and provide for programming; 
3. Failure to allow handicapped to remain in appropriate 
programs; 
4. Inadequate, limited evaluations; 
5. Placement in programs without specific goals and no 
review of progress; 
71 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 98 L. Ed. 
873, 74 S. Ct. 686 (1954). 
72 Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E. D. Pa. 1971). 
73 . Mills v. Board of Education, 348 F. Supp. 866 (,D. D. C. 
1972). 
74 Reed Martin, The Impact of Current Legal Action on 
Educating Handicapped Children, Workshop Materials (Champaign, 
Illinois: Research Press Company, 1980), p. 3. 
and 
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6. Segregation from nonhandicapped; 
7. Inadequate provision of "related services;" 
8. Failure to notify parents of changes in programs; 
9. Failure to provide parents with access to records; 
75 
10. Failure to provide due process hearings. 
Two pieces of legislation have been passed to protect 
the rights of handicapped persons. While many have heralded 
the "Education for All Handicapped Children Act," Public Law 
7 6 94-142, as the most important piece of legislation to 
affect the handicapped student, it has been upstaged by Sec­
tion 504 of Public Law 93-112,the "Rehabilitation Act of 
1973," which is the first civil rights law to protect the rights 
7 8 of all handicapped persons. 
Both Acts stipulate that all handicapped children within 
a jurisdiction must be located, identified, and provided with 
a free, appropriate public education in the least restrictive 
environment; that they must be educated with nonhandicapped 
students to the maximum extent possible; that evaluations must 
75Ibid., pp. 3-5, 
76 U. S. Department of HEW, "Education of Handicapped 
Children and Incentive Grants Program: Assistance to States," 
41 Fed. Reg. 46966-46998 (1976). 
77 U. S. Department of HEW, "Nondiscrimination on Basis 
of Handicap: Programs and Activities Receiving or Benefiting 
from Federal Financial Assistance," 42 Fed. Reg. 22676-22702 
(1977). 
7 8 Lynn Erb and Cecil D. Mercer, "Legislation for the 
Handicapped: In Brief" NQLPE School Law Journal 7, No. 
2 (1977): 194. 
35 
be performed by trained personnel, assessing relevant educa­
tional areas, measuring students' aptitude and achievement 
levels, and must provide more than just an intelligence 
quotient; that testing may not be the only means of deter­
mining appropriate placement; that placement decisions must be 
made by a group of persons knowledgeable about the student; 
that procedural safeguards must be provided for handicapped 
and their parents; and that handicapped students must be pro­
vided with equal opportunity to receive nonacademic and extra-
. . . 79 curricular services. 
There are three important differences between the two 
laws regarding their application to the public school: 
1. Public Law 94-142 makes money available to states 
which participate in the funding program. 
2. Section 504 adds two new categories of handicapping 
conditions which are to be served by the public school: drug 
addicts and alcoholics. 
3. Section 504 does not provide that an Individual 
Educational Program must be provided for each child, while 
O Q 
Public Law 94-142 does have such a provision. 
Placement and provision of special services for the 
handicapped require much knowledge of the law on the part of 
school principals. 
7̂ Ibid., pp. 195-196. 
80Ibid., pp. 196-197. 
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Court rulings and legislation described above have 
dealt with students' rights, an area which offers much 
81 
concern to today's principals. Since the Tinker decision, 
it is evident that a new breed of student has been produced 
by the social and political movement toward increased human 
rights in the school setting. Administrators are now faced 
with questioning students whose legal actions have gradually 
eroded the sovereign authority formerly possessed by the 
school principal. Legal actions are being instituted more 
frequently against school officials, and there is reason 
to believe that in the future, the pressure will increase. 
The American Civil Liberties Union is much busier in the 
field of school law than ten years ago; there are many anti-
poverty legal service organizations seeking to fight for 
what they believe to be the rights of children; and there 
are research and service centers working with anti-poverty 
lawyers, seeking to broaden the legal rights of public school 
students.^ 
Students have the rights of access to education; to 
freedom of association; to take part in institutional government; 
to have an effect upon organized learning activities; to 
freedom of inquiry and expression; to establish standards for 
dealing with discipline and grievances; and to have standards 
8 X Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dis­
trict, 393 U. S. 503, 89 S. Ct. 733 (1969). 
8 2 Carter, Harris, and Brown, "Student and Parent Rights: 
What Are Their Constitutional Guarantees?," pp. 59-60. 
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8 3 enforced justly. It is up to the principal to see that 
they receive these rights. 
Following are some preventive educational principles 
which have been offered in the "Code of Student Rights and 
Responsibilities of the NEA Task Force on Student Involvement:" 
1. Policies governing the appearance and conduct 
of students should be developed by parents, teachers, 
students, administrators, and board members coopera­
tively. 
2. Policies must be reasonable and understandable. 
Vague and ambiguous statements create misunderstandings. 
3. Policies must be administered in a reasonable 
manner. Fairness and consistency are important. 
4. Policies should be re-evaluated regularly and 
changes made only when conditions warrant change. 
5. Students want to assume responsibility for their 
own behavior and should be given every opportunity to 
participate fully in student governance. 
6. Substantive and procedural due process must be 
accorded students. School authorities must orient 
students concerning their rights. 
7. Students have responsibilities to the overall 
educational enterprise so that the welfare of the group 
has priority over individual rights when these conflict. 
Students need help in understanding this. 
8. School authorities should constantly seek ways 
to enhance school experiences for students. How 
can school programs be improved? 
9. Litigation is a part of the democratic process, 
and the threat of a suit should in no way deter a 
school administrator from the proper administration 
of the school.84 
83Ibid., p. 58 
84Ibid., pp. 57-58. 
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The principal is also vulnerable to being sued for 
civil damages. School administrators must be cognizant of 
both legal and monetary consequences of actions in school-
related duties, because statutory and constitutional viola­
tions of any individual's civil rights may result in legal 
8 5 action. Until approximately 1960, almost all school 
districts were immune from liability for torts (civil wrongs 
against a person, his property, or reputation, not related to 
contracts) which arose from performance of governmental functions. 
Recently, however, the doctrine of sovereign immunity has been 
modified through legislative and judicial action. Courts have 
ruled that employees of the school district are not protected 
against liability arising from their personal negligence toward 
8 ft 8 7 
students. In Crabbe and Lovitt, the court held ttetthe fact 
that a person is performing a governmental function for the 
school board does not mean that such employee is exempt from 
liability for negligence in performance of such duties. 
Principals are particularly susceptible to being sued 
because of their supervisory duties over teachers. If it 
^~*E. Wayne Trogdon, "The Civil Rights Law of 1871 and 
Its Effect on Teacher Dismissal" (Ed. D. dissertation, 
University of North Carolina, Greensboro, 1979), p. 1. 
O C 
Ralph D. Stern, "The Principal and Tort Liability," 
The School Principal and the Law, Ralph D. Stern, Ed. 
(Topeka: National Organization on Legal Problems of Education, 
1978), p. 206. 
8 7 Crabbe v. County School of Northumberland County, 164 
S. E. 2d 639 (1968) and Lovitt v. Concord School District 
et al, 228 N. W. 2d 479 (1975). 
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can be established that the principal did not take measures 
to protect the safety or constitutional rights of children, 
8 8 he or she may be held negligent. In recent years, actions 
have been brought seeking monetary damages against principals 
for negligence resulting in student injury in gym classes, 
shop classes, on the playground, in the school building or 
on school grounds, at athletic events, at school outings, and 
8 9 even en route to or from school. 
More and more lawsuits are being filed against public 
school officials under Section 1983 of Title 42 of the 
United States Code, which provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, or any state or terri­
tory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen 
of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution 
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper pro­
ceeding for redress.90 
91 The United States Supreme Court in Wood v. Strickland 
held as follows: 
In the specific context of school discipline, we 
hold that a school board member is not immune from 
liability for damages under Section 1983 if he knew 
or reasonably should have known that the action he took 
within his sphere of official responsibility would vio­
late the constitutional rights of the student affected, or 
^Thomas, "Tort Liability of Teachers and Principals," p. 52. 
89Floyd G. Delon, "Tort Liability," The Yearbook of School 
Law 1977 (Topeka: National Organization on Legal Problems of 
Education, 1977): 71-79. 
9^U. S. Code, Chapter 42, Section 1983 (1866). 
91-Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308, 95 S. Ct. 992, 43 
L. Ed. 2d 214 (1975). 
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if he took the action with the malicious intention to 
cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other 
injury to the student. That is not to say that school 
board members are 1charged with predicting the future 
course of constitutional law' (citations omitted). A 
compensatory award will be appropriate only if the 
school board member has acted with such an impermissible 
motivation or with such disregard of the student's clear­
ly established constitutional rights that his action can­
not reasonably be characterized as being in good faith. 
While the foregoing refers only to school board members, 
the reasoning is applicable to any school official who exercises 
discretionary authority. Since lower courts are sure to apply 
the same standard to school principals in matters involving 
constitutional rights of students, the principal should not 
act without deliberate thought in student discipline or 
92 freedom of expression matters. 
M. A. McGhehey states that those who voluntarily assume 
supervision of students are charged with knowledge of the 
basic, unquestioned constitutional rights of students, and 
93 that Wood v. Strickland would apply with equal force to ad-
. . 94 ministrators and teachers. 
95 In Carey v. Piphus, a suit for damages for violation 
of the student's procedural due process rights, the Supreme 
Court held that violation of due process, even though ultimately 
considered proper, could not be tolerated, and that therefore, 
^Stern, "The Principal and Tort Liability," p. 220. 
Q "3 
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308, 95 S. Ct. 992, 43 
L. Ed. 2d 214 (1975). 
94 M. A. McGhehey, Speech presented at NOLPE School Law 
Seminar, Williamsburg, Virginia, June 9, 1980. 
95 
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 98 S. Ct. 1042, 55 L. 
Ed. 252 (1978). 
the courts would have to entertain the suit. However, if school 
action turned out to be proper, students must show some actual 
damage caused by violation of their rights in order to be com­
pensated. Since no damage was done in Carey, plaintiffs were 
96 
entitled to only nominal damages in the amount of one dollar'. . 
97 While there has been no litigation concerning it, the 
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, as amended, 
sets out standards to which principals of federally assisted 
9 8 schools must adhere. This Act, known as the Buckley Amendment, 
is aimed at protecting students and their families from record-
99 keeping abuses. Failure to comply with the law may result m 
withholding of federal funds from schools not in compliance. 
The issue involved in the Buckley Amendment is respect 
for the privacy of the individual versus the public's need to 
know matters of record.1̂  Prior to 1890, no English or 
American court had ruled in a case expressly upon the invasion 
of a "right to privacy." However, in 1890, an article was 
published by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, entitled, 
"The Right to Privacy," in which a number of cases were reviewed. 
96 Reutter, Speech. 
97 Ibid. 
9®August W. Steinhilber and Michael A. Resnick, "Student 
Records," The School Principal and the Law, Ralph D. Stern, Ed. 
(Topeka: National Organization on Legal Problems of Education, 
1978), p. 187. 
^^Ronald N. Kilpatrick, "The Buckley/Pell Amendment: Its 
Implications," Current Legal Issues in Education, M. A. McGhehey, 
Ed. (Topeka: National Organization on Legal Problems of Education, 
1977), p. 81. 
1Q0lbid., p. 81. 
101Ibid., p. 80. 
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Relief had been afforded in these cases on the basis of 
defamation, breach of confidence, or of an implied con­
tract, in the publication of letters and similar items. 
The article held that those cases were actually founded upon 
the right of a private individual to be let alone in his 
essentially private affairs. 
Although the right of privacy is not mentioned in the 
United States Constitution, the Court has recognized in a 
series of cases that guarantee of certain areas of privacy 
is constitutionally protected. In Griswold, the 
United States Supreme Court held that there is a right to 
privacy, which is derived from the "penumbra" of rights guaran-
105 teed by the First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments. 
Student records dealt with by the federal law are those 
which are personally identifiable. It is quite clear under 
the common law that any student records which do not identify 
students (such as test scores) have to be made available to 
vi • 106 the public. 
The fundamental rule governing access to students' 
school records is that school systems shall provide parents 
of students or eligible students with the right to access, 
102t, . , 0_ Ibid., p. 83. 
10 Ibid., p. 84. 
104 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965). 
105 
Kilpatrick, "The Buckley/Pell Amendment, Its Impli­
cations," p. 84. 
1 06 
Reutter, Speech. 
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including the following: 
a. The right to be provided a list of the types 
of education records which are maintained by the 
institution and are directly related to students; 
b. The right to inspect and review the contents 
of those records; 
c. The right to obtain copies of those records, 
which may be at the expense of the parent of the 
eligible student (but not to exceed the actual 
cost to the educational institution of reproducing 
such copies); 
d. The right to a response from the institution 
to reasonable requests for explanations and inter­
pretations of those records; 
e. The right to an opportunity for a hearing to 
challenge the contents of those records; and 
f. If any material or document in the education 
record of a student includes information on more 
than one student, the right to inspect and review 
only such part of such material or documents as 
relates to such student or to be informed of the 
specific information contained in such part of such 
material.107 
Rules governing release of records generally prohibit 
school officials from giving third persons access to student 
education records or "personally identifiable information 
contained therein" without written consent of parents of 
108 the student. Exceptions are provided which include cer­
tain information to be provided for the following: a direct­
ory dealing with emergency situations; school officials and 
state, federal, or local officials having been determined to have 
legitimate educational or other interests; in connection with 
financial aid for a student; organizations conducting educa­
tional studies under particular guidelines; accrediting 
107steinhilber and Resnick, "Student Records," p. 189. 
108Ibid., p. 195. 
organizations; parents or a dependent student of such parents, 
as defined in Section 152 of Title 26; and in compliance with 
a judicial order or lawfully issued subpoena, upon certain 
109 conditions. 
Student privacy amendments were intended to establish 
minimum standards and not to preempt existing state law. 
Therefore, school principals should review state and local 
requirements in order to see that appropriate provisions 
are made for those obligations which go beyond federal law. 
Forty-seven states have public record statutes, which vary 
from state to state. Court cases concerning student records 
are few, and are usually litigated in those states which have 
student record statutes. 
Ronald N. Kilpatrick states that the primary concern of 
the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, as 
amended, is to see that invasions of privacy and denial of 
parent access be curtailed. He recommends that educational 
institutions devslop written procedures to see that the Act 
111 is fully implemented. 
Not only has the principal had to keep abreast of court 
and legislative holdings concerning student rights, but also 
those regarding the rights of teachers. During recent years, 
fewer restrictions have been placed upon teachers, with 
courts holding that even nontenured teachers are entitled 
109 
Ibid., p. 197. 
H^Kilpatrick, "The Buckley/Pell Amendment, Its Impli­
cations," p. 87. 
m-Ibid. , p. 97. 
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to due process under certain conditions, and that teachers 
have the right to freedom of expression. 
The public has always been more restrictive in expec­
tations for teacher conduct than for conduct of others. 
Rigid moral and religious standards were evoked for teachers, 
particularly during the first half of the nineteenth century. 
Teachers were reprimanded, dismissed, fined, and imprisoned 
for real or imagined violations of public standards. 
By 1900, state statutes contained provisions which 
prescribed personal attributes required for teacher certifi­
cation. In the 1920's, stress was placed upon legislative 
bills forbidding teachers to teach evolution. 
A 1939 study indicated that teacher dismissal in most 
states was on a personal rather than a professional basis, 
with courts tending to affirm dismissals of women for marriage, 
upholding dismissals for 'immorality,' and invalidating dis-
112 missals for 'anticipated' causes. 
The popular conception that nontenured teachers had no 
rights to future employment and served at the will of the em-
113 114 ployer was challenged by Roth and Sindermann, when the 
United States Supreme Court indicated that under certain 
112 Floyd G. Delon, Legal Controls on Teacher Conduct: 
Teacher Discipline (Topeka: National Organization on Legal 
Problems of Education, 1977), p. 2. 
113 
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 92 S. Ct. 
2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972). 
114 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 92 S. Ct. 2694, 
33 L. Ed. 2d 570 (.1972) . 
115 circumstances, due process is required. A gradual shxft 
has occurred in the courts concerning employment which must 
prevail in order for due process to be required for a non-
116 
tenured employee facing nonrenewal of a contract. 
The Fourteenth Amendment requires due process when, a 
governmental entity seeks to deprive a person of life, liberty, 
or property. Courts are interpreting what constitutes a "liberty" 
interest more liberally than in the past. Principals need to 
understand two basic concepts of what constitutes a liberty 
interest for teachers as defined by the United States Supreme 
Court in relation to the Fourteenth Amendment. First, rea­
sons given for teacher renewal or dismissal must seriously damage 
standing, reputation or associations in the community; and 
second, publicity given such nonrenewal or dismissal must fore-
117 close future employment opportunities. Since teaching has not 
been held to be a "property" right, and therefore, not a con­
tract which comes under protection of the due process clause, 
one has only the "privilege" of being employed. Joseph E. Bryson 
states that "although no person has the constitutional right to be 
a teacher, there must be a reasonable basis for depriving an 
H^Larry L. French, "Teacher Employment, Evaluation and 
Dismissal," The School Principal and the Law, Robert D. Stern, 
Ed. (Topeka: National Organization on Legal Problems of Education, 
1978), p. 36. 
116Richard H. Lampshire, "Due Process for Non-Tenured 
Teachers," Current Legal Issues in Education (Topeka: National 
Organization on Legal Problems of Education, 1977), p. 52. 
1-^Jane K. Carrigan, "The Legal Aspects of Stigmatizing 
Teachers in Nonrenewal and Dismissal" (Ed. D. dissertation, 
University of North Carolina, Greensboro, 1979), pp. 141-142. 
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118 individual of the privilege of teaching. The doctrine of 
"privilege" has been altered in recent court decisions, so 
that substantive due process may apply when continued 
119 employment by a governmental entity is threatened. 
The nontenured employee must be able to establish a 
legitimate claim to public employment under the laws of the 
state. Whether a particular teacher has a right to a hearing 
120 on renewal of a contract hinges on a question of state law. 
When teachers are tenured, the courts have consistently 
recognized the existence of a property right which affords 
constitutional protection. The question has been raised most 
often as to the extent to which due process protection is 
121 due the nontenured teacher. 
122 In Sindermann, the United States Supreme Court stated: 
A person's interest in a benefit is a 'property' interest 
for due process purposes if there are such rules or 
mutually explicit understandings that support his 
claim of entitlement to the benefit and that he 
may invoke at a hearing.' 
Although courts have ruled that no property interests 
are acquired with annual contracts, they have raised the argu-
118 Joseph E. Bryson, "Academic Freedom and Due Process 
for Public School Teachers," Educational Horizons 54, No. 1 
(Fall 1975), p. 47. 
119 Lampshire, "Due Process for Non-Tenured Teachers," p. 53. 
120Ibid., p. 54. 
121 
Ibid. 
122 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 92 S. Ct. 2694, 
33 L. Ed. 2d 570 (1972). 
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ment that longevity on the job creates an expectancy of 
123 re-employment. The Fourth Circuit stated in Johnson 
that "the continuous employment of a teacher over a significant 
period of time can amount to the equivalent of tenure, and when 
it does, dissolution of relationship requires prior notice and 
an opportunity to be heard, or else due process is wanting." 
If no legitimate claim of property interest can be shown, 
the courts have been consistent in holding that due process 
124 rights do not pertain. 
Claims of Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests must 
be heard in the federal courts, since deprivation of a liberty 
interest results from a governmental action which infringes 
125 upon one's liberty rights. The courts have defined the 
"liberty" interest as applying when a person's name, reputation, 
honor or integrity is at stake; when one's standing in the 
community is damaged "by charging him with an unsavory charac­
ter trait such as dishonesty or immorality;" and when the 
government's action affects one's ability to obtain new em-
126 ployment. The courts have held that when "liberty" in-
127 terests are threatened, due process is required. 
Teachers have gained First Amendment protection from 
the courts for speech and expression within the classroom. 
123Johnson v. Fraley, 470 F. 2d 179 (4th Cir. 1972). 
124 Lampshire, "Due Process for Non-Tenured Teachers," p. 56. 
125Ibid. 
126Ibid., pp. 56-57. 
127Ibid., p. 58. 
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Since the late 1960's, the courts have protected teachers 
for engaging in questionable speech and expression, provided 
such speech or expression was not inappropriate for the age 
and maturity of students involved, was relevant to the class, 
12 8 and was such that it did not "materially and substantially" 
129 
disrupt or threaten to disrupt school discipline. 
The traditional view of the teacher as an employee of 
the state, subject to arbitrary restrictions of freedom of 
130 
speech and expression, was overruled in Epperson in 1968. 
In 1969, Tinker held that teachers and students have First 
Amendment rights in the classroom, although they are limited 
in some instances because of the "special characteristics 
131 of the school environment." The balancing test applied 
by the court stated that school officials could only justify 
taking action to limit First Amendment rights when the exercise 
of the forbidden right would "materially and substantially 
interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in 
132 the operation of the school." 
Teacher speech and expression in the public schools can 
take many different forms which have been tested in court 
"^^Burnside v. Byars, 363 F. 2d 744 (.1966) . 
129 Edwin H. Sponseller-, Jr. , "Freedom of Expression for 
Teachers in the Public School Classroom," Current Legal Issues 
in Education (Topeka: National Organization on Legal Problems 
of Education, 1977), p. 44. 
130 
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 89 S. Ct. 266, 21 
L. Ed. 2d 228 (1968). 
131 • Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dis­
trict, 393 U. S. 503, 89 S. Ct. 733 (1969). 
"*"32Burnside v. Byars, 363 F. 2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966) . 
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to ascertain protection under the First Amendment. Among 
these are utterances, dress and appearance, wearing of badges, 
and refusal to salute the flag. While teachers have gained 
First Amendment protection in all these areas, circumstances 
133 of the particular case often determine the amount of protection. 
134 Courts have established in Pickering and cases that 
followed it that teachers have the same right to free speech 
as other citizens, and that teachers' speech can only have 
limitations imposed by the government for good reasons, 
ones that do not conflict with the policy of encouraging an 
135 informed public. 
The principalship of today requires much knowledge of 
the law and its interpretation by the courts as it relates 
to schools, students, and teachers. An important role of the 
principal is that of seeing that the school is administered 
within the boundaries and guidelines of the law. 
133 Sponseller, "Freedom of Expression for Teachers m 
the Public School Classroom," p. 45. 
134 
Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563, 88 
S. Ct. 1731, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1968). 
135 Boote, "The Public School Teacher's Right to Criti­
cize the School Administration," p. 143. 
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CHAPTER III 
LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE SCHOOL PRINCIPALSHIP 
The majority of court cases arising from actions of 
the principal are the result of claims by plaintiffs that 
they have been denied rights guaranteed by the Consti­
tution of the United States. Many issues once considered 
to be solely educational questions have recently become legal 
concerns. 
Generally, actions brought against principals and others 
in the school system allege that certain practices of the 
principal or school system have resulted in a denial to 
plaintiffs of constitutional rights to freedom of speech, 
freedom of the press, equal protection of the laws, and 
other privileges, or that certain practices depriving plain­
tiffs of their constitutional rights have been implemented 
without appropriate due process procedures. 
It is important for principals to remember that each 
decision of a court relates only to the specific issues 
of that particular case. However, as indicated earlier, 
some decisions establish legal precedents more than others. 
Decisions from a circuit court of appeals tend to establish 
legal precedent more than do district court decisions, while 
52 
United States Supreme Court rulings are binding across the 
country. 
Decisions have been handed down by various courts 
regarding a number of constitutional questions related to 
First Amendment rights, personal appearance of students, sus­
pension and expulsion of students, corporal punishment, search 
and seizure, rights of married and pregnant students and unwed 
mothers, rights of handicapped children, tort liability, and 
teacher rights. As a result of these decisions, certain 
legal principles have evolved. These will be enumerated and 
discussed in this chapter. 
First Amendment Rights 
Courts have established the principle that the Four­
teenth Amendment protects the First Amendment rights of 
students against unreasonable rules and regulations imposed 
by school authorities, and that this right cannot be infringed 
upon, unless student exercise of such right materially and 
substantially interferes with the requirements of appropriate 
discipline in the school operation. In Tinker} the United 
States Supreme Court held that First Amendment rights of freedom 
of speech expression are available to teachers and students, 
neither of whom sheds such rights at the schoolhouse gate. 
The Court further stated that where there was no finding or 
showing that engaging in of the forbidden conduct would 
"'"Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dis­
trict, 393 U. S. 503, 21 L. Ed. 2d 731, 89 S. Ct. 733 (1969). 
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"materially and substantially interfere with the requirements 
of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school, 
2 the prohibition could not be sustained." 
Tinker resulted in what has come to be known as the 
"Tinker Test," which provides that educators must not seek 
to regulate student speech or expression unless they can 
prove that it will lead to "material and substantial dis­
ruption" of the educational process. (However, a 1980 ruling 
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
viewed disruption of school activities as being only one 
justification for restraining distribution of a publication. 
The court upheld a school regulation allowing restraint of 
distribution of publications which encouraged actions to en-
3 danger student health or safety.) 
Personal Appearance of Students 
No encompassing legal principle has been established 
as to personal appearance of students. Since the Supreme 
Court did not specify in Tinker what constitutes "free 
expression," it has not been determined whether students' 
ways of dressing and wearing hair can be recognized as a 
means of self-expression. 
Suspension and Expulsion 
The legal principle has been firmly established that 
school authorities have the right to suspend or expel from 
2Ibid., p. 739. 
^Williams v. Spencer, 622 F„ 2d 1200 (.1980) . 
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school a student who disobeys a reasonable rule or regulation. 
However, the United States Supreme Court has also established 
the legal principle that students have two interests which 
are entitled to due process protection, the "property" in­
terest in a public education and the "liberty" interest in 
reputation.4 
5 In Goss v. Lopez, the United States Supreme Court ex­
tended due process requirements to all school suspensions, 
whether short-term or long-term. 
Corporal Punishment 
g 
In Baker v. Owen, the United States Supreme Court, in 
affirming the ruling of a three-judge federal district court, 
established the legal principle that "the state has a counter­
vailing interest in the maintenance of order in the schools 
sufficient to sustain the right of teachers and school officials 
to administer reasonable punishment for disciplinary purposes." 
The legal principle has also been established by the 
7 Supreme Court, m Ingraham v. Wright, that the Eighth Amend­
ment concerning "cruel and unusual punishment" does not 
apply to corporal punishment in the schools. 
4GOSS V. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975), 42 L. Ed. 2d 
725, 95 S. Ct. 725, 735. 
^Ibid. 
^Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294 (1975), aff'd., 423 
U. S. 907 (1976). 
"^Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 51 L. Ed. 2d 711, 
97 S. Ct. 1401 (1977). 
Search and Seizure 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the per­
sons or things to be s e i z e d . ^  
Courts have recently held that public school officials 
9 
are government officials operating "in loco parentis." 
They have found that a less stringent standard than probable 
cause is required under the Fourth Amendment to determine 
reasonableness of search when the search is conducted pri­
marily by school officials for furtherance of school pur­
poses, such as disciplinary rules. 
This "reasonable suspicion" standard, used when school 
officials are acting alone, protects students' rights by 
requiring school officials to establish at least reasonable 
grounds for their suspicions that an unlawful act is being 
committed, before justifying a student search. 
Where school officials and law enforcement officers 
conduct joint searches, for the primary purpose of discovering 
evidence of a crime, courts have tended to hold that search 
and seizure standards applicable in criminal cases must be 
8 
U. S. Const, amend. IV. 
^Picha v. Wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214 (1976). 
"^People v. Jackson, 65 Misc. 2d 209, 319 N. Y. S. 2d 
731, 726 (1971), aff'd. 30 N. Y. 2d 734, 333, N. Y. S. 2d 
167, 285 N. E. 2d 153 (1972). 
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4 .  11 met. 
The nature of the place searched may be the determining 
factor in courts' decisions as to whether a person had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. In 1979, the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals stated that "as the intrusiveness of the 
search intensifies, the standard of Fourth Amendment 'reasona-
12 bleness1 approaches probable cause, even in the school context" 
Marriage and Parenthood 
Courts have established the legal principle that stu­
dents cannot be prohibited from school attendance on a perma-
13 nent basis solely because of marriage. It has also been 
determined that married students cannot be compelled to 
14 attend school. Courts have likewise held that unwed mothers 
15 cannot be refused readmission to school. 
Since 1972, courts have ruled that students cannot be 
prohibited from participating in extracurricular activities 
because of marriage, and that such prohibition is a denial 
of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
"'""'"Robert E. Phay, "Search and Seizure in the Schools," 
The Law of Procedure in Student Suspensions and Expulsions 
(Topeka: National Organization on Legal Problems of Education, 
September, 1977), p. 44. 
12M. M. V. Anker, 607 F. 2d 589 (1979). 
13McLeod v. State, 154 Miss. 468, 122 So. 737 (1929); 
Alvin Independent School District v. Cooper, 404 S. W. 2d 76 (1966). 
"^State v. Priest, 210 La. 389, 27 S. 2d 173 (1946); In 
re State in Interest of Goodwin, 214 La. 1062, 39 S. 2d 731 (1949). 
"^Perry v. Grenada Municipal Separate School District, 300 
F. Supp. 748 (1969); Ordway v. Hargraves, 323 F. Supp. 1155 (1971). 
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Rights of Handicapped Children 
Courts have established the right to equality of edu-
X 6 cational opportunity for handicapped children. It has 
been held that before a disruptive, handicapped student 
is expelled from school, it must be determined whether the 
17 child's handicap causes the propensity to be disruptive. 
The Supreme Court of Iowa also held that expulsion procedures 
for handicapped children must include re-evaluation of the child 
by a diagnostic-educational team, a report and recommendation 
by that team, and after full hearing, determination by the 
school board as to whether an alternative placement will meet 
the needs of the child and the district, with expulsion to be 
resorted to only when no reasonable alternative placement is 
available. 
The principle has also been established by the courts 
that individuals are entitled to minimal due process procedures 
19 before they can be stigmatized. This principle has been 
applied to identification and placement of students into 
special education classes. 
Numerous legal challenges have been made in recent 
years by parents who are concerned with educational practices, 
16 
Mills v. Board of Education of the District of Columbia, 
348 F. Supp. 866 (1972). 
"^Doe v. Koger, 480 F. Supp. 224 (1979). 
18 Southeast Warren Community School District v. Depart­
ment of Public Instruction, 285 N. W. 2d 173 (1979). 
19 . 
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U. S. 433 (1971). 
5 8  
with the result that more courts appear to be requiring 
school systems to prove a direct educational relationship 
between educational practices such as ability grouping and 
2 0  the ability to learn. In Hobson, the federal district 
court for the District of Columbia ruled that ability 
grouping as practiced in that school system violated students* 
constitutional rights to equal educational opportunities. In 
general, Hobson holds that if an ability grouping plan is 
to be constitutionally acceptable, it must ensure equal 
educational opportunities for every student and must bring 
students into the mainstream of public education without isola­
ting them. The school system must be able to show whether 
such placement meets the child's specific educational needs 
21 and whether a less extreme alternative is available. 
Courts have generally upheld the right to least restric-
22 23 tive placement for handicapped children. Public Law 94-142 
24 and Section 504 of Public Law 93-112 have provided that 
handicapped children cannot be excluded from any federally 
funded school program. Other important provisions of these 
laws will be discussed in Chapter IV. 
^Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 408 F. 2d 175 
(1969) . 
21Ibid., p. 516 
22H. Rutherford Turnbull, III, "The Past and Future 
Impact of Court Decisions in Special Education," Phi Delta 
Kappa (April, 1978): 525. 
S. Department of HEW, "Education of Handicapped 
Children and Incentive Grants Program: Assistance to States," 
41 Fed. Reg. 46966-46998 (1976). 
S. Department of HEW, "Nondiscrimination on Basis 
of Handicap: Programs and Activities Receiving or Benefiting 
from Federal Financial Assistance," 42 Fed. Reg. 22676-22702 (1977). 
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Tort Liability 
Numerous court actions seeking damages for common law 
torts, constitutional torts, and learning torts have been 
filed against principals and school officials. 
Common Law Torts 
Most common law torts allege negligence on the part of 
defendants. The legal principle has been recognized that 
"before liability may be imposed for an act or failure to 
act, prevision of a reasonable person must be able to recog­
nize danger of harm to plaintiff or one in plaintiff's situa-
25 tion." The courts have made xt known that a principal has 
a duty to take action in a situation in which a reasonably 
prudent person would foresee the possibility of injury to 
a student, and that the principal must see that proper super­
vision occurs, both by the principal and the teachers. Courts 
have held that principals and other employees of the school 
district are not protected by governmental immunity of the 
school district against liability arising from their personal 
negligence toward students. 
Litigation against principals and teachers in tort 
liability cases most often involves lack of supervision, 
improper or inadequate instruction, failure to exercise 
responsibilities properly, and field trips. Numerous 
cases have been instituted concerning inadequate instruction 
in performance of an activity and failure to instruct in safety 
Morris v. Ortiz, 437 P. 2d 652 (1968) . 
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rules. Courts have ruled in favor of students when instruction 
was inadequate and students were not instructed as to reasonable 
safety precautions.^ 
Failure to exercise responsibilities properly is another 
allegation made against principals and school officials. Ver­
dicts have been rendered in favor of plaintiffs against princi­
pals, teachers, and school personnel, when evidence indicated 
that dangerous conditions existed in the schools and were not 
2 7 corrected. Herb Appenzeller states that 'the court clearly 
tends to favor the injured pupil in cases where school offi­
cials know that dangerous equipment or unsafe facilities exist 
2 8 and still fail to remedy them." 
The same principles of tort law apply on field trips as 
at school. Provisions for proper supervision must be made. 
Constitutional Torts 
The Civil Rights Act of 1871, Section 1983, was rediscovered 
in the mid-1960's and has resulted in a change in status of 
board members and school administrators. Section 19 83 provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom or usage of any State or Territory, 
subjects or causes to be subjected any citizen of the 
United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, 
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at 
26Armlin v. Board of Education, 320 N. Y. S. 2d 402 (1971); 
LaValley v. Stanford, 70 N. Y. S. 2d 460 (1947); Gardner v. 
State, 22 N. E. 2d 344 (1939); Darrow v. West Genesee Central 
School District, 342 N. Y. S. 2d 611 (1973). 
27sush v. Oscoda Area Schools, 275 N. W. 2d 268 (1979); 
Webb v. Hennessey, 257 S. E. 2d 315 (1979). 
28Herb Appenzeller, From the Gym to the Jury (Charlottes­
ville: The Michie Company, 1970), p. 115. 
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law, suit in equity or other proper proceeding for re­
dress. 29 
This Act imposes civil liability on every "person" who de-
30 prives another of his federally protected rights. The 
United States Supreme Court has ruled that: 
....a school board member is not immune from liability 
for damages under Section 1983 if he knew or reasonably 
should have known that the action he took within the 
sphere of official responsibility would violate the 
constitutional rights of the student affected, or if 
he took the. action with the malicious intention to 
cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other 
injury to the student; and that a compensatory award 
will be appropriate only if the school board member has 
acted with such an impermissible motivation or with 
such disregard of the student's clearly established 
constitutional rights that his action cannot reasonably 
be characterized as being in good faith.31 
The United States Supreme Court has also ruled that: 
In the absence of proof of actual injury, public 
school students who were suspended from school without 
procedural due process and who bring actions under 42 
USCS i 1983 against school officials are entitled to 
recover only nominal damages; if it is determined that 
the suspensions were justified, the students neverthe­
less are entitled to recover nominal damages not to ex­
ceed one dollar from the officials.32 
Learning Torts 
Recently, lawsuits have been instituted by students seek­
ing damages for failure to learn. It is not certain what courts 
will do in the future, but in a 1976 case, the court stated: 
Substantial professional authority attests that the 
achievement of literacy in the schools, or its 
failure, are influenced by a host of factors which 
affect the pupil subjectively, from outside the 
formal teaching process, and beyond the control of 
29U. S. C., Section 1983 (1871). 
^^Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of 
New York, 436 U. S. 658, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611, 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978). 
31Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308, 95 S. Ct. 992, 
43 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1975. 
^^Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 55 L. Ed. 2d 252, 253, 
98 S. Ct. 1042 (1978) . 
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. . 33 xts ministers. 
Teacher Rights 
The principal must be knowledgeable of the legal impli­
cations regarding teacher tenure and the applicability of due 
process and other constitutional principles as they have been 
interpreted by the courts, as well as state laws respecting 
employment of personnel. While statutes vary in stipulating 
dismissal causes, among the most frequent causes are incompe­
tency, immorality, insubordination, and neglect of duty. 
In cases alleging incompetency on the part of a teacher 
as grounds for dismissal, detailed documentation concerning 
the teacher's performance is looked upon with favor by the 
34 courts. The principal's position is viewed as stronger when 
the teacher has been given warning and opportunity to correct 
ineffective performance. When procedural requirements are 
met, courts usually consider proven deficiencies and a failure 
to correct them sufficient cause for termination. 
In immorality cases, courts have considered the impact 
of behavior upon the school rather than some pre-existing societal 
norm. They question whether alleged immoral conduct has adversely 
affected teacher's performance in the classroom. 
Courts have established the principle that teachers' 
chronic refusal to comply with reasonable administrative 
obligations "can have a disruptive effect on students, fellow 
33 Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School District, 121 
Cal. R. 854 (1976). 
34 Canty v. Board of Education, City of New York, 312 F. 
Supp. 254 (1970); Schmidt v. Fremont County School District No. 
25, State of Wyoming, 558 F. 2d 982 (1977). 
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teachers, and administrators alike, and consequently poses 
35 a threat to an optimum learning environment, and therefore, 
tend to rule in favor of school administrators and systems 
in such instances. 
While courts have made it clear that they will protect 
the exercise of federal constitutional and statutory rights, 
it is apparent that they will not ignore substantial neglect 
of duty on the part of school personnel. 
Courts have established the principle that personnel 
3 6 decisions must be free from constitutional violations. 
The Supreme Court also has held that where a teacher alleges 
that free speech activity is a substantial or motivating 
factor in nonrenewal of a contract, the teacher must establish 
this fact. The burden is then on the school board to prove 
that it would have reached the same decision not to renew 
37 the contract m the absence of the protected behavior. 
Courts have established the legal principle that public 
employment is a benefit which cannot be conditioned upon 
3 8 denial of constitutional rights. A claim under the 
39 First Amendment was not defeated by lack of tenure. 
35 . Simard v. Board of Education of Town of Groton, 473 
F. 2d 988, 995 (1973). 
36perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 92 S. Ct. 2694, 
33 L. Ed. 2d 570 (1972). 
37Mt. Healthy School District v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 
97 S. Ct. 568, 50 L. Ed. 2d 471 (1977). 
3?Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 92 S. Ct. 2694, 
33 L. Ed. 2d 570 (1972); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 
U. S. 589, 87 S. Ct. 675, 17 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1967); Wieman v. 
Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183, 73 S. Ct. 215, 97 L. Ed. 216 (1952). 
^Barbre v. Garland Independent School District, 474 F. 
Supp. 687, 696 (1979). 
Courts have ruled that in order to have a property 
interest protected by due process, a person must have a 
legitimate claim of entitlement to continued employment 
arising from state law. Generally, it has been recognized 
that a property interest exists if, by statute, rule, or 
contract, express or implied, an employee can be fired only 
r || || 4 0 for "cause. 
Courts have also ruled that a person is entitled to 
due process for protection of the liberty interest when 
a "person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at 
41 stake because of what the government is doing to him," and 
when the government employer has imposed a "stigma or other 
disability that foreclosed the employee's freedom to take 
42 advantage of other employment opportunities." 
As stated earlier, teachers' constitutional rights to 
43 freedom of speech and expression were recognized in Tinker, 
although the court cautioned that rights of speech and asso­
ciation may be limited because of the unique nature of a 
school. This right cannot be exercised to the extent that 
40 
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 343-47, 96 S. Ct. 2074 
48 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1974) . 
41 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 573, 92 S. Ct. 
2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972). 
42Ibid., p. 2707. 
43 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dis 
trict, 393 U. S. 503, 21 L. Ed. 2d 731, 89 S. Ct. 731 (1969). 
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it creates disruptions. Teaching of controversial, irrele-
44 vant materials has resulted m the dismissal of teachers. 
It is evident that the school principal needs a know­
ledge of school law and legal precedents which have been 
established in the areas discussed above. 
44 Cooley v. Board of Education, 327 F. Supp. 454 (1971); 
Burns v. Rovaldi, 477 F. Supp. 270 (1979); Knarr v. Board of 
School Trustees, 317 F. Supp. 832 (1970), Aff'd. 452 F. 2d 649 
(1971) ; Pyle v.- Washington County School Board, 238 So. 2d 121 
(1970) . 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE PRINCIPAL AND STUDENT RIGHTS 
Since 1969, the role of the school principalship has 
been changed by a procession of cases dealing with student 
rights in the areas of First Amendment rights, personal 
appearance of students, suspension and expulsion, corporal 
punishment, search and seizure, marriage and parenthood, and 
rights of the handicapped. As the review of cases will indi­
cate, principals no longer have unlimited power to control 
student behavior without recognition of students' constitu­
tional rights. 
First Amendment Rights of Students 
During the 1970's, the courts began to look carefully 
at the issue of regulating the speech, expression, and 
publications of students and to rule that educators are 
not empowered to enforce regulations which infringe upon 
students' First Amendment rights. As stated previously, 
the First Amendment, which was made applicable to the states 
by the Fourteenth Amendment, provides: 
Congress shaLl make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; 
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; 
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or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and 1 
to petition the government for a redress of grievances. 
Courts generally hold that the Fourteenth Amendment 
protects the First Amendment rights of students against un­
reasonable rules and regulations imposed by school authorities, 
and that school officials cannot infringe upon these rights, 
unless student exercise of such rights materially and substan­
tially interferes with the requirements of appropriate disci­
pline in the school operation. Federal courts have ruled in 
many First Amendment cases dealing with student wearing of 
insignia or emblems and control of student publications. 
Insignia and Emblems 
Two cases dealing with First Amendment rights of students 
to freedom of expression through insignia and emblems were 
tried in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
District on July 21, 1966. These cases clearly illustrate 
what has become court policy with regard to student expression. 
2 In Burnside v. Byars, the Court of Appeals held that a high 
school regulation prohibiting students from wearing "freedom 
buttons" was "arbitrary and unreasonable, and an unnecessary 
infringement on students' protected rights of expression." 
There was no evidence in this case that the school was hampered 
from carrying on its regular schedule of activities. Affidavits 
and testimony revealed no interference with educational activity. 
"̂ U. S. Const, amend. I. 
^Burnside v. Byars, 363 F. 2d 744 (1966). 
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For this reason, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed 
the order of the district court for the southern district of 
3 Mississippi, which had denied preliminary injunction. 
4 In the second case, Blackwell v. Issaquena, evidence 
indicated that the wearing of "freedom buttons" caused an 
"unusual degree of commotion, boisterous conduct, collision 
5 with rights of others, and undermining of author ity'i For 
this reason, the same court held that the regulation of 
school authorities prohibiting students from wearing "freedom 
buttons" was reasonable and affirmed the district court's 
order denying injunction.^ 
The United States Supreme Court's landmark decision on 
the issue of students' First Amendment rights was Tinker v. 
7 Des Moines in 1969. In this case, students were suspended 
for wearing black armbands in protest of hostilities in 
Vietnam and in support of a truce. 
Students, through their fathers, filed a complaint in 
the federal district court for the southern district of Iowa, 
seeking an injunction restraining school authorities from 
disciplining students and nominal damages. The district 
court dismissed the complaint and upheld the constitutionality 
3Ibid., p. 744. 
4 Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of Education, 363 
F. 2d 749 (1966). 
^Ibid., p. 749. 
6Ibid., p. 750. 
7 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dis­
trict, 393 U. S. 503, 21 L. Ed. 2d 731, 89 S. Ct. 733 (1969). 
of school officials' action. On appeal, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed without 
opinion. On certiorari, the case was reversed and remanded 
by the United States Supreme Court. 
The United States Supreme Court held that the wearing 
of armbands in Tinker was "entirely divorced from actually 
or potentially disruptive conduct," and as such, was closely 
g 
akin to "pure speech" protected under the First Amendment. 
The Court quoted from both the Burnside and Blackwell cases 
in its opinion. 
The United States Supreme Court stated that: 
First Amendment rights of freedom of speech expression, 
applied in light of the special characteristics of the 
school environment, are available to teachers and 
students, and neither students nor teachers shed 
such rights at the schoolhouse gate.9 
The Court stated that a regulation prohibiting students' 
wearing of the black armbands violated their constitutional 
rights to free speech where there was no evidence that the 
authorities had reason to anticipate that the wearing of 
such armbands would substantially interfere with the work 
of the school or impinge upon other students' rights, "or 
that the prohibition was necessary to avoid material and substan­
tial interference with school work or discipline... 
In agreement with the Burnside decision, the Supreme 
Court held: 
8Ibid., p. 733. 
^Ibid. 
10Ibid., p. 734. 
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In order for the State in the person of school offi­
cials to justify prohibition of a particular expression 
of opinion, it must be able to show that its action was 
caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid 
the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany 
an unpopular viewpoint. Certainly, where there is 
no finding and no showing that engaging in of the 
forbidden conduct would 'materially and substantially 
interfere with the requirements of appropriate disci­
pline in the operation of the school,' the prohibition 
cannot be sustained.H 
The Court also pointed out, however, that conduct by 
a student which "materially disrupts classwork or involves 
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, 
of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of 
12 freedom of speech. 
The principle set out in the Tinker decision has become 
the standard for later federal court decisions dealing with 
First Amendment rights and for school administrators in 
13 the organization and governance of public schools. The 
Tinker decision has brought a new awareness to high school 
14 students of First Amendment rights. Courts must weigh the 
issue of infringement of personal rights of expression against 
the concept of whether the exercise of such rights would 
"materially and substantially interfere with the requirements 
"^Ibid. , p. 739. 
12Ibid., p. 741. 
13 Neil C. Chamelm and Kae B. Trunzo, "Due Process and 
Conduct in Schools," Journal of Research and Development in 
Education 11 (Winter 1978): 75. 
14 David Emerson Hoffman, "Legal Aspects of Student News­
papers and the Virginia Secondary Schools" (Ed. D. dissertation, 
University of North Carolina, Greensboro, 1979), p. 1. 
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of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school. 
From Tinker has come the "Tinker Test," which provides 
that educators must not seek to regulate student speech or 
expression unless it can be proven that such activity will 
lead to "material and substantial disruption" of the educa-
16 tional process. Later cases have sought to clarify what 
is meant by "material and substantial disruption." 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
affirmed the district court's action in dismissing complaint 
17 in Guzick v. Drebus, and the United States Supreme Court 
denied certiorari. This was an action brought by a high school 
student for injunctive relief from school authorities' refusal 
to permit him to wear a button soliciting participation in 
an anti-war demonstration, from refusal to reinstate him, 
for declaratory judgment that rule proscribing wearing of 
buttons was unconstitutional, and for damages. The court 
found that the high school rule prohibiting wearing of any buttons 
or insignia was of long standing; that the rule had been uni­
versally applied; and that an incendiary situation existed at 
the school in question, which had undergone change of racial 
composition from all white to 70 percent black. Evidence 
showed that the wearing of buttons, pins, and other emblems had 
^Connors, Student Discipline and the Law, p. 36. 
"^Ibid. , p. 38. 
"^Guzick v. Drebus, 431 F. 2d 594 (1970). 
. 12 
caused disruption in the past; that students had attempted 
to vear buttons and badges expressing inflammatory messages, 
which would lead to racial disorders at the school; that 
polarization of students had resulted; and that in at 
least one instance, a fight had occurred. The court found 
that under the existing circumstances, the rule prohibiting 
buttons or insignia did not deny right of free speech. 
18 In Hill v. Lewis, a district court for the eastern 
district of North Carolina denied preliminary injunction 
sought by plaintiffs to restrain a high school principal 
from suspending plaintiffs for wearing armbands in protest 
of the Vietnam War. The court found that more than one-third 
of students in the school were children of military personnel, 
who held diverse views as to war and nonwar related issues; that 
a tense situation had developed; that at least twenty-five to 
fifty students with antagonistic views were involved; and 
that there had been advance advertisement of demonstration, 
active group participation, marching in hallways, recruitment 
of other children to join several groups, chanting, belligerent 
and disrespectful attitude toward teachers, incidents of flag 
19 disrespect, and threats of violence. The court held that 
in balancing of First Amendment rights, the duty of the state 
to operate a public school system for benefit of all children 
must be protected, even if governmental regulations incidentally 
l^Hill v. Lewis, 323 F. Supp. 55 (1971). 
19Ibid., p. 55. 
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limit "untrammeled exercise of speech, symbolic or otherwise, 
by those who would impede education of those who desire to 
learn". 
Another case involving symbols was decided in favor 
of school authorities by the United States district court in 
21 Colorado on August 18, 1970. Suspended high school students 
of Mexican descent sought a declaration that constitutional 
rights were violated by school suspension of students for 
wearing black berets maintained to be symbols of Mexican cul­
ture, of Mexican unity and respect, and of dissatisfaction with 
society's treatment of Mexican race and desire to improve treat­
ment. The court dismissed the complaint. 
22 Evidence in Hernandez indicated that principal had 
granted students permission to wear black berets until dis­
ruption of the school became so great that students were told 
to remove berets or be suspended. Evidence was without dispute 
that beret had come to be used by plaintiffs as a symbol of 
power which was used to disrupt the school and to exercise 
control over other students; that plaintiffs had talked in 
loud voices in halls, shouting, "Chicano power;" that students 
had blocked the halls, preventing free passage; had refused 
to obey teachers; had caused a disturbance in the lunchroom; 
had told other students not to listen to "that old bag - the 
^Ibid., p. 56. 
21 Hernandez v. School District Number One, Denver, Colora­
do, 315 F. Supp. 239 (1970). 
22Ibid., p. 291. 
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berets will take care of her," when a teacher had attempted 
to supervise hallways and give students directions; that one 
plaintiff had taken a paper away from a teacher; and that 
plaintiffs had attempted to induce students to leave class­
rooms and join students in the hallways. 
23 A Pennsylvania case, Wise v. Sauers, also resulted 
in a decision favorable to school authorities. The action 
arose during a period of extreme unrest in American schools, 
as a result of the involvement of American and Vietnamese 
troops in Cambodia and the killing of four students at Kent 
State University. There were strong feelings at the school 
in question on both sides of the issues involved. Because 
of this, the principal asked students wearing armbands containing 
the words, "Strike," and "Rally," to desist from wearing such 
armbands, in the interests of keeping calm and peace in the 
school. Students were informed that they could wear armbands 
of any color, provided such armbands did not contain words 
which were likely to cause disruption of the school. Plaintiff 
continued to wear the forbidden armbands and was suspended 
from school. The court held that the principal's restrictions 
were reasonable and necessary under the existing conditions, 
and that the suspension of plaintiff was proper. 
24 In a 1972 case, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit affirmed judgment of the district court 
"^Wise v. Sauers, 345 P. Supp. 90 (1972). 
?4 
Melton v. Young, 465 F. 2d 1332 (1972). 
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for the eastern district of Tennessee which was adverse to 
plaintiffs. Plaintiff-minor had been suspended from school 
for wearing an emblem depicting a Confederate flag on the 
sleeve of his jacket, in violation of the school's code of 
conduct. Evidence indicated that the school had formerly 
been an all-white school with the Confederate flag as school 
flag and "Dixie" as the school song; that school was attended 
by both white and black students at time of action; that 
student body had become racially polarized as a result of 
controversy over use of Confederate flag and song, "Dixie," 
at various school functions; that class disruption had occurred; 
that various disturbances had taken place in the city, culmina­
ting in a citywide curfew in October, 1969; that it had become 
necessary to close the school to restore order and calm tensions 
in the Spring of 1970; that a committee of citizens had studied 
difficulties and had sought to correct them through recommenda­
tions which were adopted as official policy by the school board 
in July, 1970; that one of the corrective measures had been 
to recommend the discontinuance of use of Confederate flag 
as a school symbol and the song, "Dixie" as school song; and that 
each principal had been asked to develop and disseminate a "code 
of conduct" in keeping with the policy. It was this 'bode of 
25 conduct" which gave rise to the lawsuit. The court concluded 
that under all the circumstances presented, appellant's sus­
pension was not violative of First and Fourteenth Amendment 
25Ibid., p. 1333. 
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rights and that judgment of the district court was proper. 
2 6 The case of Aguirre v. Tahoka was decided against 
school authorities by the district court for the northern 
division of Texas in 1970, when the court concluded that 
evidence did not establish that wearing of brown armbands 
by students (in violation of school district regulation 
prohibiting wearing of "apparel decoration that is dis­
ruptive, distracting, or provocative") was a disruption in 
and of itself. 
27 In Butts v. Dallas Independent School District, the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed district court's 
denial of temporary injunction and remanded the cause with 
direction to the district court to grant an injunction en­
joining defendants from interfering with plaintiffs in 
exercise of First Amendment rights by wearing black armbands 
to school to protest the Vietnam War. Evidence indicated 
that wearing of black armbands by high school students had 
caused no substantial disruption of the educational process. 
Publications 
Since 1968, a number of cases have been tried in federal 
courts concerning power of school officials to control both 
school-sponsored and underground publications. Attempts at 
regulation have been tested against First Amendment protection 
of freedom of speech and 
2 6 Aguirre v. Tahoka Independent School District, 311 F. 
Supp. 664 (1970). 
2̂ Butts v. Dallas Independent School District, 436 F. 
2d 728 (1971) . 
Judicial decisions insist that school authorities 
have the right to control "time, place, and manner" of 
2 8 expressive activity. Grayned states: 
Our cases make equally clear, however, that rea­
sonable 'time, place and manner1 regulations 
may be necessary to further significant govern­
mental interests, and are permitted.-29 
30 In Fujishxma v. Board of Education, the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals indicated that school officials have 
the right to promulgate "reasonable specific regulations set­
ting forth the time, manner, and place in which distribution 
of written materials may occur," although the court pointed 
out that this did not mean that students are required "to 
obtain administrative approval of the time, manner, and 
place of the particular distribution" proposed. Instead, the 
court held that school officials have the burden of telling 
students when, how, and where materials might be distributed. 
Several cases have arisen where school officials have 
attempted to exercise prior restraint on publications to be 
distributed on school premises. Among the reasons given by 
school administrators for requiring that materials be submitted 
for approval prior to distribution are the following: 
1. To prevent distribution of libelous or obscene 
materials. 
2. To prevent distribution of publications advocating 
illegal actions; and 
3. To prevent distribution of publications which are 
insulting to any group or individual. 
^Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 33 L. Ed. 
222, 92 S. Ct. 2294 (1972). 
29ibid., pp. 231-232. 
30Fujishima v. Board of Education, 460 F. 2d 1355 (1972). 
3lBaughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F. 2d 1345, 1346 (1973). 
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It has been held that school authorities may by appro­
priate regulation, exercise prior restraint upon publications 
distributed on school premises during school hours in those 
special circumstances where they can reasonably "forecast 
substantial disruption of or material interference with school 
32 activities" on account of such printed material. 
In 1971, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
a school board policy requiring prior approval of distribution of 
printed or written material on school grounds was constitutionally 
deficient in that it did not prescribe a definite, brief period 
within which review of submitted material would be completed 
and did not specify to whom and how material might be submitted 
for clearance. The Stamford Board of Education had adopted a 
policy providing that no person should distribute any printed 
or written matter on the grounds of any school without prior 
approval of the school administrator. The policy stated that 
in granting or denying approval, the following guidelines must 
apply: 
No material shall be distributed which, either by its 
content or by the manner of distribution itself, will 
interfere with the proper and orderly operation and 
discipline of the school, will cause violence or 
disorder, or will constitute an invasion of the rights 
of others.33 
The Court of Appeals applied the Tinker test and held 
32 
Eisner v. Stamford Board of Education, 440 F. 2d 803, 
807 (1971). 
33Ibid., pp. 804-805. 
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that the policy was clearly directed at behavior which would 
be disruptive, even though the phrase, "material or substantial 
34 disruption" was not used. However, the court stated: 
The policy as presently written is wholly deficient.... 
for it prescribes no period of time in which school 
officials must decide whether or not to permit dis­
tribution. To be valid, the regulation must prescribe 
a definite brief period within which review of sub­
mitted material will be completed. 
The policy is also deficient in failing to specify 
to whom and how material may be submitted for clear­
ance. Absent such specifications, students are 
unreasonably proscribed by the terms of the policy 
statement from distributing any written material on 
school property, since the statement leaves them 
ignorant of clearance procedures. Nor does it pro­
vide that the prohibition against distribution without 
prior approval is to be inoperative until each school 
has established a screening procedure.35 
The court also found that the proscription against "dis­
tributing" written or printed material without prior consent 
was unconstitutionally vague and did not indicate that the 
board would require prior submission only when there is a 
substantial distribution of written material, which the court 
assumed to be the case.^ 
Actually, the Eisner decision directed certain procedural 
formalities to be followed by school officials who seek to 
exercise the right of prior approval of publications for dis-
34Ibid., p. 808. 
35Ibid., p. 811. 
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tribution on school grounds. The essential elements in a 
procedure for submission of material according to this 
ruling are: 
1. Adequate definition must be given to the term, 
'distribution,' to make clear that policy is directed 
at substantial distribution and not the passing of a 
note from one student to another or the exchange of 
copies of Time or Life. 
2. A definite person must be established to whom 
the material is to be submitted for approval and 
how the submission is to be accomplished. 
3. A definite, brief period must be set within 
which the review will take place and be completed. 
4. There must be a provision that the policy will 
not operate until each school has established its 
7 review procedure and informed its students. ' 
The need for establishing definite procedures in school 
3 8 
rules for prior restraintwas again recognized in Quarterman. 
In this case, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
a school rule prohibiting distribution of printed material 
without express permission of the principal was invalid on its 
face as an improper prior restraint, in that it failed to 
contain any criteria to be followed by school authorities 
to determine whether to grant or deny permission, and failed 
to contain procedural safeguards for review of school authori­
ties' decision. 
39 In Baughman, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that a regulation lacked "procedural safeguards of a specified 
37 T. Page Johnson, "Eisner v. Stamford: Prior Restraint 
on Distribution of Literature in High Schools," NOLPE School 
Law Journal 2 
O O 
Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F. 2d 54 (1971). 
"^Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F. 2d 1345 (1976). 
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and reasonably short period of time in which principal had 
to act and that it failed to provide for contingency of the 
principal's failure to act within a specified, brief time." 
The court pointed out that the regulation was rendered invalid 
by absence of any criteria to be followed by school authorities 
in determining whether to grant or deny permission, and of any 
procedural safeguards in the form of an "expeditious review 
40 procedure" of the decision made by school officials. As in 
Eisner, the proscription against distribution was viewed as 
being unconstitutionally vague. 
The court indicated that the decision was predicated upon 
the following propositions of law: 
1. Secondary school children are within the protec­
tion of the First Amendment, although their rights are 
not coextensive with those of adults. 
2. Secondary school authorities may exercise reasona­
ble prior restraint upon the exercise of students' 
First Amendment rights. 
3. Such prior restraints must contain precise criteria 
sufficiently spelling out what is forbidden so that a 
reasonably intelligent student will know what he may 
write and what he may not write. 
4. A prior restraint system, even though precisely 
defining what may not be written, is nevertheless in­
valid unless it provides for: 
a. A definition of 'distribution* and its 
application to different kinds of materials; 
b. Prompt approval or disapproval of what 
is submitted; 
c. Specification of the effect of failure 
to act promptly; and 
40 Ibid., p. 1348; also Hall v. Board of School Commissioners 
of Mobile County, Alabama, 496 F. Supp. 697 (1980). 
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41 d. An adequate and prompt appeals procedure. 
A district court ruling that a school board did not 
have general power to regulate a newspaper which was established 
as a public forum was affirmed by the Fourth Circuit Court of 
42 Appeals in 1977. The Farm News, a student newspaper, was 
established as a public forum, even though the paper was 
funded and sponsored by the school board, and according to 
the court ruling, was therefore, subject to First Amendment 
protection. The court concluded that it could not be viewed 
as part of the curriculum, and that the board did not have 
the right to ban publication of an article about birth control. 
43 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held m Trachtman 
that a school prohibition of distribution of sex questionnaire 
to ninth through twelfth grade students was constitutional, 
in that there was a substantial basis for authorities' belief 
that distribution of the questionnaire would result in signifi­
cant emotional harm to a number of students in the school popula­
tion. 
In a New York case, a federal district court upheld 
the right of high school students to publish in the school 
44 newspaper a paid advertisement opposing the war in Vietnam. 
The court stated that the school's prohibition of advertising 
on political matters was not in keeping with its having permitted 
^Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F. 2d 1345, 1351 (1976) . 
42 Gambxno v. Fairfax County School Board, 429 F. Supp. 
731 (1977), aff'd. 564 F. 2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977). 
^Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F. 2d 512 (1977). 
^Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 (1969). 
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publication of articles on war and the draft; that the 
newspaper was a forum for dissemination of ideas; and that 
it was open to free expression of ideas. 
Obscenity and Vulgarity 
Several cases have been concerned with obscenity and 
vulgarity in publications. School authorities have the 
45 right to ban obscene materials from school premises. 
46 Obscenity is not within the area of protected speech or press. 
The power of a state to control conduct of children reaches 
beyond the scope of its authority over adults, even when there 
is an invasion of constitutionally protected freedoms; the 
state has constitutional power to regulate the wellbeing of 
47 its children. A federal district court in Michigan ruled 
that a school regulation, providing that any student found 
with obscene literature in his possession would be suspended 
from school, did not violate the free speech provision of 
48 the First Amendment. 
4 Questions exist as to what is obscene as a matter of law. 
45 Reutter, The Courts and Student Conduct, p. 24. 
4fi Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 485, 1 L. Ed. 2d 
1498, 1507, 77 S. Ct. 1304. (1957). 
^Ginsberg v. State of New York, 390 U. S. 629, 20 L. Ed. 
2d 195, 197, 88 S. Ct. 1274 (1967). 
48 Vought v. Van Buren Public Schools, 306 F. Supp. 1388 
(1969). 
49 
Reutter, The Courts and Student Conduct, p. 24. 
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The United States district court for the eastern district 
of Michigan stated that the area of the law on obscenity 
50 "is about as well-defined as the course of a tornado." 
Ginsberg v. State of New York is viewed as having man­
dated that.the courts "more broadly construe the traditional 
definition of obscenity when applied to cases involving.... 
51 minors." Ginsberg held that: 
Freedom of expression constitutionally secured to 
minors is not invaded by a state statute making it 
a misdemeanor knowingly to sell a minor material 
'harmful to minors' and defining this phrase as 
meaning that quality of any description or represen­
tation of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement 
or sado-masochistic abuse, when it (1) Predominately 
appeals to the prurient interest of minors; (2) Is 
patently offensive to prevailing standards in the 
adult community as a whole with respect to what is 
suitable material for minors; and (3) Is utterly 
without redeeming social importance for minors.*2 
53 In Baker, a federal district court m California up­
held a ten-day suspension and removal of plaintiffs from 
office as student body and senior class presidents for use of 
profanity or vulgarity appearing in an off-campus newspaper 
published and distributed by them just outside the main campus 
gate. The court stated that "When the bounds of decency are 
violated in publications distributed to high school students, 
whether on campus or off campus, the offenders become subject 
50 
Vought v. Van Buren Public Schools, 306 F. Supp. 1388, 
1396 (1969). 
51Koppell v. Levine, 347 F. Supp. 456, 459 (1972). 
52 Ginsberg v. State of New York, 390 U. S. 629, 20 L. 
Ed. 2d 195, 197, 88 S. Ct. 1274 (1967). 
53 
Baker v. Downey City Board of Education, 307 F. Supp. 
417 (1969). 
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to discipline," and that "neither 'pornography' nor 'obscenity,' 
as defined by law, need be established to constitute a violation 
54 of the rules against profanity or vulgarity." 
In 1973, the district court for the southern district 
of Indiana ruled, and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed, that "school board provisos pertaining to distribution 
of literature were invalid and that occasional presence of 
'earthy' words in unofficial student newspaper did not render 
55 the newspaper obscene." The court stated that issues of 
the Corn Cob Curtain in the record were far from obscene in 
the legal sense, containing no material which "is in any signi­
ficant way erotic, sexually explicit, or which could plausibly 
be said to appeal to the prurient interest of adult or minor. 
The court further pointed out that the newspaper issues did not 
even approach fulfillment of the Miller definition of obscenity 
set out by the Supreme Court, namely: 
'Works which depict or describe sexual conduct' and 
'which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient 
interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a 
patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, 
do not have serious literary, artistic, political, 
or scientific value.'57 
On certiorari, however, the United States Supreme Court 
vacated judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded with 
instructions that the district court be ordered to vacate 
its judgment and dismiss the complaint. The Supreme Court 
^Ibid. , p. 526. 
55jacobs v. Board of School Commissioners, 490 F. 2d 601 
(1973). 
56cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 20, 91 S. Ct. 1780, 
29 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1971). 
57 Jacobs v. Board of School Commissioners, 490 F. 2d 601, 
610 (1973). 
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found that since the plaintiffs had graduated from school 
while the case was pending in the Supreme Court, there was 
no longer a case or controversy between plaintiffs and school 
5 8 officials, and that the case had become moot. 
59 . In Koppell v. Levine, a federal district court con­
cluded that a school literary magazine, Streams of Conscience, 
was not obscene for the following reasons: 
The magazine contained no extended narrative tend­
ing to excite sexual desires or constituting a 
predominant appeal to prurient interest. The 
dialogue was the kind heard repeatedly by those who 
walk the streets of our cities, use public convey­
ances and deal with youth in an open manner. It 
was not patently offensive to adult community standards 
for minors as evidenced by comparable material appearing 
in respected national periodicals and literature con­
tained in the high school library.60 
As stated above, while it seems apparent that school 
authorities have the right to ban obscene or profane material 
from publication or distribution on school property, the 
difficulty comes from attempting to define "obscene" and 
"profane." There are no definite answers to the problem, 
since opinions of the circuit courts often conflict. However, 
it is agreed that school authorities can suppress materials 
from children which could not be banned from the general 
• 61 public. 
58 Board of School Commissioners of the City of Indianapolis 
v. Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128, 43 L. Ed. 2d 74, 95 S. Ct. 848 (1975). 
59 
Koppell v. Levine, 347 F. Supp. 456, 459 (1972). 
^Ibid. , p. 459. 
61 Chamelin and Trunzo, "Due Process and Conduct in the 
Schools," p. 78. 
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Off-Campus Distribution of Publications 
6 2 Thomas v. Board of Education deals with the right of 
school authorities to bring their power to bear on the publi-. 
cation and distribution of a newspaper off the school grounds. 
This case, recently decided by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit, holds that the First Amendment 
forbids public school administrators from regulating material 
to which children are exposed after they leave school each 
afternoon. The court stated: 
Although states can appropriately legislate state­
wide variable standard of obscenity with respect to 
children and may, in some circumstances, suppress 
expression that is suitable for adults because of 
its potential effect on children, this power is denied 
to public school officials when they seek to punish 
off-campus expression simply because they reasonably 
foresee that in-school distribution may result. 
In this case, several students had printed a publication 
called Hard Times outside the school; no copies were sold on 
school grounds; and any activity within the school was de 
minimis, consisting of the typing of a few articles on 
school typewriters and the storing of the product in a 
teacher's closet. The court ruled that school administrators 
could not punish students for their publication of the 
allegedly "morally offensive, indecent, and obscene" 
6 4 tabloid, since Hard Times was conceived, executed and 
6 2 Thomas v. Board of Education, Granville Central School 
District, 607 F. 2d 1043 (1979). 
63Ibid., p. 1044. 
64Ibid., p. 1043 
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distributed outside the school. 
In a case heard in 1972, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a sharply worded decision, 
condemned a school board for assuming "suzerainty" of students 
before and after school, off school grounds, and with regard 
6 5 to their expression of thoughts. Five students were suspended 
from school for having distributed an underground newspaper 
entitled Awakening. Evidence indicated that the newspaper was 
written entirely by the students, during out-of-school hours, 
and without using any materials or facilities belonging to the 
school system. The students distributed the papers one afternoon 
after school hours and one morning before school hours, outside 
school premises on the sidewalk of an adjoining street, which 
was separated from the school by a parking lot. No disruption 
of classes nor disturbances whatsoever occurred. The students 
passed out the newspapers in a polite, orderly manner. The 
court found that Awakening contained absolutely no material 
which could remotely be considered libelous, obscene, or in-
6 6 flammatory. The students' suspension was for violation of 
school board policy which prohibited distribution of petitions 
or printed documents of any kind without specific approval of 
the school principal. The court held that this policy was 
unconstitutionally applied to students, to prohibit and punish 
^Shanley v. Northeast Independent School District, 
Bexar County, Texas, 462 F. 2d 960 (1972). 
66Ibid., p. 964. 
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protected First Amendment expression which took place 
entirely off campus and without substantial and material 
6 7 disruption of school activities. 
In making rules or punishing students in matters con­
cerning the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech, 
it is important that the principal consider the Tinker 
doctrine carefully. In an interesting case tried recently 
by the Fourth District Court of Appeals, however, the court 
held that disruption of school activities is only one justi­
fication for school authorities to restrain distribution of 
6 8 a publication; it is not the sole justification. The court 
stated that First Amendment rights of high school students must 
yield to the superior interest of the school in seeing that 
materials which encourage actions that endanger the health or 
safety of students are not distributed on school property. 
In this case, a school regulation permitting the principal to 
halt distribution on school premises of any publication which 
encouraged actions to endanger health or safety of students 
was found not to prohibit constitutionally protected conduct 
69 and not to be unconstitutional on its face. 
Miscellaneous 
Student freedom to express views of homosexuality was 
70 upheld in a 1980 case, when the court ruled that a male 
67lbid., p. 961. 
^Williams v. Spencer, 622 F. 2d 1200, 1201 (1980). 
69Ibid. 
^^Fricke v. Lynch, 491 F. Supp. 381 (1980). 
student must be permitted the right to bring another male 
student to the high school senior prom. The court indicated 
that a student's rights do not embrace merely the classroom 
hours, and that even though the homosexuality issue might 
arouse strong feelings, this freedom of expression must be 
protected. 
Personal Appearance of Students 
Although hair and dress codes were a major area of 
71 conflict during the 1970's, litigation concerning personal 
appearance has dwindled in recent years. The United States 
72 Supreme Court in Tinker held that educators cannot violate 
students' right to free speech and free expression, but the 
Court did not specify what constitutes "free expression." 
The question most often considered in regard to dress and 
hair codes appears to be whether students' ways of dressing 
and wearing hair is a means of self-expression. If so, dress 
and hair codes are unconstitutional invasions of students' 
First Amendment rights. If not, such codes can be instituted 
73 as a means of regulating student dress. 
The United States Supreme Court has not spoken specifi­
cally about the issue of dress and hair codes, and most cases 
have been decided at the Circuit Court of Appeals level. Be-
71 David E. Shelton, "A Study of the Opinions of the 
Federal and State Courts on the Length of Male Students' 
Hair in the Public Schools" (Ed. D. dissertation, University 
of North Carolina, Greensboro, 1979), p. 1. 
^Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District, 393 U. S. 503, 2 L. Ed. 2d 731, 89 S. Ct. 733 (1969). 
73connors, Student Discipline and the Law, pp. 42-43. 
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cause of differences in court rulings in the eleven federal 
circuit courts, there are wide geographical differences in 
74 the interpretation of the law. 
There appears to be little difference between a dress 
code and a hair style code. As a rule, wherever a dress code 
can be enforced, a hair style code can be enforced, and vice 
versa. Legally, there is no distinction between the two 
types of codes.^ 
For several years, the eleven federal circuit courts 
have been divided on the question of constitutional protection 
7 6 of students' right to wear hair as they choose. Some view 
hair and dress codes as violations of students' constitutional 
rights, while others consider such codes to be permissible and 
not unconstitutional. This is illustrated by Chart III, cover­
ing the eleven circuits, the states each circuit includes, 
rulings as to hair and dress codes, and pertinent cases. 
^Ibid. , p. 43. 
75Ibid., p. 42. 
7 6 
Allen J. Peterson, "Student Rights: A Changing Emphasis," 
North Carolina Education 8, No. 5 (January, 1978): 10. 
CHART III - RULINGS BY U. S. CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEAL ON HAIR AND DRESS CODES 
Circuit States Encompassed Ruling Pertinent Cases 
First' Maine, New Hampshire, 
Massachusetts, Rhode 
Island, Territory of 
Puerto Rico 
Dress and hair codes unconstitu­
tional with some exceptions. 
Right of students to determine 
personal appearance is "implicit' 
in "liberty" assurance of due 
process clause. 
Richards v. Thur-
ston, 424 F. 2d 
1281 (1970) 
Second Vermont, New York, 
and Connecticut 
May be constitutional. (See 
later discussion.) 
Third Pennsylvania, New Jer­
sey, Delaware, Terri­
tory of Virgin Islands 
Fourth Maryland, West Virginia, 
Virginia, North Caro­
lina, South Carolina 
Fifth Florida, Georgia, 
Alabama, Mississippi, 
Louisiana, Texas, 
Canal Zone 
Sixth Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky, 
Tennessee 
Seventh Wisconsin, Illinois, 
Indiana 
No consistent pattern. 
Dress codes violate students' 
First Amendment rights. (There 
are some exceptions.) 
Constitutionally protected 
means of self-expression, 
but school officials can in­
fringe on right if there is 
compelling reason to do so. 
Disruption and distraction fac­
tors too great to uphold con­
stitutional rights of students 
(1970); hair style regulation 
struck down more recently. 
Long hair "may" disrupt school, 
but "may" is not sufficient 
reason to infringe on consti-
Massie v. Henry, 
455 F. 
(1972) 
2d 779 
Ferrell v. 
Dallas Indepen­
dent School Dis­
trict , 392 F. 2d 
697 (1969) 
Jackson v. Dor-
rier, 424 F. 
2d 213 (1970) 
Breen v. Kahl, 419 
F. 2d 1034 
(1969) £ 
CHART III (Cont'd) 
Eighth North Dakota, South 
Dakota, Nebraska, Minne­
sota, Missouri, Arkan­
sas, Iowa 
Ninth Alaska, Guam, Hawaii, 
Washington, Oregon, 
Idaho, Montana, Califor­
nia, Nevada, Arizona 
Tenth Wyoming, Utah, Colorado, 
Kansas, New Mexico, 
Oklahoma 
tutional right. Student's right 
to govern style and length of 
hair is a personal freedom pro­
tected under Ninth Amendment and 
due process clause of Fourteenth 
Amendment. Codes unconstitutional. 
Long hair is acceptable means of 
free expression; cannot be in­
fringed upon unless compelling 
interest can be shown. 
Crews v. Clones, 
432 F. 2d 1259 
(1972) 
Bishop v. Colaw, 
450 F. 2d 1069 
(1971) 
932 (1971) 
School regulation concerning dress King v. Saddleback 
and hair does not represent any Junior College Dis-
"substantial constitutional right trict, 445 F. 2d 
being infringed upon." 
Problems of students' dress and 
hair too inconsequential to take 
up time of U. S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals. 
Eleventh District of Columbia Inconsistent. 
While the Second Circuit has not ruled upon the issue of dress codes for stu­
dents, it did rule that reasonable dress codes for teachers were not in violation of any 
constitutional rights, and by inference, it can probably be assumed that dress codes may 
77 be constitutional for students m the Second Circuit. 
77 Connors, Student Discipline and the Law, pp. 43-44 
yo 
OJ 
94 
Dress and hair codes are unconstitutional in the 
First Circuit, where the United States Court of Appeals 
ruled that regulations limiting the length of hair are in-
7 8 valid. The First Circuit court ruled that a student's 
hair style is a personal right and liberty protected by the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and can be 
limited only where the hair style causes extreme disruptions. 
A district court in the First Circuit also held that prohibi­
tion in dress code against wearing of dungarees was unconsti­
tutional in absence of evidence that wearing of dungarees 
79 inhibited or tended to inhibit the educational process. 
Legal research did not reveal any cases concerning 
student dress and hair codes tried by the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals. However, the Tinker decision is, of course, valid 
in this circuit, since it was a Supreme Court decision. The 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that reasonable 
dress codes for teachers are not in violation of constitutional 
rights, so it can probably be assumed that dress codes may be 
8 0 constitutional in this circuit. 
However, a lower court in the Second Circuit held that 
an athletic grooming code requiring males to wear hair in a 
particular way was unconstitutional when evidence showed that 
^Richards v. Thurston, 424 F. 2d 1281 (1970). 
79 
Bannister v. Paradis, 316 F. Supp. 185 (1970). 
8 0 Connors, Student Discipline and the Law, p. 44; 
East Hartford Education Association v. Board of Education 
of the Town of East Hartford, 564 F. 2d 838 (1977). 
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there was no reasonable relation between the regulatory 
classification created by the dress code and the permissible 
81 objectives of a high school tennis program. The Supreme 
Court of Nassau County, New York, also in the Second Circuit, 
held that a dress regulation prohibiting girls from wearing 
slacks except when warranted by cold weather was invalid 
8 2 as beyond the power of the board. 
While several dress codes have been ruled upon in the 
Third Circuit, there does not appear to be any pattern or 
consistent reasoning in this circuit, and no standard policy 
• 4. 83 seems to exist. 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found it constitu­
tionally impermissible for public schools to impose hair codes 
84 on their students in Massie v. Henry. The Massie doctrine 
is equally applicable to all school-controlled activities, 
extending to school athletic programs as well as to school 
8 5 academic programs. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
8 6 ruled in Long that a student's football "letter" could not 
be withheld from him because he allowed his hair to grow long 
after the football season, contrary to the rules of the coach. 
Q *J 
Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411, 420 (1970). 
82scott v. Board of Education, Union Free School District 
No. 17, Hicksville, New York, 305 N. Y. S. 2d 601 (1969). 
83connors, Student Discipline and the Law, p. 44. 
84Massie v. Henry, 455 F. 2d 779 (1972). 
8^Long v. Zopp, 476 F. 2d 180 (1973). 
86Ibid., p. 181. 
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8 7 The Fifth Circuit, in- Burnside, ruled in favor of 
students. However, in 1969, the court changed its stand, 
holding that a regulation banning long hair was not violative 
of state constitution or statutes, the Fourteenth Amendment 
8 8 
to the federal Constitution, or Civil Rights statutes. 
Testimony in the later case indicated that various problems 
had arisen in the school due to the wearing of long hair by 
8 9 students. In 1972, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
again ruled in favor of school authorities, holding that "there 
is no constitutionally protected right to wear one's hair in a 
public high school in the length and style that suits the wearer. 
The court further stated that a regulation restricting length 
of hair in public high school does not restrict privacy and 
. 9 1  is not an invasion of a constitutional right of privacy. 
In 1970, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals followed 
the example of the Fifth Circuit, when it found that wearing 
of excessively long hair by male students "disrupted class­
room atmosphere and decorum, caused disturbances and distractions 
among other students, and interfered with the elucational process. 
p 7 
Burnside v. Byars, 363 F. 2d 744 (1966) . 
8 8 Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District, 392 
F. 2d 697 (1968). 
89Ibid., p. 700. 
90 
Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F. 2d 609 (1972). 
91Ibid., p. 214. 
^^Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F. 2d 213 (1970). 
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The court held that the principal's enforcement of the long 
hair regulation did not violate the constitutional right of 
9 3  . . .  privacy of students. Again m 1971, the Sixth Circuit Court 
of Appeals ruled that the hair length provision of the high 
school dress code did not deprive the student, who was sus­
pended for nonconformance with said rule, of any constitutional 
rights, was not unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and 
that there was a rational basis for its provision when con-
94 sidered in light of functions and purposes of the school. 
A district court in the Sixth Circuit held that sus­
pension of a student for violation of a code violated his 
First Amendment rights where the student was "symbolically ex­
pressing political viewpoint by wearing his hair long and no 
danger of violence or other impediment of school activities 
95 occurred." The court made it clear that the case did not 
96 . fall in the category of Jackson v. Dorrier. Evidence indica­
ted that plaintiff grew hair long to express his convictions 
regarding intolerance for dissent regarding the Vietnam War. 
The court found that there was clear communicative intent, which 
distinguished the case from others decided by the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, and placed it within the "ambits of the 
93Ibid., p. 214. 
94 
Gfell v. Rickelman, 441 F. 2d 444 (1971). 
95 Church v. Board of Education of Saline Area School 
District of Washtenaw County, Michigan, 339 F. Supp. 438 (1972). 
96 
Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F. 2d 213 (1970) . 
98 
97 First Amendment as considered by Tinker." 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals was the first 
appeals court to rule against school authorities in hair 
9 8 or dress cases. It held that "absent showing of any 
justification therefor, school board could not properly expel 
students and/or threaten to expel them for failing to conform 
to (hair) regulation." The court ruled that "the right to 
wear one's hair at any length and in any desired manner is 
an ingredient of personal freedom protected by United States 
99 Constitution... ." The Seventh Circuit has spoken repeatedly 
and forcefully on the issue of hair codes. In this circuit, 
the burden is now on the school board to establish substantial 
burden of justification for hair and dress codes. 
In 1971, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
a public high school dress code providing for regulation of 
hair length and style of male students was invalid and un­
enforceable where the regulation was not necessary to carry out 
the institutional mission of the high school. The court 
found virtually no evidence to support the school board's con­
tention that hair regulations were necessary to prevent dis-
97Ibid., p. 542. 
Q ft 
Breen v. Kahl, 419 F. 2d 1034, 1038 (1969). 
"ibid., p. 1035. 
100Crews v. Clones, 432 F. 2d 1259 (1970); Arnold v. 
Carpenter, 459 F. 2d 939 (1972) . 
"^"'"Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F. 2d 1069 (1971) . 
102 ruptions at St. Charles High School. The court indicated 
that the common theme underlying decisions striking down 
hairstyle regulations is that the Constitution guarantees 
rights not specifically enumerated, and that the right to 
govern personal appearance is one of these guaranteed rights. 
The court stated: 
We believe that, among those rights retained by the 
people under our constitutional form of government, 
is the freedom to govern one's personal appearance. 
As a freedom which ranks high on the spectrum of our 
societal values, it commands the protection of the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.103 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that no sub­
stantial constitutional rights had been infringed upon by 
enforcement of hair length codes in a high school district 
104 and junior college district m California. In King v. 
Saddleback and Olff v. East Side, the court stated that in 
the absence of clear violation of constitutional right, 
the burden is upon those "who assail school regulations" to 
prove the invalidity of such regulations."'"^ 
In three cases (from Utah, New Mexico, and Colorado) 
which were consolidated for trial, the Tenth Circuit Court 
of Appeals stated that "the United States Constitution and 
Statutes do not impose on federal courts duty and responsi­
bility of regulating hair styles of male students in state 
102Ibid., p. 1076. 
103ibid., p. 1075. 
lO^King v. Saddleback Junior College District and Olff 
v. East Side Union High School District, 445 F. 2d 932 (1971). 
lO^Ibid.t 933. 
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public schools, and problem, if any, is one for states and 
106 should be handled through state procedures." The court 
pointed out that the federal circuits are sharply divided 
on the constitutionality of hair regulations. It stated 
further: 
Recognition of the principle that neither students 
nor teachers "shed their constitutional rights to 
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse 
gate,' (393 K. S. at 506, 89 S. Ct. at 736) does 
not mean that the First Amendment contains an express 
command that the hair style of a male student in the 
public schools lies within the protected area.107 
The court indicated that complaints based on school 
regulations of the length of a male student's hair do not 
"directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional values" 
and are not cognizable in federal courts. For this reason, 
the court stated that the complaints should have been dismissed 
for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. 
The judgments of dismissal in the Utah and Colorado cases 
were affirmed, and the judgment in the New Mexico case was 
108 reversed and the case remanded with directions to dismiss. 
In a subsequent case, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
refused to hold that regulation prohibiting hair styles ex­
tending beyond shirt collar violated Pawnee Indian students' 
guarantees of freedom of speech, free exercise of religion, 
106 Freeman v. Flake; White v. Board of Education of 
Hobbs Municipal School District No. 16; and Cranson v. East 
Otero School, District R-l, 448 F. 2d 258 (1971). 
107 Ibid., p. 261. 
108Ibid., p. 262. 
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109 equal protection and due process. The court held that the 
Indian students did not present a substantial constitutional 
question where the regulation bore a rational relationship 
to state objective of instilling pride and initiative in stu­
dents; where tbs regulation was not drafted or enforced in 
such a way as to discriminate against Pawnee Indian students 
who wished to wear hair in long braids because of pride in 
their ancestry; and where it was not shown that the regulation 
was otherwise inherently suspect. Therefore, the court affirmed 
action of the district court in dismissing the complaint."'""'"̂  
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia has been inconsistent in rulings concerning this 
issue, and therefore, no guidelines can be provided for schools 
within this circuit. 
As indicated above, states located in the First, Fourth, 
Seventh, and Eighth Circuits are prohibited from regulating 
dress and hair styles among students; those in the Fifth. 
Sixth, and Ninth Circuits may regulate them; and states in 
112 
the Second and Tenth Circuits have no precedents except Tinker 
to rely upon. Rulings within the Third and Eleventh Circuit 
113 Courts of Appeal have been inconsistent. 
109 New Rider v. Board of Education of Independent 
School District No. 1, Pawnee County, Oklahoma, 480 F. 2d 
693 (1973). 
"̂ °Ibid. , p. 694. 
"'""'""''Connors, Student Discipline and the Law, p. 46. 
112 . Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District, 393 U. S. 503, 2 L. Ed. 2d 731, 89 S. Ct. 733 (1969). 
113 Connors, Student Discipline and the Law, pp. 46-47. 
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While the issue of the constitutionality of dress and 
hair codes is still undecided, through court action over 
the past ten years, a more liberal view is being taken by 
the courts, with more courts accepting the idea that a student's 
dress is a means of personal expression. In most cases where 
courts have upheld school regulations on dress and hair, school 
administrators have clearly demonstrated a compelling reason 
114 for the regulations. 
Suspension and Expulsion 
The legal principle is firmly established that school 
authorities have the right to suspend or expel from school 
any pupil who disobeys a reasonable rule or regulation. 
"Suspension" refers to the act of a professional member of 
the school staff in sending a student home, usually for a 
short period of time, or until the pupil conforms to a rule 
or regulation. "Expulsion" is an act of the school board, 
resulting in permanent or substantially permanent discharge 
of a student.^^ 
The law has been established for some years that the 
right to an education is a property right which cannot be 
taken from a student without due process of law, as provided 
in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
114 Ibid., p. 47. 
115 Edward C. Bolmeier, The School in the Legal Structure 
(Cincinnati: The W. H. Anderson Company, 1973), p. 278. 
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Constitution. The Fifth Amendment provides in part, "...nor 
shall any person be.... deprived of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law.""'""̂  
The Fourteenth Amendment follows: 
All persons born or naturalized in t„he United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens 
of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of the 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any state 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.-*-•'-7 
There are two types of due process, "procedural due 
process" and "substantive due process." Procedural due process 
makes it necessary that when one is to be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, that person must be given notice of the 
proceedings against him or her, must be given an opportunity 
to defend himself or herself (a hearing), and the propriety 
of the deprivation, under the circumstances presented, must 
118 be resolved fairly. 
Substantive due process may be defined as the "consti­
tutional guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his 
119 life, liberty, or property for arbitrary reasons." Sub­
stantive due process involves a standard of reasonableness. 
116 
U. S. Const, amend. V. 
117 U. S. Const, amend. XIV. 
118 
E. L. Bolmeier, Legality of Student Disciplinary 
Practices, pp. 37-38. 
119 Ibid., p. 39. 
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Such a deprivation must involve behavior which is forbidden 
by reasonable legislation which is reasonably applied, with 
laws operating equally. 
Early court cases invoking due process in student 
discipline dealt mainly with substantive due process. 
121 However, since In re Gault was decided m 1967, procedural 
122 due process has come into sharper focus. Although the 
main thrust of Gault was on limitations of juvenile courts, 
it established that the Fourteenth Amendment and Bill of 
123 Rights are applicable to all, regardless of age or status. 
Courts require minimum standards of fairness and due process 
of law for students where suspension or expulsion from school 
is to be a punishment. 
When suspension or expulsion is anticipated, school 
authorities should first examine state statutes for state 
requirements, and then determine requirements imposed by 
state and federal constitutions. Since most states have 
not adopted statutes setting procedures to be followed for 
suspension or expulsion of students, of most importance is 
the requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution that no person shall be deprived of "life, 
120t, . , Ibid. 
121 
In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1 (1967). 
122 Bolmeier, Legality of Student Disciplinary Practices, 
p. 41. 
123 Ibid., pp. 44-46, 
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liberty, or property, without due process of law." 2̂̂  
The United States Supreme Court has extended due 
process requirements to all school suspensions, whether 
125 short-term or long-term. Prior to 1975, immediate sus­
pension for up to ten days could be rendered without any 
12 6 127 process at all. In Goss v. Lopez, however, the 
United States Supreme Court set up certain minimal procedures 
which must be followed before a student can be removed from 
school for even a short-term suspension. 
The Supreme Court ruled that students have two interests 
which are entitled to due process protection. The first of 
these is the "property" interest in a public education. 
When a state chooses to provide a free public education for 
children and requires children to attend school, students 
acquire a property right which is protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. This property right cannot be taken away for 
misconduct without following minimum procedures required by 
the due process clause. 
The second interest held by students and protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment is the "liberty" interest. The 
United States Supreme Court concluded that suspensions of up 
124 Phay, The Law of Procedure m Student Suspensions 
and Expulsions, p. 1. 
12 5 
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565, 95 S. Ct. 729, 42 L. 
Ed. 2d 725 (1975). 
126Farrell v. Joel, 437 F. 2d 160 (1971). 
127Goss V. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565, 42 L. Ed. 2d 725, 
95 S. Ct. 725 (1975). 
12 8T, . j ... Ibid., p. 727. 
106 
to ten days could seriously damage students' standing with 
other pupils and teachers, and interfere with opportunities 
for higher education and employment, thereby doing serious 
damage to their "liberty," which required minimum due process 
129 protections. 
Short-Term Suspensions 
The Supreme Court has held that even suspensions of up 
to ten days are not so insubstantial that they should not be 
protected. The Court concluded: 
Neither the property interest in educational benefits 
temporarily denied nor the liberty interest in reputa­
tion is so insubstantial that a student's suspension 
from a public school may constitutionally be imposed 
by any procedure the school chooses, no matter how 
arbitrary. 1^0 
131 The Goss case involved students who were suspended 
from school for misconduct for up to ten days without a hearing. 
One student alleged that he was an innocent bystander and was 
suspended without having an opportunity to tell his story. 
Suspension was made under an Ohio statute. The United States 
Supreme Court affirmed action of a three-judge district court 
which had declared the Ohio statute unconstitutional in that 
it permitted up to ten days' suspension without notice or 
hearing, either before or after suspension, and violated the 
due process clause, and found each suspension invalid. 
129t, . , Ibid., P- 735. 
130Ibid., P- 728. 
131Ibid., P- 730. 
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The Court outlined the following minimum procedures 
required by the Constitution's due process clause when public 
school students are to be suspended for ten days or less: 
1. The student must be given oral or written 
notice of the charges against him. 
2. If the student denies the charges, he must 
be given an explanation of the evidence against 
him. 
3. The student must be given an opportunity to 
present his side of the story.-'-3 
The Court concluded that: 
1. There need be no delay between the time notice 
is given and the time of the hearing< 
2. In the great majority of cases, the discipli­
narian may informally discuss the alleged misconduct 
with the student minutes after it has occurred. 
3. In being given an opportunity to explain his 
version of the facts at this discussion, the student 
first must be told what he is accused of doing and 
what the basis of the accusation is. 
4. Since the hearing may occur almost immediately 
following the misconduct, notice and hearing should, 
as a general rule, precede the removal of the student 
from the school. 
5. However, there are recurring situations in 
which prior notice and hearing cannot be insisted upon. 
6. Students whose presence poses a continuing 
danger to persons or property or an ongoing threat 
of disrupting the academic process may be immediately 
removed from school. 
7. In such cases, the necessary notice and rudi­
mentary hearing should follow as soon as practicable. 3 
132 Ibid., p. 729. 
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Goss, therefore, determined that students have the 
right to a procedural due process hearing in suspensions of 
ten days or less, although the hearing may be informal and 
conducted quickly. The Court does not require a formal 
hearing with legal counsel and witnesses for short-term sus­
pensions, but merely an informal give and take prior to sus-
134 pension. 
The exception described in "5" above was applied by 
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in a case where students 
135 were suspended from school by a radio announcement. The 
Fifth Circuit Court pointed out that the educational process 
had been significantly disturbed when students left the 
school after staging a sit-down strike and disrupting classes; 
that since they did not return to school, hearings on the day 
of suspensions could not be held; that post-suspension con­
ferences were held on Monday after suspension on Thursday; 
that these conferences sufficed as informal sessions where 
students could air their views; and that no violation of 
X 3 6 procedural due process took place. 
As indicated above, the United States Supreme Court 
has set up universally acceptable standards for short-term 
suspensions, which can be met in a matter of a few minutes in 
137 simple situations. 
134 Connors, Student Discipline and the Law,,p. 16. 
135 
Sweet v. Childs, 507 F. 2d 675 (1975). 
136Ibid., p. 676. 
137 Connors, Student Discipline and the Law, p. 16. 
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Expulsions and Long-Term Suspensions 
In general, students may be suspended or expelled for 
conduct which disrupts the educational process or endangers 
the health or safety of the student, classmates, or school 
138 personnel. While the expulsion is not necessarily made 
pursuant to established school board regulations, most dis­
ciplinary actions are based on a breach of school regulations 
governing student conduct. 
Since school regulations are usually involved in court 
cases, their language is significant. Several courts have 
139 
found school regulations to be "unconstitutionally vague." 
Courts have reached the conclusion that: 
A legislative act or statute which is so vague, in­
definite and uncertain that courts are unable, by 
accepted rules of construction, to determine, with 
any reasonable degree of certainty, what the legis­
lature intended, or which is so incomplete or con­
flicting and inconsistent in its provisions that it 
cannot be executed, will be declared inoperative and 
void.1^0 
A federal district court in Texas stated that while 
school rules probably do not need to be as narrow as criminal 
statutes, if school officials contemplate severe punishment, 
they must exercise such punishment on the basis of a rule 
which is drawn so as to reasonably inform the student what 
141 specific conduct is proscribed. 
138 Phay, The Law of Procedure in Student Suspensions 
and Expulsions, p. 4. 
139 Eisner v. Stamford Board of Education, 440 F. 2d 
803 (1971) and Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F. 2d 1345 (1973). 
140 
Whitfield v. Simpson, 312 F. Supp. 889, 891 (1970). 
141 Sullivan v. Houston Independent School District, 
307 F. Supp. 1328, 1330 (1969). 
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Requirements of minimal due process in school expulsion 
and long-term suspension cases involve three main concerns: 
notice which is adequate, a fair hearing, and substantial 
142 evidence to support disciplinary action. 
Notice 
According to Robert E. Phay, the procedural due process 
requirement of proper notice obligates the school in several 
ways: 
1. The school must forewarn the student of the 
type of conduct which will subject him to expulsion. 
2. The school must give the accused student and 
his parents notice of the charges against him and 
the nature of the evidence supporting those charges. 
3. The school must tell the accused student 
where and when the hearing will occur. 
4. The school must inform the student of his 
procedural rights before a hearing.1^3 
A federal district court in Illinois held that a duty 
imposed by statute must be prescribed in terms definite enough 
144 to serve as guide for those who must comply with it. The 
student must understand the statute or regulation which sets 
out the conduct which will be subject to expulsion. 
According to ruling of a federal district court in 
Ohio, the school must furnish immediate written notice to 
student and parents of the reason for a student's removal 
142 Phay, The Law of Procedure in Student Suspensions 
and Expulsions, p. 27. 
143 
Ibid., pp. 7-9. 
1 44 Whitfield v. Simpson, 312 F. Supp. 889, 891 (1970). 
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from school and any proposed suspension, within twenty-four 
145 146 hours. In Keller, a district court also stated that 
a "student facing expulsion is entitled to timely and adequate 
notice of charges against him so as to allow him meaningful 
opportunity to be heard, even where student at hearing unequivo-
147 cally admits conduct charged." In DeJesus, a Connecticut 
court found that a student was denied due process when he was 
expelled on the basis of a charge of which he had neither notice 
nor opportunity to defend against. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
ruled that when suspended high school students were told that 
they could attend a board meeting, but were not given notice 
of the time or place of the meeting, procedural due process 
/I • A 148 was denied. 
Although several courts have held that a high school 
student must be given a minimum of five days' notice before 
a hearing on his expulsion, a Florida court ruled that due 
process was not offended where a university student was given 
only two days' notice that the president of the university 
149 would review case. 
"'"̂ L̂opez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 1279, 1280 (1973). 
146Keller v. Fochs, 385 F. Supp. 262 (1974). 
147 DeJesus v. Penberthy, 344 F. Supp. 70 (1972). 
148Strickland v. Inlow, 519 F. 2d 744 (1975). 
149 Center for Participant Education v. Marshall, 337 
F. Supp. 126, 127 (1972). 
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A Connecticut court suggested that school boards might 
"wish to consider the practice in use at many schools and 
colleges of giving accused students a brief written state­
ment of all their rights at the same time they are notified 
150 of the charges against them." 
Hearing 
While the "relationship between parents, pupils, and 
school officials need not be conducted in an adversary atmos-
151 
phere with the procedural rules applicable in a court of law," 
the right to a fair hearing is the most fundamental aspect of 
procedural due process, and must be conducted in accordance 
152 with the basic principles of due process. 
Procedural requirements for a fair hearing were set out 
in a case concerning the expulsion of a college student in 
153 Alabama. These requirements apply generally to secondary 
154 155 schools. Requirements, according to Dixon, include pro­
viding the student with names of witnesses, a report of facts 
to which each witness testifies, opportunity to present de­
fense against charges, and the right to produce either oral 
testimony or written affidavits of witnesses. 
l-^DeJesus v. „Penberthy, 344 F. Supp. 70, 77 (1972). 
ISljackson v. Dorrier, 424 F. 2d 213 (1970). 
-l-^Phay, The Law of Procedure in Student Suspensions 
and Expulsions, p. 10. 
-^•^Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F. 
2d 150, cert, denied, 368 U. S. 930 (1961). 
154phay, The Law of Procedure in Student Suspensions 
and Expulsions, pT TUT 
l^^Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F. 
2d 150, cert, denied, 368 U. S. 930 (1961). 
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In some instances, courts have held that the student 
may waive the right to a hearing. For example, a federal 
district court held that refusal of a student and his father 
to contact the superintendent following the student's dis­
missal constituted a waiver of right to any hearing with 
regard to subsequent dismissal.Courts have also held 
that an absence or deficiency of an initial hearing may be 
cured by a later valid hearing. A district court in Texas 
ruled that: 
Any lack of due process in hearing held before 
principal was fully cured by hearing before 
board of trustees at which due process re­
quirements were met.1^7 
A Florida district court also stated that: 
District court cured any deficiencies which might 
have existed in prior administrative or quasi-
judicial proceedings in relation to suspension of 
student from university by court's conducting a 
trial de novo in review of the suspension. 
However, a New York case held that when a suspended 
student had not responded to a school notice to contact 
the superintendent within five days to arrange the hearing, 
the school could not assume that student had waived right 
U • 159 to a hearing. 
Courts are divided over whether the school must provide 
160 a transcript of the hearing upon student request, and there 
"'"̂ Grayson v. Malone, 311 F. Supp. 987 (1970) . 
157 
Greene v. Moore, 373 F. Supp. 1194, 1195 (1974). 
158 Center for Participant Education v. Marshall, 337 
F. Supp. 126 (1972). 
159 
MacDonald v. Tompkins, 323 N.Y.S. 2d 1002, 1003 (1971). 
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is a question as to whether students are entitled to have 
counsel at the hearing. Courts are divided as to whether 
due process requires students to have counsel. However, it 
is probable that few courts would find that a student has no 
constitutional right to legal counsel when a hearing could 
result in expulsion. Many school regulations and state 
statutes now provide for student representation by counsel 
at expulsion hearings. Robert E. Phay recommends that the 
school permit the student to have counsel if student feels 
strongly that only legal counsel can represent interests 
, 160 properly. 
A Texas district court ruled that "fundamental to 
the requirements of due process is the opportunity to be 
heard before a fair and impartial tribunal of some nature, 
161 composed of neutral and detached persons." The court held 
that a student member of a high school honor society was denied 
procedural due process when the accusing witness who brought 
charges was a member of the council and sat as a judge in 
dismissal hearings. 
While the student may call witnesses in a school dis­
ciplinary hearing, courts disagree over the rights to confront 
and cross-examine witnesses and to compel witnesses to attend 
the hearing. The Fifth Circuit held that the right to cross-
160 Phay, The Law of Procedure in Student Suspensions 
and Expulsions, pp. 12-15. 
161 Warren v. National Association of Secondary School 
Principals, 375 F. Supp. 1043, 1044 (1974). 
115 
162 examine witnesses is not required, but a more recent case 
in North Carolina held that the right to confront and examine 
witnesses is a basic requirement of due process. 
A federal district court in California held that a 
comment by counsel on students' refusal to testify at expul­
sion hearing and arguments that guilt could be inferred from 
such refusal was a violation of students' Fifth Amendment 
164 rights. The court stated that a high school student's 
expulsion might well bring about more injury than conviction 
of a criminal offense. 
Evidence 
Disciplinary action must be taken only if the charges 
are supported by "substantial evidence. The following 
definition of "substantial evidence" was adopted by a federal 
court in Pennsylvania: 
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. 
It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.... 
Accordingly, it 'must do more than create a suspicion 
of the established.... it must be enough to justify, if 
the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict 
when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one 
of fact for the jury....' The substantiality of evidence 
must take into account whatever in the record fairly 
detracts from its weight.... Congress has merely made 
it clear that a reviewing court is not barred from 
setting aside a board decision when it cannot con-
scientously find that the evidence supporting that 
16 2 Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F. 
2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 368 U. S. 930 (1961). 
"^"^Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202 (1972) . 
164 
Gonzales v. McEuen, 435 F. Supp. 460 (1977). 
-j C C 
Slaughter v. Brigham Young University, 514 F. 2d 
622, 625 (1975). 
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decision is substantial, when viewed in the light 
that the record in its entirety furnishes, including 
the body of evidence opposed to the Board's view.166 
Students who feel that disciplinary action was improper 
have the right of appeal. Most state statutes provide for 
expulsion by the school board or review by the board of such 
expulsion. In most states, an appeal can be made from a 
final administrative decision to a state court if students 
think they have been denied statutory or constitutional 
rights or that the administrator or school board has acted 
arbitrarily or capriciously. However, most actions arise in 
the federal courts under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1871.167 
Corporal Punishment 
It has been held by the courts that when pupils are 
in school, the "in loco parentis" concept applies. This 
doctrine holds that school authorities stand in the place 
of parents while the child is in school, and may inflict 
reasonable corporal punishment on the pupil to enforce dis-
X 6 8 X 6 9 cipline. In Indiana State Personnel Board v. Jackson, 
the court stated, "Teacher stands in loco parentis to child, 
X 6 6 Still v. Pennsylvania State University, 318 F. Supp. 
608 (M. D. Pa. 1970), aff'd., 315 F. Supp. 125 (M. D. Pa.), 
aff'd., 462 F. 2d 463 (3rd Cir. 1972). 
X 6 7 Phay, The Law of Procedure in Student Suspensions 
and Expulsions, pp. 31-32. 
"'"̂ Guerrieri v. Tyson, 24 A. 2d 468 (1942) . 
169 Indiana State Personnel Board v. Jackson, 192 N. E. 
2d 740 (1963) ." 
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and his authority is no more subject to question than is 
authority of parent. 
According to Bolmeier, legal principles derived from 
court cases indicate that any corporal punishment administered 
should: 
1. Be in conformance with statutory enactment; 
2. Be for the purpose of correction without malice; 
3. Not be so cruel or excessive as to leave per­
manent marks or injuries; and 
171 4. Be suited to the age and sex of the pupil. 
The most important cases tried in recent years concern-
172 ing corporal punishment are Baker v. Owen (1975) and In-
173 graham v. Wright (1977). These two cases dealt with issues 
having to do with use of corporal punishment, and whether 
corporal punishment constitutes cruel and unusual punishment 
in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
The Baker case was instituted in North Carolina by a 
sixth grade student and his mother against a school principal 
and others, claiming that constitutional rights had been 
171 Edward C. Bolmeier, The School m the Legal Structure 
(Cincinnati: The W. H. Anderson Company, 1973), p. 277. 
"*"̂ Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294 (1975), aff'd., 
423 U. S. 907 (1976). 
"^^Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 51 L. Ed. 2d 711, 
97 S. Ct. 1401 (1977). 
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violated when plaintiff student was given two licks by 
a teacher, after request by mother that school officials 
not impose corporal punishment on student. A three-judge 
federal district court held that while the Fourteenth Amendment 
liberty embraces the right of parents generally to control 
the means of discipline for children, "the state has a counter­
vailing interest in the maintenance of order in the schools 
sufficient to sustain the right of teachers and school offi­
cials to administer reasonable punishment for disciplinary 
purposes.... and that the spanking of the student in question 
174 did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment." 
As to due process, the court held that "teachers and 
school officials must accord students minimal procedural due 
process in the course of inflicting such punishment," as 
follows: 
Except for those acts of misconduct which are so 
antisocial or disruptive in nature as to shock the 
conscience, corporal punishment may never be used 
unless student is informed beforehand that specific 
misbehavior will occasion its use and, subject to 
same exception, it should never be employed as first 
line of punishment for misbehavior, but should be 
used only after attempt has been made to modify be­
havior by some other means. 
Teacher or principal must punish corporally in 
presence of second school official, who must be 
informed beforehand and in student's presence of 
reason for punishment; student need not be afforded 
formal opportunity to present his side to second 
official. 
School official who has administered corporal 
punishment to student must provide child's parents, 
174 
Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294 (1975), aff'd., 
423 U. S. 907 (1976) . 
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upon request, written explanation of his reasons 
and name of second official who was present.175 
District court rulings were affirmed without comment 
by the Supreme Court in 1976. This case applied only to 
North Carolina. 
On April 19, 1977, the Supreme Court affirmed the 
judgment of a Florida district court and a panel of the 
176 Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Ingraham v. Wright, 
holding that disciplinary paddling of public school students 
did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation 
of the Eighth Amendment and that the due process clause did 
not require prior notice and a hearing before corporal punish­
ment was administered. 
The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall 
not be required nor excessive fines imposed nor cruel and 
177 unusual punishments inflicted." 
Plaintiffs' action was instituted to seek damages and 
injunctive and declaratory relief, and alleged that pur­
suant to a Florida law, students had been subjected to paddlings, 
without prior notice and a hearing, which were so severe as 
to keep one plaintiff out of school for eleven days and to 
deprive the other plaintiff of full use of his arm for a week; 
and that said paddlings were administered in violation of 
175Ibid., p. 296. 
"^^Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 51 L. Ed. 2d 
711, 97 S. Ct. 1401 (1977). 
•^^U. S. Const, amend. VIII. 
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constitutional rights. 
The United States Supreme Court stated that the Eighth 
Amendment was designed to protect those convicted of crime and 
did not apply to disciplinary corporal punishment of public 
school children.. The Court indicated that extension of the 
cruel and unusual punishment clause to corporal punishment of 
school children was not justified, because public schools are 
open to public scrutiny, are supervised by the community, and 
school officials are subject to legal constraints of the common 
law, so that excessive punishment could result in both civil and 
17 9 criminal liability for school officials under state law. 
The Court's reasoning for holding that the due process 
clause did not require prior notice and a hearing before the 
disciplinary paddling of students was that common law reme­
dies preserved under state law were adequate to afford due 
process, and that requiring such advance procedural safe­
guards would burden the use of corporal punishment and intrude 
180 into the area of educational responsibility. 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently decided 
a case which held that under certain circumstances, infliction 
of corporal punishment can violate a student's substantive 
181 due process rights. This ruling is significant, because 
178ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 51 L. Ed. 2d 711, 
97 S. Ct. 1401 (1977). 
179lbid., pp. 711-712. 
180Ibid., p. 712. 
18lnall v. Tawney, 621 F. 2d 607 (1980). 
a student, in the proper kind of case, can recover damages 
under 42 U. S. C., Section 1983. In this case, the court 
stated that: 
....the substantive due process inquiry in school 
punishment cases must be whether the force applied 
caused injury so severe, was so disproportionate to 
the need presented, and was so inspired by malice or 
sadism rather than a merely careless or unwise excess 
of zeal that it amounted to a brutal and inhumane 
abuse of official power literally shocking to the con­
science. 182 
Allegations in the complaint indicated that student 
was struck with a rubber paddle across left hip and thigh; 
that she was shoved into a desk and had arm twisted by 
teacher; that student was paddled again by teacher with 
permission and in the presence of the principal; that student 
was hospitalized for ten days for treatment of injuries to 
hip, thigh, and buttock; and that student was receiving treat­
ment of specialists for possible permanent injuries to lower 
back and spine. The court held that the complaint stated 
a cause of action against teacher and principal. 
While the Supreme Court has upheld the right of school 
officials to use corporal punishment, several states have 
banned the use of corporal punishment either through state 
statute or school board policy. In those states, the use of 
182Ibid., p. 614. 
183Ibid., p. 607. 
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corporal punishment is illegal. Some local school boards 
184 have also banned or restricted the use of corporal punishment. 
185 In Ingraham, the Supreme Court indicated that excessive 
corporal punishment may violate state statutes, and that 
school officials could be liable for civil damages as well. 
Search and Seizure 
School administrators are often called upon to search 
students and property, principally in connection with drugs. 
These searches have prompted courts to seek to settle the 
issue of applicability of the Fourth Amendment to the school 
setting. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their per­
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasona­
ble searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup­
ported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describ­
ing the place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized. ̂6 
The basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment, as recognized 
in many decisions of the United States Supreme Court, is to 
safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against 
187 arbitrary invasions by governmental officials. 
Since the Amendment does not define what constitutes a 
184 Connors, Student Discipline and the Law, p. 11. 
^^Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 51 L. Ed. 2d 
711, 712, 97 S. Ct. 1401 (1977). 
186 
U. S. Const, amend. IV. 
187 Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of 
San Francisco, 387 U. S. 523, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930, 87 S. Ct. 1727 
(1967) . 
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legal search nor what constitutes an unreasonable one, 
the courts have been asked to clarify these two questions. 
Until the last few years, school officials' searches 
of students and lockers were rarely challenged on consti­
tutional grounds. Most courts which had considered the 
question held that school personnel were considered pri­
vate persons, not constrained by Fourth Amendment prohi­
bitions against unreasonable searches and seizures by 
188 government officials. An example of these holdings can 
be found in the 1970 ruling of the Court of Civil Appeals of 
Texas, as follows: 
Unreasonable seizure forbidden by Fourth Amend­
ment is that taken through governmental actions, 
and security afforded by Amendment is not invaded 
by acts of individuals in which government has no 
part. 
Principal of high school who demanded that juvenile 
student disclose contents of his pockets was acting 
in loco parentis, and not for arm of government, 
thus discovery of marijuana upon such demand and 
upon threat to call student's father was not viola­
tion of juvenile's Fourth Amendment rights.189 
During the 1970's, however, the courts began to hold 
that "activities of a principal cum parent must be con­
sidered as the activities of a state official giving rise 
190 to constraints which flow from the Bill of Rights." Public 
school officials are now recognized as government officials 
188 Allen J. Peterson, "Student Rights: A Changing 
Emphasis," N. C. Education 8, No. 5 (January 1978): 11. 
1 ft Q 
Mercer v. State, 450 S. W. 2d 715 (1970). 
•'"̂ Picha v. Wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214 (1976). 
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191 operating "in loco parentis." 
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals found that the Fourth 
Amendment applies, but that the doctrine of "in loco parentis" 
lowers the standard applied to determine reasonableness of 
search when the search is conducted primarily by school offi-
192 cials to further school purposes. In developing this less 
stringent, "reasonable suspicion" standard, the courts place 
more weight on the "in loco parentis" doctrine and statutory 
responsibilities of school officials to protect the welfare 
193 and safety of students. One court concluded that the Reasona­
ble suspicion" standard protects students' rights by requiring 
school officials to show at least reasonable grounds for suspi­
cions that an unlawful act is being committed, before justify­
ing a student search when the school official is acting "in 
194 loco parentis." 
In analyzing a search to determine reasonableness, "the 
court must weigh the danger of the conduct, evidence of which 
is being sought, against the students' right of privacy and 
the need to protect them from the humiliation and psychological 
195 harms associated with such a search." In making an analysis 
191phay, Speech. 
l. v. Circuit Court of Washington County, 280 N.W. 
2d 343 (1979). 
l^Robert e. Phay and George T. Rogister, Jr., "Searches 
of Students and the Fourth Amendment," Journal of Law-Education 
5 (1976): 60. 
194pe0p]_e v. Jackson, 65 Misc. 2d 209, 319 N.Y.S. 2d 731, 
736 (1971), aff'd. 30 N.Y. 2d 734, 333, N.Y.S. 2d 167, 285 N.E. 
2d 153 (1952). 
195People v. D., 34 N.Y. 2d 483, 358 N.Y.S. 2d 403, 315 
N.E. 2d 466 (1974) . 
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as to reasonableness, some factors which warrant considera­
tion are: student's age, student's history, and student's school 
record, seriousness and prevalence of problem to which search 
is directed and exigency requiring that an immediate, warrant­
less search be made."*"̂  
The Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable 
searches has usually been interpreted as permitting a search 
only when: 
1. The person whose interests are involved con­
sents to the search; or 
2. There is probable cause to search and a warrant 
has been issued to authorize such search; or 
3. There is probable cause and exigent circumstances 
exist such that taking the time to obtain a warrant 
would frustrate the purpose for which the search is 
to be made; or 
4. A valid arrest has been made and the search is 
incident to the arrest.197 
When searches are made which do not comply with the 
above requirements, possible results are: 
1. A criminal prosecution for violation of privacy; 
2. A civil suit for violation of privacy; 
3. Declaring of evidence inadmissible in a school 
proceeding; 
4. Declaring of evidence inadmissible in a criminal 
proceeding.198 
1 Qfi 
Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47 (1977). 
197 Phay, Speech. 
198 Phay and Rogister, "Searches of Students and the 
Fourth Amendment," p. 58. 
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Research did not reveal any cases where school officials 
were criminally prosecuted. However, there are a growing num­
ber of cases where students are bringing civil suits against 
school officials, seeking damages for alleged deprivation of 
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches 
and seizures. Such an action was brought by eight high school 
students against school officials and the police, where stu­
dents were subjected to a strip search after a ring had been 
taken. The court held that even though police made the search, 
if it could be shown that school officials participated with 
police in making statements and taking action coercing stu­
dents to submit to search, school officials could be held per-
199 sonally liable. It has been made clear by the United States 
Supreme Court that school officials are not iitvmune from personal 
liability in such suits. 
Research did not reveal any cases involving school 
searches made by school administrators on school grounds where 
evidence was held not to be admissible in school disciplinary 
proceedings in elementary and secondary schools. In consider­
ing whether evidence is admissible in criminal proceedings, 
the courts consider the following questions: 
1. Did the school official act alone or in con­
cert with police? 
2. Why was the search instituted? (Was the need to 
enforce school discipline or to discover evidence for 
criminal prosecution?) 
1 9 9  
Potts v. Wright, 357 F. Supp. 215 (1973) . 
200Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308, 95 S. Ct. 992, 
43 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1975) . 
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201 3. What was the place searched? 
Searches by School Officials Acting Alone 
Where school officials were acting alone and a search 
was made for the purpose of enforcing student conduct rules, 
the courts have helu that the Fourth Amendment requires less 
stringent standards, and that contraband seized by school 
officials may be used in a court trial, provided the school 
can show "reasonable suspicion" or reasonable grounds. Evi­
dence can be used in an expulsion from school or by the prosecu-
4. 202 tor m court. 
A New York court held that where a high school dean of 
boys received information from student informers concerning 
student defendants, had them come into his office and empty 
their pockets which contained narcotics, and where there was 
no basis for belief that the dean was acting for police, such 
evidence was admissible. 
The Supreme Court of Georgia held that: 
Searches of students by public school officials acting 
in their proper capacity without the involvement of 
law enforcement personnel for purpose of maintaining 
educational atmosphere are reasonable under Fourth 
Amendment on less than probable cause.204 
The court held that search of a high school student by 
201  Phay, Speech. 
202 t ,  .  ,  Ibid. 
203 People v. Stewart, 63 Misc. 2d 601, 303 N.Y.S. 2d 
142 (1970) 
204 State v. Young, 216 S. E. 2d 586 (1975) 
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an assistant principal, who observed furtive gestures on the 
part of the student and companions did not violate Fourth 
Amendment; and that the exclusionary rule did not require 
suppression of marijuana found on the student, regardless of 
whether search violated the student's constitutional rights, 
stating: 
Although public school officials are governmental 
officers subject to some Fourth Amendment limita­
tions in searching their students, even if they 
violate those limitations, exclusionary rule is 
not available to students to exclude from evidence 
items illegally seized, but students are relegated 
to other remedies law affords them, whether by actions 
based upon claimed violation of their civil rights by 
state officers or by tort claim seeking damages.205 
School officials must be able to show "reasonable sus­
picion," although the facts held to justify reasonable sus-
2 06 
picion have varied from case to case. In Bellnier, a 
district court stated: 
Where there were no facts which allowed school 
officials to particularize with respect to which 
pupil might have possessed allegedly stolen $3, 
search of entire fifth grade class was invalid under 
Fourth Amendment.... 
For purpose of determining reasonableness of school 
officials' strip search of fifth grade pupils, court 
would determine search to be unreasonable unless 
there was demonstrated existence of some articulable 
facts which together provided reasonable grounds to 
search pupils and unless search was in furtherance 
of legitimate purpose with respect to which school 
officials were empowered to act, such as maintenance 
of discipline or the detection and punishment of 
misconduct.207 
205Ibid., pp. 586-587. 
^^Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 42 (1977) . 
2®7Ibid., pp. 47-48. 
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A 1979 case tried in a district court in New York held 
that an initial search of the book bag of a female high school 
student by a teacher, who had no information that the student 
had stolen the property in her possession^ was invalid, as was 
a subsequent body search. The court concluded that the teach­
er's actions could not be defended on grounds that they were 
208 undertaken in good faith. 
In a 1974 case, the New York Court of Appeals ruled 
that the fact that a high school student was observed twice 
within an hour entering the toilet with a fellow student and 
exiting within five to ten seconds; that the student had been 
under observation for six months for possible dealing in drugs; 
and that the student had been observed having lunch with ano­
ther student under suspicion did not justify the student's 
search by a teacher. The court held that the drugs taken from 
the student's wallet during the strip search were obtained 
209 illegally and should have been suppressed. 
Joint Searches by School Officials 
and Law Enforcement Officers 
If a search is initiated by police and conducted jointly 
by school officials and police for the primary purpose of 
discovering evidence of a crime, courts have tended to hold 
that search and seizure standards applicable in criminal 
4- U 4. 210 cases must be met. 
208M. M. V. Anker, 477 F. Supp. 837 (1979). 
209People v. Scott D., 315 N. E. 2d 466 (1974). 
210phay, The Law of Procedure in Student Suspensions and 
Expulsions, p. 44. 
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In a civil action for damages against school officials, 
a United States district court in Illinois held that even 
where school officials had initiated the search and called on 
police before conducting it, when the search was at least 
partly a quest for illegal items, civil rights violation could 
be found by jury if police proximately caused any student 
to be searched without probable cause to believe student was 
breaking the law by possessing an illegal substance on person. 
The court stated that: 
School officials cannot claim immunity when they 
violate the well-settled rights of their students.... 
No case can be found contradicting the notion that 
when a government official works with the police to 
conduct a search which is, at least in part, in the 
nature of a criminal investigation, and which occa­
sions such an invasion of privacy as in the present 
case, that search is subject to the reasonableness of 
the Fourth Amendment.211 
In a case involving a warrantless search of two college 
students' dormitory rooms, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
stated that where a warrantless search of dormitory rooms 
had been conducted by university officials and police narcotics 
agents (after law enforcement agents had informed the university 
that they had information that drugs were in the rooms of 
several students and asked permission to search the rooms), the 
drugs recovered were inadmissible as evidence in court because 
they were the fruit of an unreasonable search. The court held 
that the university did not have the right to consent to a search 
2̂ "1Picha v. Wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 1215 (1976). 
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for evidence "for the primary purpose of a criminal prosecu-
..212 tion. 
The search of a high school student by a school security 
guard, employed by the board of education to maintain school 
safety and control student crime and disturbances, was held 
to be unlawful, and the marijuana seized was held inadmissible 
as evidence in a criminal charge. The guard stopped a student 
in the school corridor because he was wearing a coat fitting 
the description of a coat worn by a person who had stolen a 
watch, and not because he suspected the defendant of possessing 
drugs. The guard asked defendant student to empty his pockets 
when he saw a brown envelope protruding from the pocket of 
defendant's pants. The envelope contained marijuana. The 
court found that the security guard was acting as an agent 
of the city government, cloaked with police powers; that he 
acted on the "skimpiest of hunches;" and that the "case involved 
neither probable cause for a lawful arrest nor consent nor 
213 abandonment nor exigent circumstances." 
When school officials, in seeking to maintain order and 
to determine whether a school regulation or criminal statute 
has been violated, have asked for police assistance in con­
ducting a search, the lesser "reasonable suspicion" standard 
has usually been applied. Courts have concluded that police 
212 
Piazzola v. Watkins, 442 F. 2d 284 (1971). 
213 
People v. Bowers, 339 N. Y. S. 2d 783 (1973). 
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may conduct the search based on the reasonable suspicion of 
214 215 school officials. However, as pointed out above, Picha 
is an exception to this rule. 
The Supreme Court of Illinois held that officers who 
searched a student and removed a gun from the student's pants 
pocket could reasonably search the student immediately after 
having been informed by school officials that school had 
anonymous information that student had a gun. The gun was 
found to be admissible as evidence at student's delinquency 
216 hearing. A New York court held that when a patrolman 
was summoned after narcotics were found on a student, the 
217 narcotics were admissible as evidence. 
218 As indicated earlier, however, the court in Picha 
held that a jury could find civil rights violation if police 
proximately caused a student to be searched without probable 
cause to believe that the student was breaking the law by 
possessing an illegal substance. 
Nature of Place Searched 
In determining the applicability of the Fourth Amendment 
to school searches and the standards to be applied, the courts 
have looked closely at the nature of the place to be searched. 
214phay, The Law of Procedure in Student Suspensions and 
Expulsions, p. 44. 
215picjia v> wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214 (1976) . 
216people v. Boykin, 237 N. E. 2d 460 (1968) . 
217peopie v> Stewart, 63 Misc. 2d 601, 313 N. Y. S. 2d 
253 (1970). 
218picha v> wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214 (1976). 
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The nature of the place searched may determine whether the 
person had a reasonable expectation of privacy in that 
219 place. Cases m elementary and high schoo2s have dealt 
mainly with searches of student lockers and searches of 
students' persons. 
Searches of Student Lockers 
Two cases which reached the United States Supreme 
Court give help in determining how far a school administrator 
2 2 0  may go in searching school lockers. In People v. Overton, 
the facts indicated that three police detectives presented a 
search warrant to a high school vice-principal which appeared 
to authorize search of two students and lockers. When nothing 
was found in search of students, the vice-principal opened the 
school locker of one student, and found four marijuana cigarettes. 
Although the warrant as to school lockers was later declared 
defective, the court denied motion of Overton to suppress 
the contents of the search, on the grounds that the vice-
principal had voluntarily consented to search, and that he had 
the right to do so. 
Overton's conviction was reversed by the Appellate Term 
of the Supreme Court, where the court held that since consent 
for search was induced by search warrant, it was not freely 
219 Phay, The Law of Procedure in Student Suspensions 
and Expulsions, p. 46. 
220People v. Overton, 20 N. Y. 2d 360, 283 N. Y. S. 2d 
22, 229 N. E. 2d 596, vacated and remanded, 393 U. S. 85 (1968), 
original judgment aff'd. at 24 N. Y. 2d 522, 301 N. Y. S. 2d 
479, 249 N. E. 2d 366 (1969). 
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given. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the decision 
of the Supreme Court Appellate Term and reinstated the 
original conviction. The court stated: 
It is doubtful if a school would be properly dis­
charging its duty of supervision over the students 
if it failed to retain control over the lockers. 
Not only have the school authorities a right to 
inspect but this right becomes a duty when suspi­
cion arises that something of an illegal nature 
may be secreted there. When Dr. Panitz learned 
of the detectives' suspicion, he was obligated to 
inspect the locker. This interest, together with 
the nonexclusive nature of the locker, empowered 
him to consent to the search by the officers.22-^-
The case was then appealed to the United States Supreme 
Court, which vacated the judgment of the New York Court of 
Appeals and remanded the case back to the New York courts 
for further consideration in light of the Supreme Court de-
222 cision m Bumper v. North Carolina. 
223 Bumper held that a search could not be justified 
as lawful when consent to search was given only after the 
official conducting the search had asserted that he possessed 
a search warrant. In a rehearing of the Overton case by 
the New York Court of Appeals, the court reaffirmed the 
previous conclusion, holding that the Bumper decision was 
not relevant, because the vice-principal had consented to the 
224 search without coercion by the search warrant. 
221Ibid., pp. 362-363. 
222 Bumper v. North Carolina 391 U. S. 543, 20 L. Ed. 
2d 797, 88 S. Ct. 1788 (1968). 
223ibid. 
224people v. Overton, 20 N. Y. 2d 360, 283 N. Y. S. 2d 
22, 229 N. E. 2d 596, vacated and remanded, 393 U. S. 85 (1968), 
original judgment aff'd. 24 N. Y. 2d 522, 301 N. Y. S. 2d 479, 
249 N. E. 2d 366 (1969). 
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A more recent decision in Kansas held that school au­
thorities have the right to search a student's locker without 
a search warrant upon reasonable belief that a locker con-
225 tains something which is prohibited. In Stein, the Kansas 
Supreme Court upheld a burglary conviction based on the dis­
covery of stolen goods in a bus station locker, which was 
opened with a key recovered from defendant's school locker. 
The defendant had consented that the principal open the school 
locker in the presence of police. The court upheld the search 
on the basis of the consent and the nature of the school locker. 
The court concluded that while the student could control the 
locker as opposed to other students, possession was not ex­
clusive against school and its officials. The court pointed 
out that the principal had a master list of all lock combina­
tions and a key to open all school lockers. The court con­
sidered the right of inspection of lockers inherent in the 
authority vested in school administrators to manage schools 
2 2 6 and protect students. 
Based upon these cases, it appears that evidence which 
has been seized by school officials from a student's locker 
without warrant or the student's permission may be introduced 
in a criminal trial, when school officials had reasonable 
grounds for search. Also, school officials may authorize a 
police search when they have reasonable grounds to believe that 
State v. Stein, 203 Kan. 638, 456 P. 2d 1 (1969), 
cert, denied 397 U. S. 947 (1970). 
22<5lbid. 
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a crime has been committed and that evidence of the crime 
227 may be within the locker. 
However, even if warrants are not required for searches 
of lockers by school officials, such a search cannot be classi­
fied as administrative unless it is a general search of all 
lockers for the purpose of enforcing school regulations of 
health, safety or order (general searches for rotting food, 
missing library books, etc.). The searches approved in the 
cases above involved searches focusing on individual students,-
seeking evidence of violations of school regulations and 
228 criminal statutes. 
Search of a Student's Person 
Most courts have upheld the "reasonable suspicion" 
standard in testing the legality of a search of the student's 
person. However, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, while 
upholding the "reasonable suspicion" standard in a 1979 case, 
stated that as the intrusiveness of the search intensifies, 
the 
standard of Fourth Amendment 'reasonableness' ap­
proaches probable cause, even in the school context. 
Thus, when a teacher conducts a highly intrusive 
invasion such as the strip search in this case, it is 
reasonable to require that probable cause be present. 
230 In M. M. v. Anker, a fifteen-year-old student sued 
school administrators for violation of Fourth Amendment rights 
against an unreasonable search. The girl had been discovered 
227pftay an£ Rogister, "Searches of Students and the 
Fourth Amendment," p. 66. 
f pp_ 66-67. 
229M. M. V. Anker, 607 F. 2d 589 (1979). 
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after a fire drill, crouched behind a door with another stu­
dent's pocketbook. She had also taken down some classroom 
posters to give to her sister. The student gave the pocketbook 
up when another student claimed it. Although no theft had been 
reported, the dean searched the student, stating that the rea­
son for search was the desire to clear the student in the 
event she was accused of stealing. Upon request, the student 
dumped the contents of the bookbag onto the table. When the 
dean reached for a bus pass holder, the student grabbed it. The 
dean stated that she saw what appeared to be a marijuana pipe 
in holder. M. M. refused to surrender the holder and threw 
it onto a table, from which it fell to the floor and was re­
trieved by the student. When the student made a tucking mo­
tion at the waistband of her jeans as she handed the holder 
back, the dean had a search of the room made for the pipe, 
which was not found. Female security guards then searched 
the student down to her underwear. The search produced nothing. 
A jury returned a verdict for the school administrators, 
finding that reasonable grounds for search existed, and that 
it was not unreasonably intrusive. The judge reversed the 
jury and directed a verdict against defendants, stating that 
the information upon which the search was made did not even 
come up to the lower "reasonable suspicion" standard. The 
judge stated: 
To justify searching a high school child for a possi­
ble stolen object, it is indispensable that there be a 
reliable report that something is missing, and not a 
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report, however reliable, that the suspected student 
had an opportunity to steal.231 
232 In another 1979 case, an Indiana district court held 
that a nude search of a student solely upon continued alert of 
a trained drug-detecting canine was unreasonable. In Doe, school 
administrators had a canine drug-detection team brought into 
junior and senior high schools in Highland, Indiana, and asked 
for assistance of police after the problem of illicit drug use 
had become more and more acute. School administrators made it 
clear to police that criminal investigations were not to be made 
as a result of any evidence recovered. School officials did in­
tend, however, to bring necessary disciplinary actions against 
students possessing drugs or drug paraphernalia. During the in­
spection by the canine team, body searches were conducted with 
respect to eleven students, because the dog continued to alert 
to them. As a result of body searches and emptying of pockets 
or purses, seventeen students were found in possession of drugs. 
However, plaintiff, who was one of the students on whom a 
body search was conducted, informed officials that she had never 
used marijuana, and no drugs were found on her, although the 
dog had alerted to her approximately fifty times. It was later 
discovered that plaintiff had been playing with a dog themorning 
of the search, and that the dog had been in heat. 
The court held that the presence of the marijuana-
sniffing dog and its trainer in the school classrooms for the 
purpose of aiding school administrators in observation for 
231 M. M. v. Anker, 477 F. Supp. 837, 839 (1979). 
232 
Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012 (1979) . 
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drug abuse was not, of itself, a "search;" that the walking 
up aisles and sniffing by the dog were not violations of 
students' constitutionally protected rights, where school 
officials had independent evidence indicating drug abuse 
within the school and evidence from students of refusal to 
speak out against drug users for fear of reprisals; that 
search of student's pockets was an invasion of the sphere of 
privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment, but that the alert 
by the marijuana-sniffing dog constituted reasonable cause 
to believe that student was concealing narcotics, and thus, 
there was no violation of student's Fourth Amendment rights; 
but that the conducting of nude search solely on the continued 
alert of a trained drug-detecting canine, without existence 
of other facts which would reasonably lead school officials to 
believe a student possessed drugs, was unreasonable even 
under the lesser "reasonable cause to believe" standard applica-
233 ble to school searches. 
2 34 In a 1980 case, a United States district court m 
Texas held that public school officials' subjection of stu­
dents and automobiles to a blanket "sniff-search" by a dog 
trained to detect illegal drugs constitutes unreasonable 
search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. The court viewed 
the dog's inspection as being virtually equivalent to a physical 
entry into students' pockets and personal possessions. The 
233ibid., p. 1013. 
234 Jones v. Latexo Independent School District, 4 9 
U.S.L.W. 2232 (1980). 
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court further stated that the announcement by school officials 
that individual rights were about to be infringed through sur­
prise inspections by the dog could not justify the subsequent 
infringement. The court was critical of the approval of blanket 
235 sniff-search m Doe. 
A strip search of a fifth grade class where school offi­
cials had no facts to particularize with respect to which 
pupil might have possessed stolen money, was found to be invalid 
236 under the Fourth Amendment. 
Although most courts have upheld the "reasonable sus­
picion" standard, as searches become more intrusive, involv-
237 xng strip searches, it is evident that the standard rises. 
The United States Supreme Court has not decided any 
cases governing Fourth Amendment rights of public school 
students. The law relating to balancing of students' con­
stitutional rights and the interests of the state in maintain­
ing order and discipline in the public school is one of the 
most rapidly changing areas of school law. Although recog­
nizing Fourth Amendment protection of students from "unreasona­
ble" searches by school officials, courts in defining reasona­
bleness have usually struck the balance in favor of order and 
238 discipline in the schools. 
^"^Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012 (1979). 
23-^Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47 (1977) . 
^^Phay, Speech. 
238 Phay and Rogister, "Searches of Students and the 
Fourth Amendment," p. 72. 
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Marriage and Parenthood 
A number of cases have been tried concerning rules 
and regulations dealing with married students, pregnant 
students, and students who have become parents. Courts have 
attempted to determine the extent to which school authori­
ties can deny or restrict the right to attend the public 
schools and to participate in extracurricular activities. 
School Attendance 
The courts have established that students cannot be 
prohibited from school attendance on a permanent basis solely 
239 because of marriage. A Texas court held that a school 
board rule excluding married students from school, upon grounds 
that when a student married, he or she became an adult and 
240 could no longer be considered a youth, was void. 
It has also been judicially determined that a school 
241 board cannot compel school attendance of married students. 
In a Louisiana case, the court held that a married, fourteen-
year-old girl could not be compelled to attend school, because 
242 she had been "irrevocably emancipated." 
239McLeod v. State, 154 Miss. 468, 122 So. 737 (1929). 
240 Alvin Independent School District v. Cooper, 404 
S. W. 2d 76 (1966). 
241State v. Priest, 210 La. 389, 27 S. 2d 173 (1946). 
242 In re State m Interest of Goodwin, 214 La. 1062, 
39 S. 2d 731 (1949). 
In recent years, courts have invalidated school board 
rules prohibiting school attendance by unwed mothers or 
pregnant, unwed girls. The position of the courts seems to 
be that such girls should be given the opportunity for rehabili­
tation and a future education. 
24 3 In Perry v. Grenada, two unwed mothers had been re­
fused readmission to school, pursuant to a school board ruling. 
The court stated that "any rule which fastens on one wrong, 
and never permits a person to change his position or condition 
is indeed on tenuous grounds." The court ruled that the 
plaintiffs were entitled to readmission, unless on a fair 
hearing, they were found to be so lacking in moral character 
that their presence would taint the education of other stu­
dents. The court made the following statement: 
But the fact that a girl has one child out of wed­
lock does not forever brand her as a scarlet woman, 
undeserving of any chance for rehabilitation or 
the opportunity for future education.^44 
An action was brought by a fifteen-year-old mother in 
Georgia, challenging school officials' denial of her re­
admission as a regular, daytime student. The school had offered 
her the opportunity to attend night school. The court held 
that the school policy requiring students who marry or become 
parents to attend a fully accredited night school did not 
penalize plaintiff nor deprive her of any entitlement. However, 
243 Perry v. Grenada Municipal Separate School District, 
300 F. Supp. 748 (1969). 
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the court stated that the defendants' policy of requiring the 
plaintiff to pay night school tuition and to provide her own 
textbooks was unconstitutional, and defendants were permanently 
245 enjoined from taking such action. 
An unmarried, pregnant student in a Massachusetts high 
school was told by the principal that she must stop attending 
regular classes in the school. The student was given permission 
to use school facilities after school hours, to seek help from 
teachers after school, to receive free tutoring, and to be 
tested by teachers. The student brought action against the 
principal and school committee, seeking an injunction which 
would require school officials to allow her to attend school 
on a full-time, regular class hour basis. The court ordered 
school authorities to readmit plaintiff to regular atten-
246 dance. 
Extracurricular Activities 
Until 1972, courts had upheld the power of school 
boards to limit participation of married students in extra­
curricular activities. Since 1972, however, an opposite 
247 judicial view has predominated. 
The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed by a divided court 
in 1960 that a school district had not violated the statute 
245Houston v. Prosser, 361 F. Supp. 295 (1973) . 
246ordway v. Hargraves, 323'F. Supp. 1155 (1971). 
247e. Edmund Reutter, Jr., and Robert R. Hamilton, 
The Law of Public Education (Mineola, New York: The Founda­
tion Press, Inc., 1976), p. 2. 
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guaranteeing all students an equal right to public educational 
facilities by excluding married high school students from par­
ticipation in co-curricular activities.2̂ ® 
A rule precluding married high school students from 
participating in extracurricular activities was held to be 
valid in preventing a married student from playing basketball 
249 in an Ohio high school m 1962. 
In 1967, it was held by the Iowa Supreme Court that 
a school board rule barring participation in extracurricular 
activities by married students was based on reasonable grounds 
and did not deny a student equal protection.250 
A change in judicial thinking became apparent in 1972, 
when a United States district court in Houston, Texas, ren­
dered judgment in favor of a student, enjoining school authori­
ties from enforcing a regulation pertaining to married stu­
dents' exclusion from extracurricular activities. In this 
action, brought by a married, sixteen-year-old girl, the 
student had been excluded from participation in the chess 
club, on-stage participation in drama and choir, and eligibility 
for membership in the National Honor Society. The court made 
the following statement: 
248 Cochrane v. Board of Education of the Mesick Con­
solidated School District, 103 N. W. 2d 569 (1960). 
24 9 State of Ohio ex rel. Baker v. Stevenson, 189 N. E. 
2d 181 (1962). 
250 Board of Directors of the Independent School District 
of Waterloo v. Green, 147 N. W. 2d 854 (1967). 
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Any and all extracurricular activities cannot rational­
ly or legally be disassociated from school courses 
proper where they do or may form an element in future 
collegiate eligibility or honors as here. Such a prac­
tice is not only discriminatory on its face, but is 
fundamentally inconsistent with the state's promise of 
a public education for its youth upon an equal basis.25! 
Another case heard in 1972 concluded with a similar find­
ing when the court held that a regulation prohibiting married 
students from participating in extracurricular activities in-
252 fringed upon married students' fundamental right to marry. 
253 In Davis v. Meek, an Ohio district court entered 
judgment that a school board rule excluding married students 
from extracurricular activities was an improper invasion of 
marital privacy, and issued an injunction against the school 
board. 
An injunction was granted against the school district in 
254 Moran v. School District, restraining it from enforcing a 
rule concerning prohibition of married students' participation 
in extracurricular activities against plaintiff student. A 
Texas district court ruled that a school district's policy of 
excluding married students from engaging in interscholastic 
255 league athletic activities was unconstitutional. 
In 1974, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals held that a 
regulation prohibiting married high school students from 
25lRomans v. Crenshaw, 354 F. Supp. 868 (1972). 
252Holt v. Shelton, 341 F. Supp. 821 (1972). 
253Davis v. Meek, 344 F. Supp. 298 (1972). 
254jy[0ran v> School District No. 7, Yellowstone County, 
350 F. Supp. 1180 (1972). 
255Hollon v. Mathis Independent School District, 358 F. 
Supp. 1269 (1973). 
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participating in extracurricular activities was violative 
256 ' of the equal protection clause. 
In 1977, it was ruled by the Colorado Court of Appeals 
that school board policy prohibiting married students from 
participating in extracurricular activities was invalid as 
a denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The court held that students had a fundamental right to enter 
the marriage relationship, and the reasons given by the school 
board for the policy did not establish a compelling state 
257 
interest to justify violation of this right. 
It is evident from court rulings that students cannot 
be excluded from extracurricular activities solely because 
they are married. 
Rights of Handicapped Children 
Since 1954 when the United States Supreme Court established 
the principle that all children must be guaranteed equal edu-
2 58 cational opportunity, courts have been active in deciding 
cases regarding the right to equality of educational opportunity 
for handicapped children. They have established that right. 
Where selected students have been excluded from school 
under discriminatory practices, courts have strictly scruti­
nized the decisions of educators. The United States Supreme 
Court has implied that any attempt by a state to deny completely 
256 Bell v. Lone Oak Independent School District, 507 
S. W. 2d 636 (1974). 
257 Beeson v. Kiowa County School District, 567 P. 2d 
801 (1977). 
258 
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U. S. 483 
98 L. Ed. 873, 74 S. Ct. 686 (1954). 
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a public education to selected children would be seen as im-
259 pairing a fundamental right of liberty. 
Lower courts have focused on rulings relating to total 
exclusion of certain children from public schools. A class 
action was instituted in Pennsylvania under the Civil Rights 
Act of 1871, on behalf of all retarded persons between the ages 
of six and twenty-one who were excluded from public education. 
A three-judge panel of the federal district court for the east­
ern district of Pennsylvania held in a consent judgment that 
no child in Pennsylvania could be denied admission to a public 
school program or have educational status changed without 
procedural due process of law. The state was declared obliga­
ted to place each "mentally retarded child in a free, public 
program of education and training appropriate to his capaci-
260 ty." This was the first case in what has become a national 
movement to establish the principle that all handicapped chil-
261 dren have a constitutional right to a public education. 
The principle established in the Pennsylvania consent 
262 order was followed in Mills v. Board of Education, a 
Washington, D. C., case which expanded the right to an appro­
priate public education beyond the mentally retarded to all 
children labeled as behavioral problems, mentally retarded, 
259san Antonio Independent School District v. Rodri­
guez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973). 
260pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. 
Commonwealth, 34 3 F. Supp. 2 79 (1972). 
26lMartin, The Impact of Current Legal Action on Edu­
cating Handicapped Children, p. 11^ 
262Mills v. Board of Education of the District of 
Columbia, 348 F. Supp. 866 (1972). 
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emotionally disturbed, or hyperactive. The district court 
held that the conduct of the District of Columbia board of 
education in denying children labeled as behavioral problems, 
mentally retarded, emotionally disturbed, or hyperactive 
and their class , a publicly supported education while 
providing such education to other children violated the due 
263 process clause. Since this ruling was made on a consti­
tutional issue, it established stronger legal precedent than 
264 the consent order issued in the Pennsylvania case. The 
court further ruled that due process of law required a hear­
ing before children who had been labeled behavioral problems, 
mentally retarded, emotionally disturbed, or hyperactive, 
were suspended or expelled from regular schooling in publicly 
265 supported schools or reassigned for specialized instruction. 
In Mills, the judgment stated that: 
No child eligible for a publicly supported education 
in the District of Columbia public schools shall be 
excluded from a regular public school assignment by 
a rule, policy, or practice of the Board of Education 
of the District of Columbia or its agents unless such 
child is provided (a) adequate alternative educational 
services suited to the child's needs, which may include 
special education or tuition grants, and (b) a consti­
tutionally adequate prior hearing and periodic review 
of the child's status, progress, and the adequacy of 
any educational alternative.266 
The court adamantly stressed that no student could be 
excluded from publicly supported education on the basis of 
263Ibid., p. 867. 
264 McCarthy and Thomas, "The Right to an Education: New 
Trends Emerging from Special Education Litigation," p. 78. 
265Mills v. Board of Education of the District of 
Columbia, 348 F. Supp. 866 (1972). 
266Ibid., p. 878. 
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a claim of insufficient resources and that inadequacies of 
the District of Columbia public school system, whether 
occasioned by insufficient funding or administrative in­
efficiency, could not be permitted to bear more heavily on 
the exceptional or handicapped child than on normal chil-
267 dren. 
Since the P.A.R.C. and Mills cases, forty-six cases 
have been instituted in twenty-eight states concerning the' 
268 right to an education for handicapped children. Recent 
years have brought about a judicial trend toward mandating 
full educational services for the "special" child. Courts 
have ordered states to provide individually designed instruc­
tional programs which are appropriate to the unique needs of 
269 the handicapped and other "special" children. 
The subject of expulsion of a disruptive, handicapped 
student was dealt with by a Connecticut court in Stuart v. 
. 270 Nappi, when the court clearly implied that expulsion cannot 
be used by administrators to handle handicapped children's 
discipline problems. An Indiana district court in Doe v. 
271 Koger, a 1979 case, held that before a disruptive, handi­
capped student can be expelled, it must be determined whether 
267Ibid., p. 867. 
268 Martin, The Impact of Current Legal Action on Educating 
Handicapped Children, p. 12. 
269 McCarthy and Thomas, "The Right to an Education: 
New Trends Emerging from Special Education Litigation," p. 86. 
27<̂ Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235 (1978) . 
271Doe v. Koger, 480 F. Supp. 224 (1979). 
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the child's handicap is the cause of the propensity to dis­
rupt. The court stated that expulsion of a handicapped 
child from school did not deny equal protection so long as the 
handicapped student was subjected only to the same disciplinary 
sanctions as other students. 
In another 1979 case, the Iowa Supreme Court ruled as 
follows: 
Statutory power for school districts to expel any 
scholar from school includes power to expel a special 
education student, but in such cases, expulsion pro­
cedures must include re-evaluation of the child by 
diagnostic-educational team, a report, and recom­
mendation by that team to school board, and after 
full hearing, determination by school board whether 
an alternative placement will meet needs of the 
child and the district; expulsion should be resorted 
to only when.no reasonable alternative placement is 
available. 
The right to nondiscriminatory evaluation in assigning 
children to special education classes was asserted in Hobson 
273 v. Hansen, where the use of test scores for placing students 
in various ability tracks was attacked as unconstitutional. 
The court entered a decree enjoining defendants from operating 
the track system in the District of Columbia public schools. 
A ruling concerning IQ scores was made in Larry P. v. 
274 Riles, when the court ordered that the San Francisco Uni­
fied School District be restrained from placing black students 
in classes for the educable mentally retarded on the basis of 
criteria which placed primary reliance on the results of i; Q. 
tests, if the consequence is racial imbalance in the composi-
275 tion of such classes. 
272southeast Warren Community School District v. Depart­
ment of Public Instruction, 285 N. W. 2d 173 (1979). 
^^Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 408 F. 2d 175 (1969). 
274Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306 (1972). 
275United States v. Texas, 342 F. Supp. 24 (1971). 
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The right to appropriate programs of instruction was 
provided through a court ruling that discrimination exists when 
bilingual educational programs are not provided for non-
276 English-speaking students. 
Courts have generally upheld the right to least restric­
tive placement for handicapped children, indicating that they 
are to be included in a regular educational program in prefer­
ence to a special program, and in the regular school environ-
277 ment rather than in the special school. 
The right to procedural due process has been established 
278 in the P.A.R.C., Mills, and LeBanks cases. The handicapped 
child and his/her parents have rights to notification before 
the school takes action with respect to a child's educational 
claims, to a hearing before an impartial tribunal, to have 
case presented by counsel and expert witnesses, to confront 
and cross-examine witnesses, to have access to school records, 
to have the tribunal's decision based on evidence presented, 
279 and to appeal. 
A recent landmark in the history of education for the 
handicapped is Public Law 94-142, the federal "Education for 
2 80 All Handicapped Children" Act, which was signed into 
276jj. Rutherford Turnbull, III, "The Past and Future 
Impact of Court Decisions in Special Education," Phi Delta 
Kappa (April 1978): 525. 
277ibid. 
278it,id. 
279ibid. 
280u. S. Department of HEW, "Education of Handicapped 
Children and Incentive Grants Program: Assistance of States," 
41 Fed. Reg. 46966-46998 (1976). 
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law on November 29, 1975, and which became effective October 
1, 1977. The law expands, improves, and diversifies special 
2 81 education opportunities for handicapped children. Its 
four major purposes are said to be to: 
1. Guarantee the availability of special educa­
tion programming to handicapped children and youth 
who require it. 
2. Assure fairness and appropriateness in decision­
making with regard to providing special education to 
handicapped children and youth. 
3. Establish clear management and auditing re­
quirements and procedures regarding special education 
at all levels of government. 
4. Financially assist the efforts of state and 
local government through the use of federal funds.282 
Operating in conjunction with P. L. 94-142 is Section 
o o o 
504 of P. L. 93-112 (the "Rehabilitation Act of 1973"), 
a basic civil rights provision with respect to terminating 
discrimination against America's handicapped citizens, which 
reads: 
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in 
the United States shall, solely by reason of his 
handicap, be excluded from the participation in, 
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis­
crimination under any program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance.^84 
Both P. L. 94-142 and Section 504 assure handicapped 
281 Pennsylvania School Journal, "Education for the 
Handicapped," Education Digest XLIII, No. 7 (March, 1978): 
12. 
2 o o 
Joseph Ballard and Jeffrey Zettel, "Public Law 94-142 
and Section 504: What They Say About Rights and Protections," 
Exceptional Children 44, No. 3 (November, 1977): 177-178. 
283 U. S. Department of HEW, "Nondiscrimination on Basis 
of Handicap: Programs and Activities Receiving or Benefiting 
from Federal Financial Assistance," 42 Fed. Reg. 22676-22702 (1977). 
284!bid. 
153 
children that they may not be excluded from any federally 
funded school program. P. L. 94-142 requires that each 
eligible handicapped child receive an education designed to 
285 meet unique learning needs at no cost to the parents. 
It also provides for placement of a child in the least restric­
tive environment, insures procedural safeguards of due pro­
cess and confidentiality of reports and records pertinent 
to handicapped child's education, and requires that inservice 
286 training be provided to regular and special educators. 
The law requires that an individualized Educational 
Program (IEP) be devised for each child in special education. 
Contents of the IEP include the following: 
1. A statement of the child's present level of 
educational performance. 
2. Annual goals and short-term instructional 
objectives contributing to the annual goals. 
3. A statement of the extent to which the child 
will be able to participate in a regular education 
program. 
4. A statement of the specific educational ser­
vices to be provided. 
5. A statement of appropriate criteria, evaluation 
procedures, and schedules. 
6. The projected date for initiation of services 
and anticipated duration of such services. 
In a 1980 case, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled 
285 Josephine Hayes and Scottie Torres Higgins, "Issues 
Regarding the IEP: Teachers on the Front Line," Exceptional 
Children 44, No. 4 (January, 1978): 267. 
286Ibid., pp. 268-269. 
287 Pennsylvania School Journal, "Education for the Handi­
capped," pp. 14-15. 
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in a case dealing with the IEP for a handicapped child who 
suffered from a neurogenic bladder which prevented her from 
being able to empty her bladder voluntarily. Parents brought 
action against the school district for alleged violation of 
the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 197 5, 
for failure to include the scheduling of clean instrument 
catherization in the child's IEP. The court held that 
clean instrument catherization was a "supportive service" 
required to assist this handicapped child to benefit from 
special education for purpose of Education for All Handicapped 
Children Act of 1975, and that failure to include in her IEP 
a plan for clean instrument catherization violated pro­
vision of Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which mandated that 
"no otherwise qualified individual shall be excluded from 
participation in or be subjected to discrimination under 
any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance 
2 88 by reason of his handicap." 
It appears that the rights of handicapped children to 
an equal education are receiving much attention in the courts 
and as the result of recent laws. Only those cases in which 
principals might be involved in some way have been discussed 
here. Cases concerning payment of educational costs for 
handicapped children, those dealing with provision of year-
round instruction, and other cases where school board provision 
of services is in litigation were not reported. 
7 R ft 
Tatro v. State of Texas, 625 F. 2d 557 (1980). 
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CHAPTER V 
THE PRINCIPAL AND TORT LIABILITY 
Numerous court actions seeking damages for tort liability 
have been filed against principals and other school personnel. 
These are cases which involve civil wrongs not related to 
contracts. Damages are sought by the injured party (plaintiff) 
from the person who allegedly committed the tort or caused the 
injury (defendant). 
Categories of Torts 
There are two major categories of torts: Intentional 
torts and negligence. Intentional torts grow out of a person's 
invading the rights of another. Assault and battery and defa­
mation would fall into this category. Since most cases involv­
ing the principal allege negligence, the emphasis of this 
chapter will be on that category. 
Negligence has been defined in Morris v. Ortiz"*" as 
"failure to act as a reasonable and prudent person would act 
in like circumstances." This case also stated that "Before 
liability may be imposed for an act or failure to act, 
prevision of a reasonable person must be able to recognize 
danger of harm to plaintiff or one in plaintiff's situation." 
Negligence under one situation may not be negligence 
^"Morris v. Ortiz, 437 P. 2d 652 (1968). 
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in another. Each case must be decided on the basis of the 
situation against a general set of criteria. 
Criteria Applicable to Tort Actions 
Criteria applicable to tort actions typically include 
the following four questions: 
1. Within the given situation, did one owe a 
standard of care, a duty, to another? That is, 
was the individual expected to supervise, maintain 
a safe environment, or give proper instruction? 
2. Did one fail to exercise that standard of 
care or duty? That is, was the individual derelict 
in supervising, maintaining a safe environment, or 
giving instructions? 
3. Was there an accident in which a person was 
injured? Did one actually suffer some kind of loss 
or injury? 
4. Was the failure to exercise due care the 
proximate (direct) cause of the injury? The cause 
of the injury must first be established, then it 
must be shown that there was some connection between 
it and one's failure to exercise due care.^ 
There are two tests which are usually applied in 
determining liability on the part of school administrators. 
The first is the "reasonable and prudent" test. When one's 
actions fall below the standard of care expected of any 
"reasonable and prudent" person, resulting in an injury, negli-
3 gence is established. However, according to McGhehey, 
2 H. C. Hudgms, Jr. and Richard S. Vacca, Law and 
Education: Contemporary Issues and Court Decisions (Char­
lottesville: The Michie Company, 1979), p. 72. 
3 McGhehey, Speech. 
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the test in a school situation is viewed somewhat differently 
from that in other cases. Here the court will be asking, 
"What would the average teacher or principal have done? What 
standard of care should be exercised by the teacher or prin­
cipal in that particular circumstance to protect the children?" 
There seems to be a somewhat higher standard of duty. 
4 This is illustrated in Kersey, where the court found 
that school officials, knowing of the quarrelsome propensities 
of a student, were obliged to exercise supervision of students 
and to take appropriate measures to prevent injury. In this 
case, a student received fatal injuries after horseplay in the 
gymnasium, when the student fell or was dropped on the floor. 
5 Again, xn Eversole, a court ruled that a special re­
lationship exists between a student and the school district, 
requiring the school district to protect the student and to 
exercise reasonable care for the student's safety. 
The second test is that of "foreseeability." School 
officials and teachers are expected to take reasonable care 
to avoid acts or omissions which they could reasonably fore­
see would be likely to cause injury. The educator is expected 
to foresee possible consequences of an action or condition and 
to take measures to remedy them. The question is, "Could the 
defendant reasonably have foreseen that this could have taken 
^Kersey v. Harbin, 591 S. W. 2d 745 (1979). 
^Eversole v. Wasson, 398 N. E. 2d 1246 (1980) . 
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place in the school situation?" This question was answered 
g 
in the affirmative in Brahatcek, when the Supreme Court of 
Nebraska found that "....school district instructors should 
have foreseen the intervening negligent act of a student 
who fatally struck classmate with golf club during physical 
education class... ." In this instance, a fourteen-year-old 
boy was killed, when he was accidentally struck on the head 
by another student who was attempting to show him how to grip 
and swing a golf club in a physical education class. The 
student who was killed had been absent when the class had been 
instructed in safety rules. 
An action against a school for injuries sustained when 
a student was struck by a pebble thrown by another student 
during recess on a playing field resulted in a court ruling 
that in order to recover damages for loss of an eye, it was 
necessary only to prove that a general danger was foreseeable 
and that supervision would have prevented the accident; it 
was not necessary to prove that the particular accident which 
occurred was foreseeable. Evidence indicated that pebbles 
had been thrown at student for several minutes by other students 
during recess, and that the teacher had returned to the school 
building and was not supervising children at the time of the 
accident. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed action of the 
6 Brahatcek v. Millard School District, School District 
No. 17, 273 N. W. 2d 680 (1979). 
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district court, where the student had received an award of 
$50,000.7 
O 
The Arizona Court of Appeals stated in Chavez that 
"not every danger of harm must be recognized by reasonable 
man, and if harm which results is caused by intervention of 
factors or forces which form no part of recognizable risk, 
actor is ordinarily not liable." In this case, a ten-year-
old student had left school without permission to take a 
neighbor's dog home. The student was abducted outside the 
school grounds and murdered. The court held that school per­
sonnel could not reasonably have foreseen that the student 
would leave the elementary school grounds without permission 
and thereafter be abducted and slain, and that therefore, the 
district and school personnel were not liable for death of 
child. 
Among the defenses to tort actions are: 
1. School district immunity, where the district is 
sued. 
2. Contributory negligence, where the individual 
directly and fully contributed to the injury received, so 
that no one else is to blame. 
3. Comparative negligence, where both plaintiff and 
defendant are held responsible and the court settlement 
7 Sheehan v. St. Peter's Catholic School, 188 N. W. 
2d 868 (1971). 
g 
Chavez v. Tolleson Elementary School District, 595 
P. 2d 1017 (1979). 
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adjusts damages to the degree of negligent responsibility for 
each party. 
4. Assumption of risk, where an individual understands, 
appreciates, and agrees that in undertaking an activity, 
the individual is subjecting himself or herself to a possible 
. . 9 injury. 
Governmental Immunity 
It has long been held in the common law that a school 
district is immune from liability by reason of torts committed 
by itself or its employees, since it is an instrument of the 
state, which is supposedly sovereign and cannot be sued with­
out its consent. However, in recent years, this doctrine has 
been modified through legislative and judicial action. 
In a 1978 decision, the United States Supreme Court 
held municipalities and other units of local government, 
which would include school boards, to be "persons" subject 
to liability under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 
1871. In an important 5-4 decision,"'""'" the United States Supreme 
Court indicated that Section 1983 creates a species of tort li­
ability which on its face allows no immunities. The issue raised 
in Owen was specifically whether a municipality should be immune 
from liability for damages because its officials had acted in 
Q 
Hudgins and Vacca, Law and Education: Contemporary 
Issues and Court Decisions, p. 72. 
l^Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City 
of New York, 436 U. S. 658, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611, 98 S. Ct. 2018 
(1978) . 
Howen v. City of Independence, Missouri, 63 L. Ed. 2d 
673, 676, 100 S. Ct. 1398 (1980). 
161 
good faith. 
While principals, teachers, and other school officials 
have sought to use governmental immunity as a defense in court, 
most courts have ruled that employees of the school district 
are not protected by governmental immunity of the school dis­
trict, where such exists, against liability arising from per-
12 sonal negligence toward students. In Kersey, the Missouri 
Court of Appeals stated that "supervisory public school em­
ployees and teachers are not immune from tort liability for 
13 inadequate supervision of their students " In Crabbe 
14 and Lovitt, the courts held that the fact that a teacher is 
performing a governmental function for employer school board 
does not mean that a teacher is exempt from liability for his 
or her own negligence in performance of such duties. In Cook 
15 v. Bennett, the Michigan Court of Appeals found that a 
principal would be liable for injuries suffered by student 
while playing "kill" game during recess if the principal had 
negligently performed supervisory powers. The court stated: 
Even though the supervisory powers of the school prin­
cipal are incident to her public function, she has a 
duty to reasonably exercise these powers in such a way 
as to minimize injury to students in her charge. 
Where the principal negligently performs this duty, 
government immunity does not operate to insulate her 
from all liability. 
"^Kersey v. Harbin, 591 S. W. 2d 745 (1979). 
13 Crabbe v. County School of Northumberland County, 
164 S. E. 2d 639 (1968) . 
14 Lovitt v. Concord School District, 228 N. W. 2d 479 
(1975). 
15 
Cook v. Bennett and Came, 288 N. W. 2d 609 (1980) . 
16lbid. 
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17 However, in Hennessy v. Webb, the Georgia Supreme 
Court ruled that a principal was entitled to governmental im­
munity in the absence of allegations that the principal acted 
willfully, wantonly, or outside scope of his authority. The 
negligence alleged in Hennessy was that the principal had al­
lowed a rug and mat to be placed at the school door, when he 
knew or should have known of its danger. 
Court actions seeking damages have been filed against 
principals for common law, constitutional, and learning torts. 
Common Law Torts 
Litigation against principals in common law torts most 
often involves lack of supervision, improper or inadequate 
instruction, failure to exercise responsibilities properly, 
and field trips. 
Lack of Supervision 
Administrators and teachers are expected to supervise 
students. It is generally agreed by educators that most 
18 school accidents could be prevented with proper supervision. 
Principals are also expected to supervise teachers. 
Such supervision involves assignment of qualified teachers 
to direct activities; making known general expectations to 
the teacher; making periodic visits to ascertain whether the 
teacher is meeting conditions set; determining if the teacher 
"^Hennessy v. Webb, 264 S. E. 2d 878 (1979). 
18 Herb Appenzeller, Athletics and the Law (Charlottes­
ville: The Michie Co., 1975), p. 190. 
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needs expert help; and periodic inspection of buildings, 
grounds, and facilities to determine whether hazards exist, 
19 and if they do, to see that they are corrected. 
The Supreme Court of Minnesota recently upheld a jury 
finding of negligence on the part of a school principal on 
the ground that he had not fulfilled responsibility to 
develop, administer, and supervise a physical education pro­
gram properly. In this case, an eighth grade student broke 
his neck during an attempt to perform a gymnastic exercise 
in a physical education class. The accident occurred a short 
time after a new, first-year teacher had taken over the class. 
The court noted that the principal did nothing to administer 
or supervise the physical education curriculum or to supervise 
the new teacher except to furnish the teacher with a curriculum 
bulletin. The court stressed the fact that the inexperienced 
teacher should have received closer supervision. The court 
found that the principal never had a meeting with the new 
teacher to agree upon details concerning the subjects to be 
taught. The principal had made no effort to see how the 
2 0  
curriculum bulletin was being used. This case could be of 
great significance to principals. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the finding of a 
jury that negligent supervision and organization of students 
19 Hudgms and Vacca, Law and Education: Contemporary 
Issues and Court Decisions, p. 79. 
20 Larson v. Independent School District No. 314, Braham, 
289 N. W. 2d 112 (1980). 
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at a required, school-sponsored showing of a documentary film 
caused plaintiff's injuries, when a white student had her 
wrist slashed and her purse stolen by black students. Evi­
dence indicated that the school district was aware of racial 
21 tension, and that there was a lack of supervision. 
The California Supreme Court held that the school 
district could be held liable for a ten-year-old, truant stu­
dent's injuries received from being struck by a motorcycle, 
after leaving school grounds without permission, if plaintiffs 
could prove that the injuries were proximately caused by negli-
22 
gent supervision of student while on school premises. The 
court stated: 
A school district's duty to supervise students while on 
school premises during school day includes responsibility 
for assuring that students remain on school premises 
during school days, since duty to supervise includes du­
ty to enforce those rules and regulations necessary for 
student's protection, such as regulation that a student 
may not leave school premises at recess, or at any other 
time before regular hour for closing school, except in 
case of emergency, or with approval of principal of 
school.23 
In discussing the need for supervision, the Minnesota 
24 25 Supreme Court in Sheehan quoted from a dissent in Ohman: 
21 Raleigh v. Independent School District No. 625, 275 
N. W. 2d 572 (1978). 
22noyem v. Manhattan Beach City School, 585 P. 2d 851 
(1978). 
23ifc>id. , p. 851. 
2^Sheehan v. St. Peter's Catholic School, 188 N. W. 2d 
868 (1971). 
25ohman v. Board of Education of City of New York, 90 
N. E. 2d 478 (1948). 
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Children have a known proclivity to act impulsively 
without thought of the possibilities of danger. It 
is precisely this lack of mature judgment which 
makes supervision so vital. The mere presence of the 
hand of authority and discipline normally is effective 
to curb this youthful exuberance and to protect the 
children from their own folly. 
2 6 In Ogando v.. Carquinez, the California Supreme Court 
found that "failure to supervise the conduct and play of the 
children on the occasion mentioned.... amounted to negligence, 
and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the child's 
injury and death." A ten-year-old student, playing with other 
children without teacher supervision, accidentally pushed her 
outstretched arm through a glass door. The student ran, 
screaming with fright, while other students sought to find tea­
chers. The student was finally taken by students to office of 
the nurse, but died that night because of the loss of blood. 
The court held that the trial court was 
....justified in drawing the inference that the 
presence of a teacher in or near the court while the 
game was being played would likely have resulted in 
saving the child's life, because she would have taken 
charge of the injured child at once and either arrested 
the flow of blood herself or instantly summoned the 
school nurse. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that conduct of a 
school district in failing to properly supervise and enforce 
the wearing of protective safety goggles in an industrial 
arts class constituted negligence per se and that an award 
of $60,000 for permanent injury to student's eye was not 
27 excessive. 
2 6 Ogando v. Carquinez Grammar School District of Contra 
Costa County, 75 P. 2d 641 (1938). 
27 Scott v. Independent School District No. 709, Duluth, 
146 N. W. 2d 485 (1977). 
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In California, a court found that a principal had 
failed to exercise proper supervision when he had known for 
several years that students in physical education classes 
regularly ran from the gymnasium to the playing field and 
that trucks often came onto the school grounds. A judgment 
for the plaintiff student was upheld, and the court criticized 
school authorities for failure to take precautions to minimize 
the danger of injury to students. In rejecting defendant's 
contentions that plaintiff was herself negligent and was not 
entitled to recover damages, the court made it clear that the 
duty of care to be exercised by plaintiff and the precautions 
required of school administrators vary with the age and under­
standing of the student. The court stated: 
Plaintiff is bound only to that duty of care which a 
normal child of the same age would be expected to 
exercise in such a situation.... The question is not 
whether plaintiff must be viewed as an adult or as 
a child, but simply whether the plaintiff as a fifteen-
year-old girl in a physical education class on the 
grounds of a high school, used mainly for school activi­
ties and not as a thoroughfare for automobiles, exercised 
proper caution in running across the courtyard toward the 
athletic field without being on the alert for the sudden 
appearance of a motor vehicle. 
The courts have made it clear that a principal has a 
duty to take action when a situation is encountered in which 
a reasonably prudent person would foresee the possibility 
of injury to a student. The principal must see that proper 
supervision takes place, both on the principal's part and on 
the part of teachers. 
2 8 
Taylor v. Oakland Scavenger Company, 110 P. 2d 1044 
(1941). 
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Improper or Inadequate Instruction 
One of the most frequent allegations of negligence 
concerns inadequate instruction in the performance of an 
activity. Another act of negligence complained of is 
failure to instruct in safety rules. 
29 In a New York case, evidence indicated that a fifth 
grade girl was injured while performing on rings, when she 
stood up in the rings and fell backward in jumping out. 
Evidence indicated that the teacher had never demonstrated 
stunts and had never instructed "spotters" in how to break a 
fall in case of mishap. The New York Supreme Court's Appellate 
Division affirmed judgment of the lower court in favor of 
plaintiffs. 
30 In LaValley, the New York Supreme Court's Appellate 
Division ruled that reasonable care must be taken to prevent 
injuries to pupils, and "pupils should be warned before being 
permitted to engage in a dangerous and hazardous exercise." 
Evidence indicated that the teacher sat in the bleachers and 
watched while untrained students fought until plaintiff re­
ceived a blow to the temple, resulting in a cerebral hemorrhage. 
The court stated that the two boys should have been warned of 
the danger and should have been taught the principles of 
defense, if it were indeed a reasonable thing to permit a 
"slugging match" of the type indicated. The court affirmed 
29 Armlm v. Board of Education of Middleburgh Central 
School District, 20 N. Y. S. 2d 402 (1971). 
^LaValley v. Stanford, 70 N. Y. S. 2d 460 (1947) . 
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judgment of the lower court in favor of plaintiff. 
The New York Court of Appeals found that failure to 
instruct claimant pursuant to the customary method was the 
31 
proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries in Gardner v. State. 
The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held 
that school authorities have an affirmative duty "to instruct 
students in physical education classes on reasonable safety 
32 precautions to be observed while engaging in class activities." 
Testimony in the case against the school district for damages 
sustained by a ten-year-old boy while playing soccer indicated 
that reasonable care required demonstration and explanation 
of the game. The judgment of the Onondaga Trial Court dis­
missing the case was reversed, and a new trial was ordered by 
the Supreme Court Appellate Division. 
Failure to Exercise Responsibilities Properly 
School authorities have the responsibility for in­
specting buildings, equipment, and grounds, and for reporting 
hazardous conditions for correction. If the hazard is not 
corrected immediately, school officials have the responsibility 
of seeing that students are protected from the danger. 
An action was instituted in Michigan against a school 
district and its superintendent, principal, and a classroom 
teacher as individual defendants, for injuries sustained by a 
31Gardner v. State, 22 N. E. 2d 344 (1939). 
32 Darrow v. West Genesee Central School District, 342 
N. Y. S. 2d 611 (1973). 
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fourteen-year-old student when a jug of wood alcohol exploded 
during a physical science class, on grounds that improper 
design of the classroom and absence of safety devices rendered 
it unsafe, dangerous, and defective and the cause of plaintiff's 
33 injuries. The Michigan Supreme Court held that the complaint 
was sufficient to stake a claim for relief against the superin­
tendent, principal, and classroom teacher as individual defen­
dants. 
Field Trips 
The same principles of tort law apply on field trips 
as they do at school. Provisions for proper supervision must 
be made before taking children on field trips away from school. 
34 
In Morris v. Douglas County School District No. 9, an action 
seeking damages for injuries received by a child on a school 
outing to the beach, the Oregon Appellate Court stated that 
whether the kind of harm received was reasonably foreseeable 
and whether supervision was adequate were fact questions. 
The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirmed 
judgment of the New York Supreme Court in favor of plaintiff 
35 and finding inadequate supervision by teachers m Williamson. 
Plaintiff was injured when he was struck by a student motor­
cyclist at a public park to which the class had gone for the 
purpose of taking pictures under supervision of two teachers. 
"^Bush v. Oscoda Area Schools, 275 N. W. 2d 268 (1979). 
34 Morris v. Douglas County School District No. 9, 403 
P. 2d 775 (1965). 
•>5 
Williamson v. Board of Education of Berne-Knox Junior 
Senior High School, 375 N. Y. S. 2d 221 (L975). 
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On a field trip to a museum in Illinois, a twelve-year-
old student was assaulted by a group of youths not connected 
with the school. Plaintiff brought action through his father 
against the school district, two teachers, and the museum for 
injuries sustained in the assault. The circuit court dis­
missed suit, and plaintiff appealed. The appellate court held 
that an assault in the museum was not reasonably foreseeable 
and affirmed the decision of the lower court. 
Liability release forms signed by parents for children 
prior to field trips cannot diminish the responsibility of 
the school district and its employees. The principal purposes 
served by such forms are the giving of permission for the trip 
and the informing of parents. 
The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed judgment of 
the circuit court that where a high school principal gave 
appropriate instructions and specified certain conditions 
under which students were to go on an outing, he was not 
37 negligent with respect to drowning of a high school student. 
Constitutional Torts 
The Civil Rights Act of 1871, Section 1983, was re­
discovered in the mid-1960's, thereby changing the status of 
individual board members and school administrators. Section 
1983 provides: 
^^ancha v. Field Museum of Natural History, 283 N. E. 
2d 899 (1972). 
"^Cox v. Barnes, 469 S. W. 2d 61 (1971). 
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Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom or usage of any State or Territory, 
subjects or causes to be subjected any citizen of the 
United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, 
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at 
law, suit in equity or other proper proceeding for 
redress. 
This Act provides that school board members and school 
administrators who deprive employees of their constitutional 
rights may be personally liable. This liability under Section 
1983 was extended to students by a 1975 decision of the 
39 
Supreme Court. In Wood, the Court held that: 
....a school board member is not immune from liability 
for damages under Section 1983 if he knew or reasonably 
should have known that the action he took within the 
sphere of official responsibility would violate the 
constitutional rights of the student affected, or if 
he took the action with the malicious intention to 
cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other 
injury to the student; and that a compensatory award 
will be appropriate only if the school board member 
has acted with such an impermissible motivation or 
with such disregard of the student's clearly established 
constitutional rights that his action cannot reasonably 
be characterized as being in good faith. 
The Court recognized that school officials have some 
degree of immunity for their acts under Section 1983, so that 
they may make a mistake for which they are not liable. The 
Court indicated that if school officials are acting sincerely 
and with a belief that they are doing right, officials will 
be protected by qualified good-faith immunity under Section 
1983. The Supreme Court stated that action taken "in the good-
faith fulfillment of their responsibilities and within the bounds 
3842 U. S. C., Section 1983 (1871). 
39wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308, 95 S. Ct. 992, 
43 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1975). 
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of reason under all the circumstances will not be punished 
and that they need not exercise their discretion with undue 
timidity."40 
41 Wood involved a suit against members of the school 
board and two administrators in Arkansas, based on 42 U. S. C., 
Section 1983, and claiming damages and injunctive and de­
claratory relief. Plaintiff students, who were expelled from 
school for violating a school regulation prohibiting use or 
possession of intoxicating beverages at school or school 
activities, alleged that their federal constitutional rights 
to due process were infringed by their expulsions. 
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that student 
plaintiffs in actions brought under Section 1983 are entitled 
to receive only nominal damages unless there is proof of 
actual injury. The Court indicated that: 
In the absence of proof of actual injury, public school 
students who were suspended from school without procedural 
due process and who bring actions under 42 U. S. C. S. 
i 1983 against school officials are entitled to recover 
only nominal damages; if it is determined that the 
suspensions were justified, the students nevertheless 
are entitled to recover nominal damages not to exceed 
one dollar from the officials.42 
Learning Torts 
Recently, students have begun to sue school districts 
for their failure to learn, causing increased pressure upon 
40 
Ibid., p. 321. 
41Ibid. 
42Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 55 L. Ed. 2d 252, 253, 
98 S. Ct. 1042 (1978). 
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school administrators who supervise teachers and evaluate per­
formance. 
In California, a high school graduate sued a school dis-
43 trict, alleging that he had received an inadequate education. 
Plaintiff averred that the school district was negligent in 
teaching, promoting, and graduating him, and that the district 
had falsely represented to his mother that he was performing at 
or near grade level. The appellate court was not certain that 
plaintiff had suffered injury within the meaning of the law 
concerning negligence. The court stated: 
On occasions when the Supreme Court has opened or 
sanctioned new areas of tort liability, it has noted 
that the wrongs and injuries involved were both com­
prehensible and assessible within the existing judi­
cial framework. ... This is simply not true of wrongful 
conduct and injuries allegedly involved in educational 
malfeasance. Unlike the activity of the highway or 
the marketplace, classroom methodology affords no 
readily acceptable standards of care, or cause, or 
injury. The science of pedagogy itself is fraught with 
different and conflicting theories of how or what a child 
should be taught and any layman might- and commonly does-
have his own emphatic views on the subject. The "injury" 
claimed here is the plaintiff's inability to read and 
write. Substantial professional authority attests that 
the achievement of literacy in the schools, or its fail­
ure, are influenced by a host of factors which affect 
the pupil subjectively, from outside the formal teaching 
process, and beyond the control of its ministers.44 
45 In a New York case, a former student brought an action 
against the school district, alleging negligence, breach of 
statutory duty, and educational malpractice in issuing a 
43peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School District, 
131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976). 
44ibid., pp. 860-61. 
45Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District, 408 
N. Y. S. 2d 584 (1977). 
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high school graduation certificate notwithstanding the 
student's deficiencies in reading and math. In dismissing the 
case, the Suffolk County Supreme Court held that the cause of 
action sounding in breach of statutory duty did not state 
a claim upon which relief could be granted, and plaintiff 
did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of 
action for negligence or educational malpractice. 
While claims for damages based on educational negligence 
have been defeated by the courts in the three major cases, 
the idea is gaining acceptance, as can be seen from the most 
46 
recent of these cases, Hoffman v. Board of Education. 
In this case, both the trial and appellate courts found in 
favor of the complaining student, and the ultimate reversal 
by the New York Appellate Division was by a closely divided 
(4-3) court. Plaintiff had been found to have an I. Q. of 
ninety a few months prior to enrollment in school. After 
enrollment in kindergarten, an I. Q. test indicated an I. Q. 
of seventy-four. (A score of seventy-five would have entitled 
student to be placed in a normal classroom.) The test ad­
ministered was verbal, even though student had a serious speech 
defect, which made evaluation difficult. Upon the basis of 
this test and recommendation of the psychologist who administered 
it, student was assigned to a class for the mentally retarded, 
where he remained, without further testing for twelve years. 
The psychologist had recommended that his intelligence be 
46 Hoffman v. Board of Education of City of New York, 
424 N. Y. S. 2d 376 (1979). 
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re-evaluated within two years. Plaintiff was retested after 
his eighteenth birthday, when he was found to have an I. Q. 
of ninety-four. 
There is uncertainty as to what legal trends may 
develop on the matter of accountability. In a 1974 case, 
a teacher's dismissal was upheld because students had scored 
low on standardized achievement tests when improvement of 
47 test scores was an objective of the school system. Destin 
Shann Tracy indicates that it is increasingly probable that 
educational negligence will become a viable basis for legal 
48 actions within the next few years. 
4 7 Scheelhaase v. Woodbury Community Central School 
District, 488 F. 2d 237 (8th Cir. 1973), cert, denied, 417 
U. S. 969 (1974). 
4 8 Destin Shann Tracy, "Educational Negligence Suits," 
School Law Bulletin XI, No. 3 (July, 1980): 9. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE PRINCIPAL AND TEACHER RIGHTS 
The principalship requires knowledge of the legal 
implications regarding teacher tenure and the applicability 
of due process and other constitutional principles as they 
have been interpreted by the courts, as well as knowledge 
of state laws with respect to employment of personnel. 
While state requirements vary, most provide for a 
probationary period for professional personnel, during 
which the principal observes and evaluates an employee's 
performance in order to determine whether to recommend 
tenure. An employee who receives tenure is construed 
to have the right of employment for a continuing or 
indefinite period of time, subject to removal only for 
a cause prescribed by state law. Definition of cause 
is a matter left for the courts to determine. Courts 
seek to ensure that tenured employees are dismissed for 
cause only and that they are not dismissed for reasons 
which may be violative of their constitutional rights 
guaranteed under the United States Constitution."'" While 
statutes vary considerably in stipulating causes for 
"^"Hudgins and Vacca, Law and Education: Contemporary 
Issues and Court Decisions, pp. 150-151. 
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dismissal of teachers, among the most frequently mentioned 
causes are incompetency, immorality, insubordination, and 
2 neglect of duty. 
Incompetency 
If a principal seeks to have a tenured teacher dis­
missed, chances of success are heightened when detailed 
documentation concerning the teacher's performance has been 
3 made. In a New York case, a United States district court re­
jected a teacher's claim that dismissal was arbitrary, capri­
cious, and in violation of right to due process, when the 
principal had documented a number of episodes (including 
parent complaints of student abuse and holding after class; 
a student's corroborated report that he had been pushed 
and injured by teacher; principal's observations of the com­
plete disorder of teacher's room; and principal's observa­
tion of teacher's sleeping in teachers' lounge). 
In spite of allegations of a high school principal 
that termination was for constitutionally impermissible 
reasons, based on statements principal had made about the 
board of education, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit found that no constitutional violations 
were involved, in view of a long list of job-related reasons 
4 for not renewing contract. 
2 Bolmeier, The School in the Legal Structure, p. 195. 
3 Canty v. Board of Education, City of New York, 312 
F. Supp. 254 (1970). 
4 Schmidt v. Fremont County School District No. 25, 
State of Wyoming, 558 F. 2d 982 (1977). 
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Evidence supporting dismissal of a teacher for incompe­
tency seems to carry more weight when teacher is given ample 
warning and adequate opportunity to correct ineffective perfor­
mance. Some state statutes require notice of deficiencies and 
a time period for correcting them before a teacher may be dis-
5 missed for incompetency. In one case, a teacher was ordered 
reinstated, because the school board had not complied with the 
g 
letter of the statute regarding proper notice. However, in 
a South Carolina case, where statute provided for dismissal of 
teachers without giving time to correct alleged deficiencies, 
the South Carolina Supreme Court held that a teacher was not 
7 entitled to a reasonable time to correct deficiencies. 
Where procedural requirements are met, the courts usual­
ly consider substantiated deficiencies and a failure to correct 
8 
them sufficient cause for termination. However, evidence 
that a particular duty was not competently performed by a tea­
cher on a certain occasion or evidence of an occasional neg­
lect of some duty, does not, in itself, ordinarily establish 
incompetency or neglect of duty sufficient to constitute just 
cause for termination of a tenured teacher. Incompetency or neg­
lect of duty are not measured in a vacuum nor against a standard 
5 Delon, Legal Controls on Teacher Conduct; Teacher 
Discipline, p. 31. 
^Blue Springs Reorganized District v. Landuvt, 499 
S. W. 2d 33 (1973). 
"^McWhorter v.-Cherokee County School District No. 1, 
261 S. E. 2d 157 (1979). 
8 Delon, Legal Controls on Teacher Conduct; Teacher 
Discipline, p. 32. 
179 
of perfection, but instead, must be measured against the 
standard required of others who perform the same or similar 
duties. The Nebraska Supreme Court held evidence insufficient 
to establish neglect of duty or incompetency on the part 
of a tenured teacher when there was no evidence that her 
performance of duties was below the standard of performance 
required of other teachers in the school."*"^ 
Immorality 
When used as a basis for dismissal, the term, "immorality," 
formerly encompassed almost any conduct offensive to the stan­
dards of the community. However, recent decisions indicate 
that courts are moving toward a more restricted definition 
of the term, almost equating it with sexual misconduct. "^ 
Courts have tended to decide recent cases on the 
basis of impact on the school rather than some pre-existing 
societal norm. Teachers' private lives are generally pro­
tected from employer interference unless an adverse impact 
on the school can be shown. 
Factors to be considered in determining whether im­
moral conduct rendered a teacher unfit to teach were identified 
by a United States district court in California as follows: 
....(A)ge and maturity of the students, likelihood 
that the teacher's conduct would adversely affect 
students or other teachers, degree of anticipated 
9  . . .  Sanders v. Board of Education of South Sioux City 
Community School District No. 11, 263 N. W. 2d 461 (1978) . 
10Ibid. 
11 Delon, Legal Controls on Teacher Conduct: Teacher 
Discipline, p. 56. 
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adversity, proximity or remoteness in time of conduct, 
extenuating or aggravating circumstances, likelihood 
that the conduct would be repeated, motives under­
lying the conduct and whether the conduct would have 
a chilling effect on the rights of the teacher involved 
or of other teachers. 
13 In Thompson, a teacher had been suspended for engaging 
in immoral conduct by living with a man for several months 
prior to their marriage. The court concluded that there was 
no evidence of ineffective teaching or disciplinary problems 
in the teacher's classropm; that there was no indication that 
the teacher had dicussed her conduct with students or that 
teacher had tried to persuade students or other teachers of 
propriety of teacher's conduct; that there was no evidence 
that teacher had ever advocated any conduct which would be 
detrimental to a moral scholastic environment; and that most 
people in the community were unaware of teacher's actions. 
The court ordered that defendants were to be restrained from 
suspending plaintiff or terminating her employment on the 
basis of immoral conduct charged without further order of the 
court. 
The California Supreme Court held that a male teacher 
who engaged in limited homosexual relationship in his apartment 
was not subject to disciplinary action for immoral conduct, 
in absence of evidence that such conduct indicated teacher's 
unfitness to teach. Discharge of a certified teacher 
12 Thompson v. Southwest School District, 483 F. Supp. 
1170 (1980). 
13Ibid., pp. 1184-1185. 
14 Morrison v. State Board of Education, 461 P. 2d 375 
(1969). 
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due to the fact that she was pregnant and unmarried was held 
to be arbitrary, unreasonable, and not supported by substantial 
evidence by the New Mexico Supreme Court.^ An Illinois appellate 
court affirmed trial court ruling that a charge of immorality, 
where a teacher was married one month and was eight and one-
half months pregnant, was a cause for dismissal only if it 
could be shown that the teacher's conduct produced harm to 
16 pupils, faculty, or the school. 
However, on the basis of evidence indicating that a 
teacher had joined the "swingers" club, engaged in sexual 
intercourse and oral copulation with men other than her hus­
band, and had appeared on television programs while facially 
disguised and discussed unconventional sexual behavior, the 
California Supreme Court affirmed the conclusion of the 
board of education and trial court that teacher's actions 
disclosed her unfitness to teach in the public elementary 
17 schools. In a case involving possession of drugs, a Georgia 
appellate court held that the proven fact of a tenured teach­
er's possession of three dangerous drugs was evidence from 
18 which "immorality" could be inferred. 
Insubordination 
Insubordination, defined as "unwillingness to submit 
"^New Mexico State Board of Education v. Stoudt, 
571 P. 2d 1186 (1977). 
"^Reinhardt v. Board of Education of Alton Community 
School District, 19 111. App. 3d 481, 311 N. E. 2d 710 (1974). 
"^Pettit v. State Board of Education, 512 P. 2d 889(1973). 
I O 
Dominy v. Mays, 257 S. E. 2d 317 (1979). 
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to authority," has become the most frequently cited reason for 
19 removing teachers. In upholding a teacher dismissal for in­
subordination, the Second Circuit Court stated: 
A school system may justifiably demand more from 
its teachers than competent classroom instruction. 
A chronic refusal to comply with reasonable ad­
ministrative obligations can have a disruptive 
effect on students, fellow teachers, and administra­
tors alike, and consequently, poses a threat to an 
optimum learning environment.2̂  
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a district 
court decision holding that the hearing afforded a teacher, who 
had been discharged for insubordination by reason of failure 
to comply with principal's instructions regarding restoration 
of order and proper curriculum in teacher's classes, was en-
21 tirely adequate. Facts indicated that teacher was clearly 
aware of charges resulting in suspension; that the superinten­
dent had notified the teacher in advance of a proposed board 
of education hearing; that the teacher was represented by 
counsel at the hearing; that the teacher was permitted to tes­
tify; and that the teacher's counsel was permitted to cross-
examine the principal. 
22 In a recent Massachusetts case, an appellate court 
held that where a tenured teacher, as an act of retaliation, 
for a decision of the school committee, refused to sign a 
l^Delon, Legal Controls on Teacher Conduct: Teacher 
Discipline, p. 3FT ' 
20simard v. Board of Education of Town of Groton, 473 
F. 2d 988, 995 (1973). 
2lAhern v> Board of Education of the School District 
of Grand Island, 456 F. 2d 399 (1972). 
22Lower v. North Middlesex Regional School Committee, 
395 N. E. 2d 1310 (1979). 
183 
contract for services as band director and there was no 
practical way of dividing functions of band director and music 
teacher without a detrimental effect on the music education 
of students, the teacher's conduct constituted insubordination, 
and there was ample justification for -the school committee's de­
cision to dismiss teacher. 
Neglect of Duty 
Since neglect of duty can usually be proven without 
much difficulty, if the teacher's duties are well defined and 
adequate personnel records are kept, the courts are not 
likely to reverse dismissals unless legally incorrect or 
23 inadequate procedures are followed. A Second Circuit court 
established that a teacher cannot be discharged for neglect 
of duty where such action deprives teacher of privileges 
secured by United States laws. In this instance, jury duty 
had resulted in teacher's absence from classroom from March 
7th through April 14th. The teacher was dismissed upon 
recommendation of principal. The court stated that refusal 
to permit a person to serve on jury denied an interest pro-
24 tected by statute. 
25 As evidenced in Bomar, the courts will protect the 
exercise of federal constitutional and statutory rights. 
However, it is apparent that they will not ignore substantial 
23 Delon, Legal Controls on Teacher Conduct: Teacher 
Discipline, p. 33. 
24 
Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F. 2d 136 (1947). 
25T, . Ibid. 
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neglect of duty or the abuse of position. A Georgia court 
upheld dismissal of a principal, when evidence indicated that 
the principal failed to hold fire drills, to secure 
buildings, to attend school meetings, to cooperate in 
giving achievement tests, and to follow school regulations 
2 6 concerning use of state-adopted textbooks. 
Teachers have brought actions in court in a number of 
cases concerning teacher tenure, First Amendment rights, 
due process, and academic freedom. 
Teacher Tenure 
Recent court decisions concerning teacher tenure 
have dealt with substantive and procedural due process as 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. United States 
27 Supreme Court holdings m Board of Regents v. Roth and 
2 8 Perry v. Sindermann have been applied consistently to 
matters of teacher personnel. These cases and those follow­
ing them have added a second dimension to teachers' job 
security, requiring that personnel decisions be free from 
29 constitutional violations. 
30 In Roth, a state university teacher m Wisconsin 
was hired under a one-year contract and was not rehired. 
^Glover v. Daniel, 318 F. Supp. 1070 (1969). 
27 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 92 S. Ct. 
2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972). 
28Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 92 S. Ct. 1693, 
33 L. Ed. 2d 470 (1972). 
29 Hudgms and Vacca, Law and Education: Contemporary 
Issues and Court Decisions, p. 147. 
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University officials were responsible for deciding whether 
to rehire nontenured teachers. Roth -contended that the rea­
son for his not being rehired was the fact that he had made 
remarks which were critical of the school administration, 
and that, therefore, the failure of university officials to 
rehire him constituted violation of constitutional right to 
freedom of speech. Roth also alleged that constitutional 
rights were violated because no hearing was held and no state­
ment of reasons was given for failure to rehire. The United 
States Supreme Court held that no hearing is required unless 
such failure to rehire would seriously damage Roth's standing 
and associations in the community, impose a stigma which 
would foreclose future opportunities to practice the teaching 
profession, or directly violate constitutional rights to 
freedom of speech. The court did not find that any of these 
conditions existed in the Roth case. 
30 In Perry v. Sindermann, tried by the Supreme Court 
on the same day as Roth, similar allegations were made by 
an untenured college professor who had been employed for 
four successive years under a series of one-year contracts. 
The Court found that the Board of Regents had issued a press 
release which charged that Sindermann was being released 
because of insubordination; that the nonrenewal of his 
contract may have been due to exercise of free speech rights, 
"^Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 92 S. Ct. 2694, 
33 L. Ed. 2d 570 (1972). 
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although the evidence was not clear; and that Sindermann had 
achieved de facto tenure under which he had more than a 
"mere subjective expectancy for re-employment," even though 
the school had no tenure system. In view of the evidence, 
the Court decided that Sindermann was entitled to notice of 
the charges against him and a hearing in which he would have 
opportunity to refute charges. 
Another teacher dismissal case was decided by the 
United States Supreme Court in 1977. In this case, Mt. Healthy 
31 School District v. Doyle, the teacher had been employed by 
the district for five years, during which period he had 
been involved in a number of altercations, including an argu­
ment with cafeteria employees and another teacher, swearing, 
and using obscene gestures toward students. In 1971, after 
the principal of school had distributed a teachers' dress code, 
this teacher telephoned a local radio station and announced 
the dress code as an item of news. A month later, he was 
among ten teachers whom the school board decided not to re­
hire. The United States Supreme Court accepted the district 
court finding that the call to the radio station was consti­
tutionally protected, but held that the district court should 
have determined whether Doyle would have been re-employed but 
for the call to radio station. The court suggested a two-
step procedure for cases similar to Mt. Healthy, indicating 
^Mt. Healthy School District v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 
97 S. Ct. 568, 50 L. Ed. 2d 471 (1977). 
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that the teacher must establish that the free speech activity 
was a substantial or motivating factor in the board's de­
cision not to rehire and that if this proof is produced, 
the school board must prove that it would have reached the 
same decision in the absence of the protected behavior. 
First Amendment Rights 
The courts have made it clear that public employment 
is a benefit which cannot be conditioned upon denial of 
32 constitutional rights. A Texas district court held m 
3 3 Barbre that plaintiff's claim under the First Amendment 
was not defeated by the fact that plaintiff did not have 
tenure. Citing Roth^ Perry, and Mt. Healthy, the 
court stated: 
Even though she could have been discharged for no 
reason whatever and had no constitutional right to a 
hearing prior to the decision not to rehire her,.... 
she may nonetheless establish a claim to reinstate­
ment if the decision not to rehire her was made by 
reason of her exercise of constitutionally pro­
tected First Amendment freedoms. 
"^Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 92 S. Ct. 2694, 
33 L. Ed. 2d 570 (1972); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 
385 U. S. 589, 87 S. Ct. 675, 17 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1967); Wieman 
v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. .183, 73 S. Ct. 215, 97 L. Ed. 216 
(1952). 
33 Barbre v. Garland Independent School District, 474 
F. Supp. 687 (1979). 
34 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 92 S. Ct. 
2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972). 
"^Perry V. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 92 S. Ct. 2694, 
33 L. Ed. 2d 570 (1972). 
"^Mt. Healthy School District v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 
97 S. Ct. 568, 50 L. Ed. 2d 471 (1977). 
37 Barbre v. Garland Independent School District, 474 
F. Supp. 687 (1979). 
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3 8 In Pickering, the Supreme Court stated that the 
First Amendment requires striking a balance between in­
terests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon 
matters of public concern, and the interest of the state, 
as an employer, in promoting efficiency of its services 
through its employees. The Court held that: 
A public school teacher's substantially correct 
comments on matters of public concern, although 
critical of school officials, may not, consis­
tently with the constitutional guarantee of free 
speech, furnish grounds for dismissal, where such 
comments do not interfere with the maintaining of 
discipline by immediate superiors or harmony among 
coworkers and the teacher's employment relationships 
with such officials are not the kind of close work­
ing relationships for which it can persuasively be 
claimed that personal loyalty and confidence are 
necessary to their proper functioning.39 
The Court further stated that under the free speech 
clause of the First Amendment, a teacher's exercise of the 
right to speak on issues of public importance cannot furnish 
the basis for the teacher's dismissal from public employment, 
in the absence of proof of false statements knowingly or 
recklessly made by the teacher. 
Facts in the Pickering case indicated that Pickering 
had written a letter to the editor of a local newspaper a few 
days after defeat of a proposal to increase school taxes. 
The letter was critical of the way the board of education 
and the superintendent of schools had handled past proposals 
O O 
Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563, 88 
S. Ct. 1731, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1968). 
39Ibid., p. 813. 
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to raise new revenue for the schools. The board of education 
had decided that publication of the letter was detrimental 
to the efficient operation and administration of the district's 
schools and that the interests of the schools required the 
teacher's dismissal. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed 
the circuit court judgment upholding the dismissal, but the 
United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that in the 
absence of proof of false statements knowingly or recklessly 
made by Pickering, his right to speak on issues of public 
importance could not furnish basis for dismissal, and that 
such dismissal violated constitutional right to free speech. 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held in 1974 that: 
In order for the government to constitutionally 
remove an employee from government service for 
exercising the right of free speech, it is incum­
bent upon it to clearly demonstrate that the em­
ployee' s conduct substantially and materially 
interferes with the discharge of duties and respon­
sibilities inherent in such employment.^ 
The United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the Pickering 
41 test in Givhan, and expanded the factors that may be balanced 
against the exercise of First Amendment freedoms when a govern­
ment employee confronts an immediate superior. In this case, 
the district court concluded that the main reason for the 
teacher's dismissal was criticism of school district policies, 
^Smith v. United States, 502 F. 2d 512 (1974). 
41 . Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District, 
439 U. S. 410, 58 L. Ed. 2d 619, 99 S. Ct. 693 (1979). 
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and, therefore, ordered reinstatement. The Fifth District 
Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that because the 
teacher had spoken privately with the principal, teacher's 
expression was not protected by the First Amendment, and 
that there was no constitutional right to press even good 
ideas on an unwilling recipient. The United States Supreme 
Court vacated and remanded, expressing the unanimous view 
that the teacher's criticism was subject to the protection 
of the First Amendment, for the following reasons: 
1. Such private expression of views is not beyond 
constitutional protection; and 
2. The 'captive audience' theory was inapplicable 
in view of the principal's having opened his door to 
the teacher.^2 
Establishing that a particular expression is protected 
by the First Amendment is not the only element needed to obtain 
relief. As stated earlier, the United States Supreme Court 
also requires a showing that constitutionally protected 
conduct is a motivating or substantial factor in school district 
43 decision not to rehire. The initial burden is on the plain­
tiff to show that conduct was constitutionally protected 
and was a motivating factor in decision not to rehire or to 
dismiss. After plaintiff carries this burden, the court must 
decide whether the board has shown by a preponderance of the 
4 ? 
Mt. Healthy School District v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 
97 S. Ct. 568, 50 L. Ed. 2d 471 (1977). 
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evidence that it would have reached the same decision even 
44 in the absence of the protected conduct. 
In Barbre,^ a Texas district court held that the 
claim of a former untenured teacher's aide that employment 
was not renewed by school district because of protected 
First Amendment speech was not defeated by the fact that 
the aide did not have tenure, because the aide could establish 
a claim to reinstatement if a decision not to rehire was made 
by reason of exercise of constitutionally protected First 
Amendment rights. The court, found, however, that even though 
the aide's speech at a school board meeting was a motivating 
factor in nonrenewal, her insubordination, subsequent to the 
board meeting, was a valid and separate explanation for non­
renewal, apart from any of prior expressions. 
A high school teacher's remarks to an unauthorized 
assembly of students on school property during school hours, 
which encouraged students to disobey directions given by the 
principal and superintendent to return to classes, were 
held to be outside the protection of the First Amendment 
46 by a Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
A United States district court in Arkansas ruled that 
an elementary teacher who was dismissed for allowing one of 
4 5 Barbre v. Garland Independent School District, 474 
F. Supp. 687 (1979). 
46 Whitsel v. Southeast Local School District, 4 84 F. 
2d 1222 (1973). 
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her students to write a letter to the cafeteria supervisor re­
questing raw carrots; for showing the principal cartoons (made 
two or three weeks after a water fountain in the room broke), 
which showed pupils lying down asking for water, wilted flowers, 
etc.,; and for voicing concern with regard to an open incinera­
tor in the center of tte playground, was denied substantive due 
47 process, and First Amendment rights were violated. 
After a Delaware district court found that considera­
tion of activities protected by the First Amendment played a 
substantial or motivating role in the decision to terminate a 
teacher's employment and that the decision would not have 
been made without reference to protected activities, the 
court ordered that plaintiff was entitled to reinstatement 
with full seniority and experience credit, to have record 
expunged, and to damages for lost salary and private piano 
lesson income, and for emotional distress and humiliation. 
The court further stated that the school district, board of 
education, board members in official capacities, and certain 
board members in individual capacities were jointly and 
48 severally liable to plaintiff for damages. 
As conduct becomes less and less like "pure speech," 
the showing of governmental interest required for its regu-
49 
lation is progressively lessened. In East Hartford, the 
47oowns v. Conway School District, 328 F. Supp. 338 
(1971)-4ft ^°Eckerd v. Indian River School District, 475 F. 
Supp. 1350 (1979). 
^East Hartford Education Association v. Board of Edu­
cation of the Town of East Hartford, 562 F. 2d 838 (1977). 
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case of a teacher who claimed that requirements imposed by 
dress code precluded close rapport with students and inter­
fered with ability to teach was found by a Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals not to implicate the First Amendment. 
A retaliatory transfer of a teacher for constitutionally 
protected speech can trigger First Amendment rights, even 
when the teacher is not discharged, because the test is 
whether adverse action taken by the board of education is 
likely to chill the exercise of constitutionally protected 
speech, and such chilling effect can be accomplished through 
an unwanted transfer as well as through outright discharge. 0̂ 
Due Process 
Two concepts which govern due process claims in public 
employment have to do with "property" and "liberty" interests. 
Property Interest 
To have a property interest that is protected by due 
process, a plaintiff must have a legitimate claim of entitle­
ment to continued employment arising from state law. A 
51 unilateral expectation will not suffice. Rules or mutually 
explicit understandings that support the claim of entitlement 
52 must exist. A claim of entitlement is not established 
^McGill v. Board of Education of Pekin Elementary 
School District No. 108 of Tazewell County, Illinois, 602 
F. 2d 774 (1979). 
~*^"Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 577, 92 
S. Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972) . 
"^Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601, 92 S. Ct. 
2694, 2699, 33 L. Ed. 2d 570 (1972). 
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solely by express statutory or contractural terms, but also 
by agreements which may be implied from the "promisor's 
words and conduct in the light of the surrounding "circum-
53 stances...." fend) "relating them to the usage of the past." 
Generally, courts have recognized that a property interest 
exists if, by statute, rule, or contract, express or implied, 
54 an employee can be fired only for "cause." 
Courts have not found a property interest when an em-
55 ployee serves at the pleasure of the public employer, as 
indicated by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Ball v. 
Board of Trustees.^ In this case, the court stated that 
having no right to reemployment, an untenured high school 
teacher who was discharged for refusal to shave 
no due process right to a hearing as to reasons for dismissal. 
57 The Colorado Court of Appeals ruled similarly in Willis, 
when it stated that nontenured teachers had no property 
interest in renewal of contracts, and that the school board 
was not required to afford a hearing or state reasons for 
nonrenewal. 
Liberty Interest 
The protected liberty interest can take two forms. 
The first form is where "a person's good name, reputation, 
"^Ibid., p. 602. 
^Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, 94 S. Ct. 1633, 
40 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1974) . 
55Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 96 S. Ct. 1633, 40 
L. Ed. 2d 15 (1974). 
^Ball v. Board of Trustees of the Kerville Independent 
School District, 584 F. 2d 684 (1978). 
S^Willis v. Widefield School District No. 3, 603 P. 2d 
962 (1979). 
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honor or integrity is at stake because of what the government 
is doing to him." In such a case, the discharged employee 
5 8 is entitled to due process. To trigger due process, 
charges must be publicly disclosed by the governmental 
59 entity. 
The second form has been determined when the govern­
ment employer imposed a "stigma or other disability that 
foreclosed the employee's freedom to take advantage of 
other employment opportunities," thereby entitling the 
employee to due process.^ To amount to foreclosure of 
future job offers, the effect of the stigma must be more than 
simply to make the employee "somewhat less attractive to 
61 some other employers." 
The North Carolina Court of Appeals held that when a 
school cafeteria manager alleged discharge from employment 
by virtue of public false accusations that she brought 
liquor into the public school and dispensed it to other 
employees, allegations sufficiently involved employee's repu­
tation, honor or integrity, that she was entitled as a matter 
6 2 of due process to hearing before discharge. 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that plain­
tiffs were deprived of a constitutionally protected liberty 
S^Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 573, 92 S. Ct. 
1707 (1972). 
59 
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 348, 96 S. Ct. 2074 
(1974); Gentile v. Wallen, 562 F. 2d 193, 197 (1977). 
^Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 573, 92 S. Ct. 
2707 (1972). 
61T, • , Ibid. 
62Presnell v. Pell, 251 S. E. 2d 692 (1979). 
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interest, upon discharge (without notice or opportunity to 
be heard) by the governor of Illinois, who then issued a 
press release, stating that plaintiffs had abused official 
positions in attempting to force a company under their 
supervision to drop criminal charges against an employee. 
The court indicated that infliction of a stigma to reputation 
accompanied by failure to rehire or, a fortiori, by a dis­
charge, stated claim for deprivation of liberty without due 
process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The court further ruled that this combination of stigma plus 
failure to rehire/discharge stated a claim even if the failure 
to rehire or the discharge of itself deprived the plaintiff 
of ?np property interest within the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Academic Freedom 
The concept of academic freedom in America grew from 
the influence of German college and university philosophy 
that scholars should be free to search for and teach the 
truth, free of constraints of immediate superordinates or 
the government. This philosophy has had a considerable 
impact on institutions of higher learning, but has had a 
64 more limited influence on elementary and secondary schools. 
6 5 Healy stated that "the college classroom with its surrounding 
^Colaizzi v. Walker, 542 F. 2d 969 (1976). 
64 Hudgins and Vacca, Law and Education: Contemporary 
Issues and Court Decisions, p. 167. 
65 
Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 180, 92 S. Ct. 2338, 
2346, 33 L. Ed. 2d 266 (1972). 
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environs is the 'marketplace of ideas.'" 
A Connecticut district court stated the following: 
Both age and the extent of education of the students 
must be considered in determining whether the stu­
dents have attained that degree of maturity which • 
would enable them to evaluate the merits of communism 
versus capitalism. Even a most expansive concept of 
a 'marketplace of ideas' would not be extended to in­
clude a class of fifth graders to discuss what is 
wrong with the world and how it can be put right.®® 
Academic freedom has two dimensions. The first is 
that of substantive freedom of a teacher to determine, within 
reasonable bounds, content and methodology which will serve 
an educationally defensible purpose. The second dimension 
is that of procedure which protects the teacher from dismissal 
except for violation of a law, policy, or regulation which 
is clearly known. 
The United States Supreme Court showed an interest in 
academic freedom in 1923, when it declared that a state law for­
bidding teaching of any language other than English to elemen-
6 7 tary school students was unconstitutional. The Court asserted 
that this legislation constituted an arbitrary interference 
with liberty of parents to control and educate their children 
and with liberty of teachers to pursue lawful calling. 
In 1952, the United States Supreme Court held that a 
teacher had a choice of teaching or exercising rights as a 
^Burns v. Rovaldi, 477 F. Supp. 270 (1979). 
^Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 485, 492, 
72 S. Ct. 380, 96 L. Ed. 2d 517 (1952). 
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citizen, stating: 
It is clear that such persons have the right under 
law to assemble, speak, think and believe as they 
will. It is equally clear that they have no right 
to work in a'school system on their own terms. 
They may work for the school system under reasonable 
terms laid down by proper authorities.... if they do 
not choose to work under such terms, they are at 
liberty to retain their beliefs and associations and 
go elsewhere. Has the state thus deprived them of 
any right to free speech and assembly? We think not. ° 
In recent years, however, teachers have asserted 
rights of academic freedom under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments and have received protection of the courts for 
rights to academic freedom. Teachers' constitutional rights 
69 
to freedom of speech and expression were recognized in Tinker, 
although the court cautioned that rights of speech and asso­
ciation may be limited because of the unique nature of a 
school. This right cannot be exercised to the extent that 
it creates disruptions, nor can it be limited because of a 
desire to avoid unpleasantness that accompanies an unpopular 
viewpoint. 
The teaching of controversial, irrelevant material 
can result in dismissal of teachers. When a minister-teacher 
persisted in carrying civil rights activities into the class­
room and disrupted the instructional program after having 
been warned by the school administration, his dismissal was 
6 8 , . ,  Ibid. 
69 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 
393 U. S. 503, 89 S. Ct. 723, 21 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1969). 
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u -1.3 70 upheld. 
When evidence indicated that a tenured fifth grade 
teacher had instituted a "pen pal" program,as a part of which 
students received letters from teacher's fiancee espousing 
communism, the court held that the interest of the board in 
prohibiting sectarian or partisan instruction at fifth grade 
level outweighed teacher's interest in First Amendment pro­
tection. The court stated: 
The plaintiff's contention that the contents of the 
pen pal letters from his fiancee to his fifth grade 
students was permissible as within an exercise of 
academic freedom is a travesty on the concept of a 
"free trade in ideas." It is equally absurd to con­
tend that a fifth grade classroom is a public forum 
traditionally devoted to speech and assembly.71 
The dismissal of a high school social studies teacher 
was upheld upon evidence that teacher had used the classroom 
for discussion of questionable topics such as teacher's 
personal opinions about union activities, approval of polygamy, 
criticism of marriage, castigation of fellow teachers, and 
72 proselytizing of students. 
When a high school band director was dismissed for 
remarks in class concerning sex, virginity, and premarital 
relations, a Florida court stated: 
....(W)e are still of the opinion that instructors in 
our schools should not be permitted to so risquely 
70 
Cooley v. Board of Education, 327 F. Supp. 454 (.1971) . 
^Burns v. Rovaldi, 477 F. Supp. 270 (1979) . 
72 Knarr v.'Board of School Trustees, 317 F. Supp. 832 
(1970), aff'd. 452 F. 2d 649 (7th Cir. 1971). 
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discuss sex problems in our teenage mixed classes 
as to cause embarrassment to the children or to 
invoke in them other feelings not incident to 
the courses of study being pursued.73 
Courses on sex education often create volatile reactions 
on the part of parents. Courts have tended to uphold legality 
of sex education courses when such courses are optional. 
The Hawaii Supreme Court ruled in 1970 that constitutional 
rights of students were not violated by sex education courses 
when parents had the option of not permitting children to 
74 attend. A New Jersey case held that a school board violated 
the constitutional rights of students when it required atten­
dance of children at a course entitled, "Human Sexuality." 
The court ruled that the course could be offered, but atten-
75 dance could not be required. 
The major emphasis of this chapter has been on liti­
gation concerning teacher rights with which the principal is 
most likely to be involved. No attention has been given to 
cases regarding reduction in force, collective bargaining, 
and teacher strikes, since these are not usually the result 
of actions of the principal. 
7̂ Pyle v. Washington County School Board, 238 So. 2d 
121 (1970). 
^Madeiros v. Kijosaki, 478 P. 2d 314 (1970). 
75Valent v. New Jersey State Board of Education, 274 
A. 2d 832 (1971). 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study was designed to review court cases of 
importance to school principals and to establish guidelines 
or recommendations which may be of benefit to school ad­
ministrators. Definite rules to fit every case cannot be 
established, since each decision relates only to the specific 
issues of a particular case and is subject to change. How­
ever, certain decisions establish legal precedent, and these 
cases will be used to recommend guidelines. 
Judicial Philosophies 
Most actions against principals are the result of 
alleged denial of constitutional rights. Based upon court 
rulings, it appears that the following judicial philosophies 
tend to control in court decisions: 
1. Each human being, whether child or adult, is im­
portant and has certain rights which must be protected. 
Prior to the late 1960's, this philosophy was not predominant 
in legal decisions, and the importance of children's rights 
was not recognized by the courts. However, in 1969, the 
United States Supreme Court recognized that students are 
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persons under the United States Constitution, who pos­
sess fundamental rights which must be respected by the state. 
2. Education is a right which must be made available 
to all on equal terms once a state chooses to provide an 
education for its citizens. Each person, whether child or 
adult, handicapped or gifted, married or unmarried, rich or 
poor, healthy or ill, is entitled to the opportunity to de­
velop and grow as a human being. 
3. The individual is more important than the state, 
as is provided in the Fourteenth Amendment. 
4. Each person is entitled to maintain personal dignity. 
Clothing and body searches of students have been held subject 
to at least minimum safeguards to prevent intrusion into 
students' privacy. 
Court rulings reported are those of the type which may 
involve actions of school administrators in the areas of 
First Amendment rights of students, personal appearance of 
students, suspension and expulsion, corporal punishment, 
search and seizure, rights of married and pregnant students 
or unwed mothers, rights of handicapped children, tort liability, 
and teacher rights. Research questions identified in Chapter 
I will be answered, findings summarized, and recommendations 
made in each of these areas. 
First Amendment Rights of Students 
Questions to be answered concerning First Amendment 
rights of students follow: 
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What are the areas most frequently involved in 
litigation concerning First Amendment rights of 
students, and what legal precedents have been 
established by the courts in these areas? 
Among the most frequently litigated cases pertaining 
to principals are those concerned with student wearing of 
insignia or emblems and the control of student publications. 
Court action has also been taken recently on the issue of 
freedom of expression of homosexuality views. 
Insignia and Emblems 
Legal precedents established by the courts were dis­
cussed in detail in the section on "First Amendment Rights 
of Students." 
Summary 
1. Where there was no evidence that student wearing 
of insignia or emblems materially and substantially inter­
fered with requirements of appropriate discipline in operation 
of the school and where student action was entirely divorced 
from actually or potentially disruptive conduct, courts up­
held the rights of students to wear armbands or other in­
signia and emblems. 
2. When there was evidence that student conduct ma­
terially disrupted classwork or involved substantial disorder 
or invasion of the rights of others, courts held that such 
conduct was not immunized by the constitutional guarantee 
of freedom of speech. 
Conclusions 
Courts will weigh the issue of infringement of personal 
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rights of expression against the concept of whether the 
exercise of such rights will materially and substantially 
interfere with requirements of appropriate discipline in 
operation of the school. 
Recommendations 
1. School authorities must not censure student wearing 
of insignia or emblems solely because of a desire to avoid 
unpleasantness which may arise as the result of expression 
of an unpopular viewpoint. If it does not appear that the 
wearing of insignia will substantially interfere with the 
work of the school or impinge on the rights of other students, 
the principal would probably be wise to ignore such student 
expression. 
2. If student wearing of insignia or emblems is to 
be censured, school administrators must be prepared to show 
a compelling reason for infringing upon First Amendment 
guarantees. There must be evidence that student expression 
materially and substantially interferes with or disrupts the 
school's educational environment. 
3. In addition to establishing a compelling reason 
for such censure, school administrators must establish fair 
procedures for implementing control action, and students 
must know of these procedures before they are applied. 
Publications 
Another area frequently involved in litigation con­
cerning First Amendment rights is that relating to publica­
tions. Legal precedents established in this area are discussed 
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below. 
Summary 
1. Courts have ruled that school authorities have 
the right to control the time, place, and manner of ex­
pressive activity, but the burden is upon school officials 
to tell students when, how, and where materials may be 
distributed, rather than requiring students to obtain ad­
ministrative approval of time, manner, and place of parti­
cular distribution. 
2. It has been concluded by the courts that school 
authorities may by appropriate regulation, exercise prior 
restraint upon publications distributed on school premises 
during school hours in those special circumstances where 
they can reasonably "forecast substantial disruption of or 
material interference with school activities" on account of 
such printed material. However, when prior approval of 
distribution is required, certain guidelines must be followed: 
a. A definite brief period of time must be 
specified within which review of submitted material 
will be completed. 
b. The policy must state to whom and how 
material is to be submitted for clearance. 
c. The policy must be clear as to what is 
meant by "distribution" of written material. 
d. There must be a provision that the policy 
will not operate until the school has established 
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and informed students of its review procedure. 
e. Criteria must be established to be 
followed by school authorities in determining 
whether to grant or deny permission for distribu­
tion, providing for prompt approval or disapproval 
of material submitted and providing for procedural 
safeguards in the form of an expeditious review 
procedure of school officials' decision. 
3. When there is a substantial basis for the belief 
that distribution of a publication will result in significant 
emotional harm to students, a school prohibition of distribu­
tion has been held to be constitutional. 
4. School authorities have the unquestioned right 
to ban obscene materials from school premises. However, the 
difficulty arises when one seeks a definition of "obscene" or 
"profane." Court definitions change often. Courts agree 
that school authorities can suppress materials from children 
which cannot be banned from the general public. 
5. Courts have held that the First Amendment forbids 
public school administrators from regulating material distributed 
off school grounds to which children are exposed prior to or 
after school. 
6. A school regulation permitting the halting of dis­
tribution on school premises of publications which encouraged 
actions to endanger health or safety of students was found not 
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to prohibit constitutionally protected conduct and not to 
be unconstitutional. 
Conclusions 
When school administrators have attempted to control 
publication and distribution of printed materials, the courts 
will be looking for evidence of substantial disruption or 
material interference with school activities, evidence of 
obscenity, a basis for belief that distribution of a publica­
tion will cause significant emotional harm to students, or 
evidence that such distribution will encourage actions to 
endanger health or safety of students. 
Recommendations 
1. The principal must exercise responsibility for 
seeing that students are aware of policies and required 
procedures prior to application within the school. (Policies 
concerning distribution of publications are usually established 
by school boards.) The principal should furnish students and 
parents with copies of board policies and explain policies to 
students. 
2. When it appears that a compelling reason has been 
established for implementing recommended control actions, 
the principal should consult with the school board attorney 
to be sure anticipated action is in keeping with board policy 
and constitutional requirements. 
Miscellaneous 
Student freedom to express views of homosexuality has-, 
been upheld. It appears that the principal should permit 
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a male student to bring another male to school activities 
such as proms, if such an issue arises. 
Personal Appearance of Students 
The question to be answered concerning personal ap­
pearance of students is: "Since the Supreme Court has not 
spoken on the issue of constitutionality of hair and dress 
codes, how have the various circuit courts of appeal ruled on 
codes governing personal appearance of students?." 
Summary 
As stated earlier, the United States Supreme Court has 
made no specific ruling on the issue of dress and hair codes, 
and most cases have been decided by United States circuit 
courts of appeal. The courts are divided on the question of 
constitutional protection of students' right to wear hair and 
dress as they choose. For a summary of rulings in the various 
courts of appeal, principals are referred to the chart of 
circuit holdings shown on page 92 of this study. 
Conclusions 
Circuit courts of appeal are divided in opinions as to 
dress and hair codes. However, there is a general trend 
toward a more liberal view regarding student dress and hair, 
with more courts accepting the idea that dress and hair are 
means of personal expression. 
Recommendations 
It is recommended that unless there is a compelling 
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reason for a hair or dress code, the principal should not 
establish such codes. Often, rules seeking to prohibit 
long hair on males or jeans on females serve to stimulate 
the conduct they seek to prevent. 
Suspension and Expulsion 
The questions this study seeks to answer in the area 
of suspension and expulsion are: 
What student rights are entitled to due process 
protection, and what procedures have been held 
by the courts to be required for suspension 
and expulsion?. 
Summary 
The United States Supreme Court has held that students 
have two interests which are entitled to due process protection. 
The first of these is the "property" interest in a free educa­
tion. When a state chooses to provide a free public education 
for children and requires them to attend school, children ac­
quire a property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, 
which cannot be taken away for misconduct without following 
minimum procedures required by the due process clause. 
The second interest which requires -due process protection 
is the "liberty" interest. The Supreme Court has concluded 
that suspensions of up to ten days could seriously damage 
students' standing with other pupils and teachers and interfere 
with opportunities for higher education and employment, thereby 
doing serious damage to students' "liberty." 
Short-Term Suspensions 
Minimum procedures outlined by the United States Supreme 
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Court for meeting requirements of due process in suspensions 
of ten days or less follow: 
1. Student must be given oral or written notice of 
charges against him. 
2. If student denies charges, he must be given 
explanation of evidence against him; and 
3. Student must be given opportunity to present his 
side of the story. 
According to United States Supreme Court ruling, it is 
not necessary that there be a delay between time notice is 
given and the hearing, so that in the majority of cases, the 
disciplinarian may discuss the alleged misconduct with the 
student informally within minutes after it has occurred. The 
student must be told what the accusation is and the basis of 
the accusation, and must be given the opportunity to explain 
his or her version of the facts. Since the hearing may occur 
almost immediately following misconduct, notice and hearing 
should preclude removal of student from school, although there 
are recurring situations in which prior notice and hearing 
cannot be insisted upon. Among these cases would be those 
where students' presence poses a continuing danger to persons 
or property or an ongoing threat of disruption of the academic 
process. In such instances, students may be removed from school 
immediately, with notice and rudimentary hearing to follow as 
soon as practicable. 
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Expulsions and Long-Term Suspensions 
Students may be suspended or expelled for conduct which 
disrupts the educational process or endangers the health or 
safety of students, classmates, or school personnel. Most 
disciplinary actions are based on a breach of school regula­
tions governing student conduct. Courts have ruled that 
school regulations must be drawn so that students will clearly 
understand what behavior is proscribed. 
Requirements of minimal due process in school suspensions 
or expulsions involve three main concerns: notice which is ade­
quate; a fair hearing; and substantial evidence to support the 
suspension or expulsion. 
Due process requirement of proper notice requires that a 
student be forewarned of conduct which will subject him or her 
to expulsion; that student and parents be given notice of 
charges and nature of evidence supporting those charges; that a 
student be advised when and where hearing will occur; and that a 
student be advised of procedural rights by the school prior 
to a hearing. 
Procedural requirements for a fair hearing include: 
a. Providing student with names of witnesses against 
him; 
b. Providing of report on facts to which each witness 
testifies; 
c. Providing student with opportunity to present de­
fense against charges; and 
d. Allowing student right to produce either oral 
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testimony or written affidavits of witnesses in his or her 
behalf. Courts are divided as to whether the student must be 
provided with a transcript of hearing upon request and whether 
due process requires student to have counsel. 
Disciplinary action should be taken only if charges 
are supported by "reasonable evidence." "Reasonable evidence" 
has been defined as such "relevant evidence as a reasonable 
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." 
Conclusions 
In short-term suspensions, courts will require that a 
student be provided with notice, explanation of evidence, 
and opportunity to present his or her side of story. In 
expulsions and long-term suspensions, courts will require 
adequate notice, a fair hearing, and substantial evidence 
to support suspension or expulsion. Courts will ascertain 
whether regulations are drawn so that students understand 
what behavior is proscribed. 
Recommendations 
1. Prior to the need for disciplinary action, the 
principal should study the language of school regulations 
carefully, to be sure that the intent of such regulations is 
clear and specific as to prohibited behavior; that they are 
in keeping with state statutes governing school discipline; 
that regulations are in writing; that there has been adequate 
publicity concerning regulations; and that regulations are 
understood by students and parents. 
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2. In addition to determining requirements imposed 
by state and federal constitutions, the principal must examine 
state statutes prior to taking action to suspend or expel 
a student, in order to be certain that proper procedures are 
being followed. 
3. The principal must consider the seriousness of 
action taken in determining whether procedures followed are 
adequate. The exactness and formality required by procedures 
in suspension or expulsion are directly proportional to the 
seriousness of the sanction imposed. 
4. The principal must insure that students and parents 
receive notice of charges against students and the nature of 
evidence supporting charges, preferably in writing. Notice 
should refer to the specific rule violated and indicate when 
and where a hearing on the charges will be held. The student 
should be given a minimum of five days' notice before a hearing 
on expulsion. 
5. The principal must see that student is informed of 
his procedural rights prior to hearing. This can be done by 
sending student a printed statement outlining the procedure 
along with notification of charges. If the school has a 
complete disciplinary and procedural code in its student 
handbook, sending student a copy of the handbook will satisfy 
this requirement. 
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6. The principal and others in authority must see that 
each student receives a fair hearing; that student is given 
the names of witnesses against him or her and a report of 
what they will testify, along with the opportunity to present 
a defense against charges and the right to produce oral 
testimony or written affidavits of witnesses in his or her 
behalf. 
7. If student believes that only an attorney can properly 
represent him or her, it is recommended that the school permit the 
student to have counsel. 
8. It is recommended that the school consider using a 
hearing panel for expulsion cases, consisting of a teacher, 
a parent, and a student. 
Corporal Punishment 
The question of concern dealing with corporal punishment 
is: "What do landmark cases of the Supreme Court hold concern­
ing corporal punishment in the schools?." 
Summary 
The courts have held that the "in loco parentis" con­
cept applies when pupils are in school. This doctrine pro­
vides that school authorities stand in place of parents while 
the child is in school, and may inflict reasonable corporal 
punishment on the pupil to enforce discipline. 
Legal principles derived from court cases indicate that 
any corporal punishment administered should conform with 
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statutory enactment; be for the purpose of correction 
without malice; not be so cruel or excessive as to leave 
permanent marks or injuries; and be suited to the age and 
sex of pupil. 
The United States Supreme Court has upheld the finding 
that the state has a "countervailing interest" in maintenance 
of order in the schools such that the right of teachers and 
school officials to administer reasonable punishment for 
disciplinary purposes is sustained. 
The United States Supreme Court has affirmed judgment 
of a lower court that disciplinary paddling of public school 
students does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment and that the due process 
clause does not require prior notice and a hearing before 
corporal punishment is administered. 
In a recent decision, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
indicated that infliction of corporal punishment can violate 
a student's substantive due process rights, asserting that 
the substantive due process inquiry must be whether the force 
applied caused injury so severe, was so disproportionate to 
need, and was so inspired by malice or sadism that it amounted 
to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official power which shocks 
the conscience. This ruling is significant, because under 
its provisions, a student can recover damages under 42 U. S. C., 
Section 1983, in the proper kind of case. 
While the United States Supreme Court has upheld the 
right of school officials to use corporal punishment, several 
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states have banned the use of corporal punishment through 
state statute or school board policy. In these states, its 
use is illegal. Some local school boards have also banned 
or restricted the use of corporal punishment. 
Conclusions 
The courts will uphold reasonable corporal punishment 
to enforce discipline, provided such punishment is permissible 
under state and local laws and policies. 
Recommendations 
1. The principal should become familiar with state 
statutes and state and local school board policies concerning 
corporal punishment, to be sure that any action taken conforms 
with state and local statutes and policies. 
2. The principal must insure that all school personnel 
with authority to administer corporal punishment are advised 
of the proper guidelines to follow. 
3. The principal must see that corporal punishment 
administered is consistent with statutory law and school board 
policies; is made for the purpose of correction; is not cruel 
or excessive; leaves no permanent or lasting injury; is appro­
priate to the age and sex of child; and involves use of an 
appropriate instrument. 
Search and Seizure 
In considering search and seizure in the public schools, 
the query is: "How does the Fourth Amendment apply to search 
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and seizure in the school setting?" 
Summary 
As stated previously, the Fourth Amendment provides 
that people have the right to be secure in persons, houses, 
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
During the 1970's, courts came to view public school officials 
as government officials operating "in loco parentis." It 
has been determined that the Fourth Amendment applies, but 
that the doctrine of "in loco parentis" lowers the standard 
applied to determine reasonableness of search when the search 
is conducted primarily by school officials to further school 
purposes. In developing this less stringent, "reasonable 
suspicion" standard., courts place more weight on the "in loco 
parentis" doctrine and the statutory responsibilities of school 
officials to protect safety and welfare of students. 
In analyzing a search to determine reasonableness, courts 
must weigh the danger of conduct against the student's right of 
privacy and the need to protect student from humiliation and 
psychological harms associated with the search. Some factors 
which warrant consideration are: child's age, history, and 
record in school; the seriousness and prevalence of the problem 
to which the search is directed; and the exigency requiring 
that an immediate, warrantless search be made. 
The Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable 
searches has usually been interpreted as permitting a search 
only when the person whose interests are involved consents, 
or there is probable cause to search and a warrant has been 
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issued to authorize the search, or there is probable cause 
and exigent circumstances such that taking time to obtain a 
warrant would frustrate the purpose of the search, or a valid 
arrest has been made and search is incident to arrest. 
In considering whether evidence is admissible in 
criminal proceedings, the courts consider whether the school 
official acted alone or in concert with police, why the search 
was instituted, and what place was searched. 
When school officials act alone and search is made for 
the purpose of enforcing student conduct rules, courts have 
held that the Fourth Amendment requires less stringent stan­
dards, and that contraband seized by school officials may be 
used in a court trial, provided the school can show "reasonable 
suspicion" or reasonable grounds. 
If a search is initiated by police and conducted jointly 
by school officials and police for the primary purpose of dis­
covering evidence of a crime, courts have tended to hold that 
search and seizure standards applicable in criminal cases must 
be met. However, when school officials, in seeking to maintain 
order and to determine whether a school regulation or criminal 
statute has been violated, have asked for police assistance in 
conducting a search, the lesser "reasonable suspicion" standard 
has usually been applied. 
The nature of the place searched may determine whether 
the\person had a reasonable expectation of privacy in that 
place. It appears that evidence seized by school officials from 
a student's locker without a warrant or the student's permission 
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may be introduced in a criminal trial, provided school offi­
cials had reasonable grounds for search. However, even if 
warrants are not required for locker searches by school 
officials, such searches cannot be classified as administrative 
unless the search is a general search of all lockers for the 
purpose of enforcing school regulations of health, safety, or 
order (searches for rotting food and missing library books, 
for example). 
While most courts have upheld the "reasonable suspicion" 
standard in testing the legality of a search of the student's 
person, as searches become more intrusive, involving strip 
searches, it is evident that the standard rises. The Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals, while upholding the "reasonable sus­
picion" standard in a 1979 case, stated that as the intrusiveness 
of the search intensifies, the standard of Fourth Amendment 
"reasonableness" approaches probable cause, even in the school 
context. 
An Indiana district court held that a nude search of 
a student solely upon continued alert of a trained, drug-
detecting canine was unreasonable. A strip search of a class 
where school officials had no facts to particularize with 
respect to which pupil might have possessed stolen money, 
was found to be invalid under the Fourth Amendment. 
The United States Supreme Court has not decided any 
cases governing Fourth Amendment rights of public school students. 
The law relating to balancing of students' constitutional rights 
and the interests of the state in maintaining order and disci­
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pline in the public school is one of the most rapidly changing 
areas of school law. 
Conclusions 
When school searches are made, courts will weigh the 
danger of student conduct against student's right of privacy, 
and need to protect student from humiliation and psychological 
harms associated with search. When school officials act alone 
and make search for the purpose of enforcing student conduct, 
upon reasonable suspicion or reasonable grounds, courts will 
likely hold that less stringent standards are required and 
that contraband seized may be used in a court trial. However, 
if school officials conduct search jointly with police for 
purpose of discovering evidence of a crime, it is probable 
that courts will require search and seizure standards appli­
cable in criminal cases. As searches become more intrusive, 
involving strip searches, courts will require that probable 
cause be present. 
Recommendations 
The following recommendations have been suggested by 
Robert E. Phay: 
1. Students should be made aware that lockers are sub­
ject to periodic searches for contraband and rule violation. 
2. When a search focuses on a particular student be­
cause of a rule violation, school officials should record 
reasons for believing the search is justified, before the 
fact. 
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3. If possible, student's consent to the search should 
be obtained prior to search. School officials would be in a 
better position if they had asked and received consent than 
if they had searched without consent. 
4. If a student's locker is being searched, the student 
should be present. 
5. The searcher should have a witness present. 
6. If a major reason for search is to provide information 
for criminal prosecution, information should be reported to law 
enforcement officers, with the request that they conduct the 
search subject to standards applicable to police search. 
7. If police seek to search to obtain evidence for 
criminal prosecution, the principal should require a search 
warrant before search is made. 
8. Under no condition should the principal approve 
a strip search without a search warrant. 
Other recommendations follow: 
1. The principal must be sure student conduct codes 
contain policies on grounds for suspension and expulsion; 
that policies are clear; that policies are specific as to 
categories of conduct for which disciplinary action will be 
carried out; that procedures for dealing with violation of 
rules of conduct are clear; that due process rights are 
enumerated; and that students and parents receive a copy of 
the student code. 
2. The principal should take steps to see that students' 
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privacy is protected, making certain that teachers and 
other personnel are aware of rules concerning search of 
students and their property. 
Marriage and Parenthood 
In researching court cases dealing with marriage and 
parenthood, the investigator sought to answer the following 
questions: 
What principles have been established by the courts 
on prohibition of school attendance for married 
students and unwed mothers or pregnant students, 
and what principles have been established dealing 
with denial of the right to participate in extra­
curricular activities by married student?. 
Summary 
Courts have established the principle that students 
cannot be prohibited from school attendance on a permanent 
basis solely because of marriage. It has also been judicially 
determined that a school board cannot compel school attendance 
of married students. 
Courts have invalidated school board rules prohibiting 
school attendance by unwed mothers or pregnant, unwed girls. 
The position of the courts seems to be that such girls should 
be given the opportunity for rehabilitation and future education. 
Since 1972, a number of courts have found school board 
rules barring participation of married students in extra­
curricular activities to be unconstitutional. 
Conclusions 
Courts will not uphold the actions of principals or 
school boards in denying married students the opportunity to 
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attend school or to participate in extracurricular activities. 
Neither will courts uphold the right of schools to prohibit 
pregnant students or unwed mothers from school attendance. 
Recommendations 
Based upon court findings, it is recommended that prin­
cipals see that married and pregnant students or unwed mothers 
are afforded the same right to school attendance as other 
students, and that students not be denied the right to par­
ticipate in extracurricular activities because of marriage. 
Rights of Handicapped Children 
The questions under study concerning handicapped chil­
dren are: "What rights have been upheld by the courts for 
handicapped children, and what protections for the handicapped 
have been provided by legislation?." 
Summary 
Courts have established the right of handicapped chil­
dren to equality of educational opportunity. Courts have 
ordered states to provide individually designed instructional 
programs appropriate to needs of handicapped and other "special" 
children. 
In 1972, the courts stated that due process of law re­
quires a hearing before children labeled as behavioral problems, 
mentally retarded, emotionally disturbed, or hyperactive, are 
suspended or expelled from regular schooling in publicly sup­
ported schools or reassigned for specialized instruction. 
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Several courts have made rulings concerning expulsion 
of handicapped children, implying in one instance that expul­
sion cannot be used by administrators to handle handicapped 
children's problems; indicating in another that before a dis­
ruptive, handicapped child can be expelled, it must be deter­
mined whether the child's handicap caused the propensity to 
disrupt; and in a third, that expulsion procedures must in­
clude reevaluation of the child by a diagnostic-educational 
team, a report and recommendation from the team to the school 
board, and determination as to whether an alternative place­
ment would meet the needs of the child. 
The right to procedural due process has been established 
by the courts. According to Turnbull, the handicapped child 
and parents have the right to be notified in advance before 
the school takes action with respect to the child's educational 
claims, including the right to a hearing before an impartial 
tribunal, the right to have a case presented by counsel and 
expert witnesses, right to confront and cross-examine wit­
nesses, right of access to school records, right to have the 
tribunal's decision based on evidence presented, and right of 
appeal. 
A landmark in legislation concerning education for the 
handicapped is Public Law 94-142, the federal "Education for 
All Handicapped Children" act, which mandates that states 
provide a free public education for all handicapped children 
between the ages of three and eighteen years. This law has 
four major purposes, as follows: 
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1. To guarantee availability of special education 
programming to handicapped children and youth who require it. 
2. To assure fairness and appropriateness in decision­
making to provide special education to handicapped children 
and youth. 
3. To establish clear management and auditing require­
ments and procedures for special education at all governmental 
levels. 
4. To assist efforts of state and local governments 
through federal funds. 
Penalty for failure to comply with this mandate is loss 
of current federal funding and loss of eligibility to receive 
future funding. 
Public Law 94-142 requires that an individualized educational 
program (IEP) be devised for each child in special education, 
with contents to include: 
1. Statement of child's level of educational performance. 
2. Yearly goals and short-term instructional objectives 
which will contribute to annual goals. 
3. A statement of amount of time child will be able to 
participate in a regular education program. 
4. A statement of the educational services to be provided. 
5. A statement of appropriate criteria, evaluation 
procedures, and schedules. 
6. The date services will be initiated and the anticipated 
length of time such services will continue. 
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It has been ruled by a court of appeals that a plan 
for clean instrument catherization must be included in the 
IEP as a "supportive service" for a child suffering from a 
neurogenic bladder. The court stated that failure to include 
such a plan in the IEP violated provision of Rehabilitation 
Act of 197 3, which mandated that no otherwise qualified in­
dividual should be excluded from participation in any program 
or activity receiving federal financial assistance by reason 
of handicap. 
Public Law 94-142 also requires that handicapped chil­
dren be placed in classes with nonhandicapped children to 
the maximum extent possible. 
Conclusions 
Courts will require that handicapped children be 
granted a hearing prior to suspension, expulsion, or reassign­
ment for specialized instruction. School officials must be 
able to show that proper study has been provided by a qualified 
team to determine whether the child's needs will be met. The 
courts will require that provision be made for "supportive ser­
vices" necessary to enable handicapped children to participate 
in school program. 
Recommendations 
1. The principal should supervise placement of handi­
capped students to insure protection of their constitutional 
rights; to see that actions are in compliance with federal 
and state laws; and to see that policies of the state and 
local boards of education are followed. 
227 
2. Administrative supervision should insure that 
temporal and procedural guidelines are followed in identi­
fication and placement of handicapped students in special 
programs.. 
3. Provision must be made for "supportive services" 
required by the handicapped to allow handicapped students to 
benefit from public education. 
4. Parents must be involved in writing an IEP for 
the handicapped child and must be informed of rights (including 
right to procedural due process, right of access to informa­
tion on child, and right to privacy for information on child). 
5. Parents must receive written notice when the school 
acts or fails to act upon a child's placement. 
6. Hie principal should assume responsibility for seeing 
that placement provided is beneficial for the child and at 
the same time, that it is in the least restrictive environment, 
as nearly like the regular program as possible and no more 
intensive than is needed. 
7. The principal must see that an IEP is written for 
all children receiving special education services. 
Tort Liability 
In examining cases in the area of tort liability, 
the investigator sought to answer the following: 
What legal decisions have been made in tort liability 
actions having to do with lack of supervision, im­
proper or inadequate instruction, failure to exercise 
responsibilties properly, field trips, and accounta­
bility, and what implications do these decisions have 
for the school principal?. 
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Summary 
A summary of findings concerning legal decisions made 
in tort liability cases follows: 
There are two major categories of torts, intentional 
and negligence. This study concentrates on negligence torts, 
since the principal is more likely to be involved in cases 
regarding negligence. 
Negligence is defined as the "failure to act as a 
reasonable and prudent person would act under like circumstances." 
When actions fall below the standard of care expected of a 
"reasonable and prudent" person, resulting in an injury, negli­
gence is established. School officials are expected to take 
reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which they could 
reasonably foresee would be likely to cause injury. 
In considering foreseeability, courts have held that 
it is necessary only to prove that a general danger was fore­
seeable, and not the particular accident which occurred. 
Courts have held that if harm which results is caused by 
intervention of factors which form no part of recognizable 
risk, defendants are not ordinarily liable. 
It has long been held in the common law that a school 
district is immune from liability by reason of torts committed 
by itself or its employees, although this doctrine has been 
modified through legislative and judicial action in recent 
years. The United States Supreme Court, for example, has 
indicated that Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 
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creates a species of tort liability which on its face allows 
no immunities. 
While principals and other school officials have sought 
to use governmental immunity as a defense in court, most 
courts have ruled that employees of the school district are 
not protected by governmental immunity of the school district 
against liability arising from personal negligence toward stu­
dents . 
Court actions seeking damages have been filed against 
principals and school officials for common law torts, consti­
tutional torts, and learning torts. 
Common Law Torts 
Litigation against principals and teachers in common 
law torts most often involves lack of supervision, improper 
or inadequate instruction, failure to exercise responsibilities 
properly and field trips. 
Lack of Supervision 
Principals are expected to supervise teachers as well 
as students. In a case of significance to principals, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court upheld a jury finding of negligence 
on the part of a school principal when evidence indicated that 
principal had not fulfilled his responsibility to develop, ad­
minister, and supervise a physical education program properly. 
The court noted that principal took no action to administer or 
supervise physical education curriculum or to supervise a new 
teacher except to furnish teacher with a curriculum bulletin. 
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In several cases, the courts have found principal 
and teachers negligent when supervision of students has 
been inadequate or nonexistent. The courts have made it 
clear that the principal has a responsibility and duty to 
take action when a situation is encountered in which a 
reasonably prudent person would foresee possibility of in­
jury to a student. 
Improper or Inadequate Instruction 
Judgments have been awarded by the courts against 
principals and teachers for negligence as the result of in­
adequate instruction in performance of an activity and failure 
to instruct in safety rules. 
Failure to Exercise Responsibilities Properly 
School principals are responsible for inspecting build­
ings, equipment, and grounds, and for reporting hazardous 
conditions for correction. Courts have held that when hazards 
are not corrected immediately, school officials are responsi­
ble for seeing that students are protected from danger. 
Field Trips 
Court decisions reveal that the principles of tort 
law which apply at school are also applicable to field trips. 
Both the "reasonable and prudent" test and the "foreseeability" 
test have been applied by the courts in actions for damages 
arising out of field trips. 
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Constitutional Torts 
The Civil Rights Act of 1871, Section 1983, providing 
that school board members and school administrators who de­
prive employees and students of their constitutional rights 
may be personally liable, has been upheld by the United States 
Supreme Court. However, the Court has ruled that student 
plaintiffs in actions brought under Section 1983 are entitled 
to receive only nominal damages unless there is proof of 
actual injury. 
Learning Torts 
In recent years, actions have been brought by students, 
seeking damages for educational negligence. Claims for damages 
based on educational negligence have been defeated by the 
courts in the three major cases, with the courts indicating 
that there are no readily acceptable standards of care, cause, 
or injury in classroom methodology. It was also recognized 
that the achievement or failure of literacy is influenced 
by many factors outside the formal teaching process and beyond 
its control. However, the idea of holding schools accountable 
for educational negligence seems to be gaining acceptance. 
Conclusions 
It is likely that the courts will hold school administra­
tors responsible for negligence when evidence is clear that 
the principal has failed to exercise responsibility to act 
to prevent the injury of a student where a reasonably prudent 
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person could have foreseen possibilities of injury. This is 
particularly true where there is lack of supervision, improper 
or inadequate instruction, and failure to exercise responsi­
bilities properly. Principals who deprive employees or 
students of their constitutional rights are likely to be 
held personally liable. While it is unlikely that principals 
will be held responsible for student lack of learning at the 
present time, legal trends which will develop in the future 
are uncertain. It is quite possible that educational negli­
gence will become a viable basis for litigation within the 
near future. 
Recommendations 
1. The principal should see that teachers are aware 
of the necessity for adequate supervision, instruction as 
to performance of activities, and instruction in safety 
rules. 
2. The principal should work closely with new teachers 
in order to see that they recognize the danger in activities 
taught and to ascertain whether teachers know how to teach 
safety rules and safe performance of activities. 
3. The principal must be constantly looking for areas 
or activities which may be dangerous to students. Safety 
rules should be adopted regulating areas of vehicular traffic 
on school grounds. 
4. The principal should inspect buildings, equipment, 
and grounds regularly, with a view toward identifying and 
reporting hazardous conditions for correction. Records 
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should be kept of equipment and facility inspection, noting 
date and recommendations made for repair. 
5. If there is a delay in eliminating hazards, the 
principal must advise students, teachers, and others of 
the danger and take action to protect them from injury. 
6. The principal must see that adequate supervision 
is provided for all field trips and should instruct teachers 
to inform students of safety rules to be followed. 
7. The principal should urge teachers to recommend 
testing and evaluation for students needing special services. 
8. The principal should provide special help for 
students with academic deficiencies or weaknesses. 
9. The principal should closely supervise the place­
ment of children in special programs to insure that reevaluation 
occurs at yearly intervals, so that if they are misplaced, 
action can be taken to provide education in the best environ­
ment for each student. 
10. The principal must take an active part in evaluating 
teachers and in providing help for weak teachers. 
11. The principal must exercise the courage to see that 
unsatisfactory probationary teachers do not become tenured 
teachers. 
12. The principal should document performance inade­
quacies of poor teachers and take action to replace them with 
qualified teachers. 
13. The principal must take a more active role in 
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curriculum development and enactment to be sure students 
are receiving the skills they need. 
Teacher Rights 
In researching cases concerning teacher rights, this 
study sought to answer the following question: 
What teacher rights are recognized by the courts in 
cases involving teacher dismissal for incompetency, 
immorality, insubordination, and neglect of duty; 
teacher tenure; First Amendment rights; due process; 
and academic freedom?. 
A summary of the findings follows: 
Summary 
Most state requirements provide for a probationary 
period for professional personnel, during which the employee 
is observed and evaluated to determine whether to recommend 
tenure. When tenure is granted, the employee is construed 
to have the right of employment for a continuing or indefinite 
period of time, subject to removal only for a cause prescribed 
by state law. Although statutes vary in stipulating causes for 
dismissal of teachers, among the most frequently mentioned 
causes are incompetency, immorality, insubordination, and 
neglect of duty. 
Incompetency 
Court decisions have indicated that when a principal 
seeks dismissal of a tenured teacher on grounds of incom­
petency, chances of success are greater if detailed documenta­
tion of performance difficulties has been made. Evidence 
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supporting dismissal for incompetency carries more weight when 
the teacher is afforded ample opportunity for correction of 
ineffective performance. Some state statutes require notice 
of deficiencies and a time period for correction before a teach­
er can be dismissed for incompetency. 
When procedural requirements are met, courts usually con­
sider substantiated deficiencies and failure to correct them 
sufficient cause for termination. However, incompetency is not 
measured in a vacuum nor against a standard of perfection, but 
against the standard required of others performing the same or 
similar tasks. 
Immorality 
Indications from recent decisions are that courts are 
moving toward a more restricted definition of "immorality" 
than in the past, almost equating immorality with sexual mis­
conduct. Recent cases have been decided on the basis of impact 
on school rather than some pre-existing social norm. Teachers' 
private lives are usually protected from employer interference 
unless an adverse impact can be shown on the school. 
Factors to be considered in determining whether immoral 
conduct renders a teacher unfit to teach were identified by a 
district court in California as age and maturity of students; 
likelihood of adverse effect upon students or other teachers; 
degree of anticipated adversity; time of conduct; circumstances; 
likelihood of repetition of conduct; motives underlying conduct; 
and whether the conduct would have a chilling effect on the 
rights of the teacher involved or other teachers. 
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Insubordination 
Insubordination is the most frequently cited reason for 
removing teachers. Courts, in upholding teachers' dismissal 
for insubordination, have recognized that teachers' chronic 
refusal to comply with administrative obligations can have a 
disruptive effect on students, teacher, and administrators, 
and poses a threat to an optimum learning environment. 
Neglect of Duty 
When neglect of duty is alleged and proven, courts 
rarely reverse dismissals unless legally incorrect or inade­
quate procedures are followed. Courts will protect the exer­
cise of federal constitutional and statutory rights, but it 
is evident that they will not ignore substantial neglect of 
duty or abuse of position. 
Teachers have filed actions in court in a large number 
of cases concerning teacher tenure, First Amendment rights, 
due process, and academic freedom. 
Teacher Tenure 
The courts have made it known that personnel decisions 
must be free from constitutional violations. The United States 
Supreme Court found that no hearing was required for a non-
tenured teacher unless failure to rehire would seriously damage 
the teacher's standing and associations in the community, impose 
a stigma upon the teacher which would foreclose future opportuni­
ties to practice the teaching profession; or directly violate 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech. The Supreme Court 
also ruled that an untenured teacher was entitled to notice 
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of charges and a hearing where the teacher would have the oppor­
tunity to refute charges, when he had achieved de facto tenure 
(through employment for four successive years under a series 
of one-year contracts), and when nonrenewal of teacher's con­
tract may have been due to exercise of free speech rights. 
A two-step procedure was suggested by the United States 
Supreme Court in Mt. Healthy, when the Court indicated that a 
teacher must show that free speech activity was a substantial 
or motivating factor in the board's decision not to rehire, 
and that if this proof is produced, the school board must 
establish that the board would have reached the same decision 
in the absence of the protected behavior. 
First Amendment Rights 
Public employment is a benefit which cannot be condi­
tioned upon denial of constitutional rights. A plaintiff's 
claim under the First Amendment is not defeated by the fact 
that he or she does not have tenure. Even though an employee 
could be discharged for no reason and had no constitutional 
right to a hearing, that person may establish a claim to re­
instatement if a decision not to rehire was made by reason of 
exercise of constitutionally protected First Amendment freedoms. 
Under the free speech clause of the First Amendment, 
a teacher's exercise of the right to speak on issues of public 
importance cannot furnish the basis for a teacher's dismissal 
from public employment, in the absence of proof of false 
statements knowingly or recklessly made by the teacher. 
238 
Not only must evidence establish that a particular ex­
pression is protected by the First Amendment, but it must be 
proven that the constitutionally protected conduct was a moti­
vating or substantial factor in the school district's decision 
not to rehire. 
As conduct becomes less and less like "pure speech," 
the showing of governmental interest required for its regula­
tion is progressively lessened. 
Even when a teacher is not discharged, but is merely 
transferred to another school with no loss of pay, seniority, 
or other rights, a retaliatory transfer for constitutionally 
protected free speech can trigger First Amendment rights. 
Due Process 
"Property" and "liberty" interests are two concepts 
which govern due process claims in public employment. A plain­
tiff must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to continued 
employment arising from state law to have a property interest. 
A claim to entitlement may be established by express statutory 
or contractual terms or by agreements which may be implied 
from promisor's words and conduct as related to usage of the 
past. Generally, courts recognize that a property interest 
exists if, by statute, rul^ or contract, express or implied, 
an employee can be fired only for "cause." 
The protected liberty interest can take two forms. The 
first is where "a person's good name, reputation, honor, or 
integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing 
to him." In such a case, the discharged teacher is entitled to 
due process. To trigger due process, charges must be made 
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publicly by the governmental entity. 
The second form of liberty interest has been determined 
when the government employer imposed a stigma or disability 
which foreclosed an employee's freedom to take advantage of 
other employment opportunities, thereby entitling the employee 
to due process. 
Academic Freedom 
In recent years, teachers have asserted rights of aca­
demic freedom under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and 
have received protection of the courts for rights. Teachers' 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech and expression were 
recognized in Tinker, although the Court cautioned that such 
rights may be limited because of the unique nature of a school. 
Teaching of controversial, irrelevant material can result in 
dismissal of teachers. 
When a teacher instituted a "pen pal" program through 
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which his students received letters from his fiancee espousing 
communism, the court held that the interest of the board in pro­
hibiting sectarian or partisan instruction at fifth grade level 
outweighed the teacher's interest in First Amendment rights. 
The court indicated that it would be ridiculous to contend 
that a fifth grade classroom is a public forum devoted to 
speech and assembly. 
Courts have tended to uphold the legality of sex educa­
tion courses when they are made optional. A New Jersey court held 
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that a school board violated constitutional rights of students 
when the board required attendance of children at a course on 
human sexuality, stating that the course could be offered, 
but not required. 
Conclusions 
When procedural requirements are met, courts will likely 
consider documented, substantiated deficiencies on the part 
of a teacher and failure to correct them sufficient cause 
for termination. In upholding teacher dismissals on the basis 
of immorality, courts will decide cases on the basis of whether 
there is an adverse impact upon the school. When insubordina­
tion or neglect of duty is alleged and proven, courts will 
uphold dismissals of teachers unless legally incorrect or 
inadequate procedures are followed. 
Courts will not condone constitutional violations in 
personnel decisions. When property or liberty interests 
exist, courts will require due process for teachers. 
Courts will uphold teachers' constitutional rights to 
freedom of speech and expression, although courts state that 
such rights are limited because of the unique nature of the 
school. 
Recommendations 
The following recommendations are made to principals 
for dealing with the rights of teachers: 
1. The principal must be aware of state statutes and 
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policies of state and local boards of education. 
2. If a teacher's performance is unsatisfactory, or 
if the teacher refuses to obey instructions, the principal 
must document the teacher's behavior in writing, taking the 
following steps: 
a. The principal must confer with the teacher 
about inadequacies and establish specific expecta­
tions for the teacher to follow. These expectations 
should be in the form of instructions rather than 
recommendations. The principal should direct the 
teacher as to what is to be done. After discussion 
with the teacher, a letter should be written to the 
teacher, reviewing what was said. 
b. The principal should provide help to the 
teacher through suggestions and all available resources, 
in an effort to facilitate improvement on the part of 
the teacher. The teacher should be afforded ample 
time for correction of problems. If state statutes 
set out a definite time period, statutory requirements 
should be followed. 
c. The principal should make frequent visits to a 
teacher's classroom for observation and should in­
volve other resource people in observation. Visits 
should be documented in writing, with follow-up 
conferences provided to discuss the visits and make sug­
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gestions for improvement with the teacher. It 
would be advisable to have a witness present 
during conferences. 
d. All help provided to teacher should be 
documented in writing. 
e. Follow-up letters should be written to 
teacher reviewing problems identified during 
visits and observation, and setting out specific 
instructions to be followed by the teacher as a 
result of the report. 
3. The principal should not attempt to take action 
seeking dismissal when a teacher has made a true statement 
protected by the First Amendment, even though the principal 
is offended by the statement. 
4. The principal must be certain that the standard 
required of the teacher for whom dismissal is sought is the same 
as that required for other teachers in the school. 
General Recommendations 
If the principal wishes to avoid involvement in liti­
gation, the general suggestions below may be of help: 
1. The principal should work with teachers to provide 
an inviting school environment, where students feel that they 
are respected, worthwhile, and valuable persons. 
2. The principal should work with the teaching staff 
to see that classroom instruction has meaning and relevance 
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for students and that learning is offered in a manner which 
will enhance each student's self-image. 
3. The principal should work with teachers to see 
that there is adequate supervision of students at all times, 
particularly outside the classroom. Someone should be present 
to supervise in the hallways and in other places frequented 
by students. 
4. The principal should work on developing a good 
relationship with teachers, through showing a genuine interest 
in them and through reinforcing their efforts at good teaching. 
5. The principal should seek to let teachers and stu­
dents know what is expected of them. Expectations should 
always be positive. 
6. The principal should reinforce positive behavior 
on the part of students and teacher. 
7. The principal should seek to be fair to everyone. 
Recommendations for Further Study 
It is recommended that studies of legal aspects of 
the school principalship be made for each state. Since 
state statutes and state court rulings differ, it would be 
beneficial for principals to have guidelines based upon state 
statutes and judicial decisions as well as those available 
from this study. 
Research dealing with the rights of the principal as 
recognized by the courts would also be helpful. This study 
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has been concerned with student and teacher rights, which 
must be recognized by the principal, and with which the 
principal must know how to deal. However, the principal 
would also be interested in knowing more about the rights 
of principals concerning administrative tenure, dismissal, 
demotion, or transfer, First Amendment rights, due process 
rights, the right to file counter suits in tort liability 
cases, and other rights. 
National, state, and local governments are taking action 
to cut spending which may eliminate principals' positions. For 
this reason, there is a need for greater awareness of legal 
rights. 
In view of the rise of teacher militancy in recent years, 
a study of the role of the principal in collective bargaining 
might be of value. 
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